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The link between the cost of equity and reinsurance purchased by insurers is 
examined in this study. This work extends the research on the economic value 
implications of corporate risk management practices. Utilising a framework based 
on the theory of optimal capital structure, this study puts forward two hypotheses 
to test empirically the cost of equity – reinsurance relation in the United Kingdom’s 
non-life insurance market. The first hypothesis tests the effect of the decision to 
reinsure on the insurers’ cost of equity, whereas the second hypothesis focuses on 
the link between the extent of reinsurance purchased and the cost of equity. Panel 
data samples drawn from 469 non-life insurance companies conducting business 
in the UK insurance market between 1985 and 2010 are used to test these 
hypotheses. The study employs a modified version of the Rubinstein-Leland (R-L) 
model to estimate the cost of equity.  
Both the hypotheses put forward are supported by the empirical evidence obtained 
through regression analysis. The empirical results suggest that, on average, users 
of reinsurance have a lower cost of equity than their counterparts who do not 
reinsure. The results also suggest that the relationship between the cost of equity 
and the level of reinsurance purchased is non-linear. It is inferred from this result 
that reinsurance can lower the cost of equity for primary insurers provided the cost 
of reinsuring is lower than the reduction in frictional costs achieved through 
reinsurance. This finding validates the use of the theory of optimal capital structure 
as the appropriate framework to guide this research. Robustness and sensitivity 
tests confirm that the influence of multicollinearity and endogeneity on the 
estimates is negligible.  This study thus provides new and important insights on 
the impact of reinsurance (risk management) on firm value through its influence on 
the cost of equity. These findings are deemed useful to various stakeholders in 
insurance companies, including investors, managers, regulators, credit rating 
agencies and policyholder-customers. 
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 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1.
1.1  Research Background 
Mayers and Smith (1990) contend that the decision of direct insurers to procure 
reinsurance is analogous to the purchasing of insurance by non-financial firms1. 
Several reasons have been reported in the literature to explain the corporate 
purchasing of reinsurance2. These include: the need to increase the underwriting 
capacity and facilitate the spreading of assumed risks (Adams, 1996), to reduce 
the bankruptcy risk and avoid regulatory intervention in the event of a severe loss 
(Hoerger, Sloan and Hassan, 1990); to improve reported earnings (Adiel, 1996); to 
reduce expected taxes (Adams, Hardwick and Zou, 2008); to mitigate agency 
problems such as the underinvestment incentive (Garven and MacMinn, 1993); 
the provision of real advisory services (Cole and McCullough, 2006); and to signal 
the surety of the economic condition to the financial markets (Plantin, 2006). Like 
non-financial firms, property-liability insurers are mainly financed by shareholders 
who expect to earn a ‘fair’ market return on their invested capital.3 However, as 
Krvavych and Sherris (2006) report, frictional costs (e.g. taxes and transaction 
costs) mean that shareholder value is more likely to be enhanced by managing 
underwriting risks than by creating value from managing investment portfolios. In 
                                            
1 (Risk) reinsurance involves a primary insurer ceding a share of its annual premiums on a 
block of underwritten business to a reinsurance company in return for the reinsurer 
assuming an agreed proportion of losses that may arise (Berger, Cummins and Tennyson, 
1992). In contrast, financial reinsurance invariably involves reinsurance companies 
providing primary insurers with an upfront capital sum representing the net present value 
(NPV) of liabilities with the level of premiums linked to future claims and profit emergence 
(Adiel, 1996).  
 
2 Powell and Sommer (2007) report that in the United States (US) property-liability 
insurance market approximately 80 per cent of annual reinsurance business is conducted 
within conglomerate groups rather than externally in the reinsurance market. Adams and 
Diacon (2006) estimate a similar percentage (approximately 75%) for reinsurance 
conducted in the United Kingdom’s (UK) property-liability insurance market. 
 
3 For example, Adams and Diacon (2006) report that approximately 95 percent of annual 
net premiums in the UK’s property-liability insurance market are written by stock 
companies. A ‘fair’ market return in this context is defined as a return in excess of the 
market cost of equity (e.g., see Shimpi, 2002). 
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finance theory, the optimal use of (re)insurance can manifest itself by reducing the 
corporate cost of capital and so increase the shareholders’ wealth by generating 
economic value in excess of the cost of capital (e.g., see Shimpi, 2002). Not only 
this, the management of underwriting risks is vital for insurers to outperform 
competition in the product-markets they operate in. As Froot (2007) suggests, 
insurers and reinsurers are not only subjected to the investment risk, but also to 
the product market imperfections arising from the inability of policyholder-
customers to efficiently diversify insurable risks. Survey evidence provided by 
Wakker, Thaler and Tversky (1997) and Merton (1993) suggests that customers 
deeply (and disproportionately) discount the premium for an insurance contract for 
any increase in the probability of default on the part of the insurer. Hence, 
reinsurance can enable the insurer to command higher market premiums by 
reducing the probability of a default. On the other hand, reinsurance can be 
expensive. For example, Froot (2001) finds that due to market frictions (e.g., 
information asymmetries and agency costs) the price of catastrophe reinsurance 
coverage in the US property-liability insurance market often exceeds the actuarial 
value of expected losses. Schrand and Unal (1998) also opine that because of the 
transaction costs involved, the hedging (reinsurance) of core risks can have a 
deleterious effect on firm value. Therefore, rather than reduce the cost of capital 
(increase firm value) reinsurance could increase the cost of capital (reduce firm 
value). It is therefore imperative to reconcile these conflicting arguments to 
comprehend the effect of reinsurance on the cost of the equity of the insurers. This 
is the key motivation underlying this study.  
1.2 Rationale for the Research Project 
During the past three decades, the increasing frequency and severity of 
environmental perils, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods have resulted in 
wide-scale losses for the property-liability insurance industry. For instance, the 
cost of insured losses resulting from super-storm Sandy in 2012, the Japanese 
earthquake and tsunami in 2011, and hurricane Katrina in 2005 are estimated to 
be USD 28 billion (Mortimer, 2013), USD 35 billion (Bevere, Enz, Mehlhorn and 
Tamura, 2012) and USD 41 billion (Knabb, Rhome and Brown, 2005) respectively. 
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Man-made disasters too have proven costly for the insurance industry. In fact, one 
of the largest property-liability claims in history was caused by the September 11 
terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 with insured losses estimated at approximately 
USD 40 billion (Makinen, 2002). Moreover, the magnitude and frequency of losses 
caused by both natural and manmade disasters is likely to increase over time due 
to the increased severity and frequency of natural disasters resulting from climate 
change, and the emergence of new man-made perils such as cyber-terrorism 
(Froot, 1999; Lewis and Murdock, 1996). Indeed, Bevere et al. (2012) report that 
combined economic losses on the global scale due to all the disasters in 2011 
were estimated at over USD 370 billion. This figure is the largest ever recorded in 
history, with an increase of approximately 64% over USD 226 billion of losses 
recorded in 2010.  
This trend of rising losses from catastrophes has serious implications for the 
insurance industry, as it can undermine the capital adequacy of insurers to service 
the claims of existing customers and to underwrite new business. Moreover, for 
other stakeholders, such as policyholders and investors, this possibility can 
potentially threaten their contractual benefits as it implies an increase in 
insurance companies’ insolvency risk and a decrease in their profitability. 
According to Jean-Baptiste and Santomero (2000) these concerns have resulted 
in an increased interest amongst managers, reinsurers, regulators, and others in 
better understanding the risk management and pricing techniques within the 
insurance industry. For property-liability (non-life) insurers, an improved 
understanding of risk-bearing and risk-financing is particularly important due to the 
potential geographical and product-market concentration of risks and the 
uncertainty associated with assessing and accurately pricing these risk exposures 
due to a lack of sufficient data and limited risk (actuarial) modelling procedures. 
Prior research (e.g., Doherty, 2000; Doherty, 2005; Doherty and Tinic, 1981; 
O'Brien, 2006; Scotti, 2005) suggests that corporate financing and (re)insurance 
decisions are inextricably bound and that investigating this issue empirically could 
yield interesting insights into the determinants of firm value in insurance markets. 
For example, Doherty and Tinic (1981) show that reinsurance can reduce the 
probability of ruin for direct insurance writers and allow them to charge higher 
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premiums than would otherwise be the case, thereby increasing expected returns 
for shareholders. Launie (1971) also notes that knowledge of the cost of capital 
can help insurance managers to make more informed portfolio and capital 
structure decisions, and better manage financial risks. The cost of equity being an 
integral element of the overall cost of capital of a firm, its relationship with 
reinsurance is also important from the perspective of maximising the traded value 
of an insurer. As Sharfman and Fernando (2008) suggest, in the context of a firm’s 
standing in the capital markets, the link between risk management and the cost of 
equity is a fundamental strategic issue. Similarly, Stulz (1996, p. 24) suggests that 
by reducing the downside financial distress/bankruptcy risks, risk management 
(reinsurance) can reduce the cost of equity along with increasing corporate debt 
capacity. Doherty and Lamm-Tennant (2009) also suggest that reinsurance being 
a leverage neutral post-loss financing mechanism can enable primary insurers to 
mitigate the adverse effects of rising losses such as the increased risks of financial 
distress and/or bankruptcy.  
Although recent studies have examined the direct impact of (re)insurance on the 
value of firms using economic measures such as Tobin’s q (e.g., see Zou, 2010)4 
or market capitalization (e.g., see Scordis and Steinorth, 2012) none have 
examined the relation between the cost of equity capital and reinsurance. 
Therefore, this study could potentially contribute important insights on the interplay 
between the cost of capital and reinsurance that might be useful for insurance 
suppliers, brokers, managers, industry regulators, and investors. For example, the 
study could help determine the optimal level of reinsurance necessary for a 
particular insurance firm to reduce its cost of equity and maximize its value for its 
shareholders. More specifically, the two main research questions being 
investigated by this study are as follows: 
Research Question 1: Does reinsurance affect an insurers’ cost of equity capital? 
Research Question 2: If it does, then to what extent does reinsurance impact on 
the insurers’ cost of equity capital? 
                                            
4 Tobin (1969, p. 21) defines q as “. . . the value of capital relative to its replacement cost.” 
Scordis and Barrese (2006) view Tobin’s q as a measure of a firm’s investment 





1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Research 
This research project examines the impact of reinsurance on the cost of the equity 
capital of UK non-life insurance companies. Stated below are the six distinct 
objectives that have been drawn up to achieve this aim: 
1. To examine the key institutional features of the UK’s non-life (re)insurance 
market that could influence the reinsurance – cost of equity relation. 
 
2. To select an appropriate theoretical framework by means of an extensive 
review of the academic literature relating to the risk management and 
financing decisions of a firm. 
 
3. To identify a suitable method to estimate the cost of equity of an insurer by 
reviewing the relevant accounting and finance literature. 
 
4. To develop and test hypotheses empirically by means of univariate and 
multivariate (panel data) statistical analyses. 
 
5. To explain and evaluate the empirical results. 
 
6. To draw conclusions, and consider the implications for future research, 
commercial decisions and public policymaking. 
1.4 Contribution of the Research 
This study should contribute to the existing insurance and finance literature, and 
generate regulatory/practical implications in at least the following four important 
regards: 
1. As mentioned in section 1.2 above, prior research suggests that corporate 
financing and risk management decisions are inextricably bound. This 
characteristic of investment and risk management decisions becomes 
critical in the case of insurers, which are systemically important regulated 
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financial intermediaries. This is because insurers are mandated by law to 
maintain a certain minimum amount of capital in order to bear assumed 
risks and continue operating as a going concern. Such a requirement 
results in the deadweight cost of capital being imposed on insurers (Froot, 
2007). The contingent capital attributes of reinsurance in this case can 
reduce the level of retained equity and so maximize the traded value of an 
insurer (Doherty and Lamm-Tennant, 2009). On the other hand, Borch 
(1961, p. 35) points out that reinsurance is expensive for insurers because 
“…when an insurance company reinsures a part of its portfolio, it buys 
security and pays for it”. In other words, reinsurance is a costly instrument. 
These conflicting views indicate that the purchase of reinsurance can be 
viewed as cost-benefit trade-off. The dynamics of the cost of equity – 
reinsurance relation implied by the aforementioned trade-off has hitherto 
remained insufficiently explored in the insurance-economics literature. 
Being the first study to focus on the interplay between firm-value (cost of 
equity capital) and risk management (reinsurance) in the non-life insurance 
industry, this study contributes new and important insights that might be 
useful for insurance suppliers, brokers, managers, industry regulators, 
investors, and others.  
 
2. Most of the previous studies have focused on financial derivatives while 
attempting to explain the impact of risk management on firm value (e.g., 
see Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Gay, Lin and Smith, 2011; Géczy, 
Minton and Schrand, 1997; Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell, 2007). The 
current study diverges from this tradition by focusing on reinsurance which 
is a pure indemnity contract5. This is in contrast with financial derivatives 
which can be used for speculative as well as hedging purposes (Harrington 
and Niehaus, 2003). Moreover, Haushalter (2000) suggests that unlike 
(re)insurance indemnity contracts, the use of financial derivatives for 
                                            
5 An insurance policy is a contract of indemnity between two parties, namely the insurer 
and the insured, that indemnifies the insured against any losses or damages caused or 
suffered by the insured, conditional on the occurrence of certain events specified in the 
terms of the contract. In other words, a policy of indemnity is designed to place the 




hedging may not completely eliminate basis risk exposures. Aunon-Nerin 
and Ehling (2008) also note that derivatives data are often ‘noisy’ and so 
difficult to interpret. These characteristics make it difficult to extract relevant 
information from derivatives data, which is usually scarce in view of the fact 
that industrial firms are seldom statutorily required to disclose such 
information. However, these limitations concerning the amount and quality 
of public information are overcome in this study as regulations mandate 
insurers to disclose reinsurance transactions in their regulatory returns. 
Therefore, it follows that the ‘pure-hedge’ nature of reinsurance and a 
sufficiently large panel dataset of reinsurance transactions allow for 
‘cleaner’ tests of the research questions posed in this study.  
 
3. Being one of the largest insurance markets in the world, (the 3rd largest in 
terms of annual premiums written) the UK is an important market in which to 
conduct this research. Other features of the UK insurance market that make 
it interesting are its unitary regulatory and fiscal regimes. These 
characteristics of the UK insurance market further enable potentially robust 
and reliable tests of the research questions this study aims to answer. This 
is because the entire market is subjected to the same insurance company 
regulations in contrast to some other markets, such as the US, where 
industry and tax-based regulations (e.g., concerning reserving policies) can 
vary from state to state. Further, the absence of both the premium rate 
regulation and the mandatory purchase of reinsurance (e.g., as exists in 
some emerging insurance markets such as China and India) removes the 
bias induced by such regulatory practices, thereby improving the reliability 
of the statistical analyses carried out.  
 
4. Since investment financing and risk management decisions go hand in 
hand, it is important to control for potential endogeneity induced by such a 
relation. This study therefore tests the cost of equity – reinsurance relations 
using a battery of tests to ensure the validity of the results. Moreover, an 
instrumental variable technique is employed to ensure the robustness of the 
results. Further, a novel technique combining the full information beta 
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method of Kaplan and Peterson (1998) and the non-parametric method of 
equity beta estimation (Wen, Martin, Lai and O'Brien, 2008) is devised for 
this study. This study is the first to employ such a procedure for examining 
the cost of equity - reinsurance relations in the non-life insurance sector, 
both in the UK and overseas. 
1.5 Research Methods 
To achieve the stated aim and objectives of the project, a combination of literature-
based and empirical research methods are employed as follows: 
1. A search and analysis of the relevant literature leading to the selection of an 
appropriate theoretical framework to guide the empirical analysis. 
 
2. A statistical analysis of the panel data for the period 1985-2010 using data 
from public sources such as the Standard & Poor’s UK Insurance 
Companies Database – SynThesys, and the Datastream database provided 
by Thomson Reuters. The data used in this study are analysed using 
descriptive and univariate and multivariate statistics. Robustness tests, 
including a two-stage instrument variable (IV) approach, are also conducted 
to control for potential endogeneity problems.  
 
3. The study utilises the recent cost of (equity) capital metrics reported in the 
literature including accounting-based valuation models (e.g., Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002) and financial economics-based asset pricing models (e.g., 
Leland, 1999; Rubinstein, 1976).  
1.6 Assumptions 
The study is predicated on five main assumptions as follows: 
1. Insurance company managers have the discretion to vary the level of 
reinsurance purchased independently of legislators, regulators and other 
external constituents (e.g., investors). This assumption is considered to be 
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justified as, unlike some emerging economies, (e.g., China and India) the 
UK’s Insurance Companies Regulations (1994) do not prescribe statutory 
minimum levels of reinsurance for direct insurance writers.  
 
2. Restrictions in the supply of reinsurance do not severely distort the 
reinsurance decisions of managers. Prior studies (e.g., Blazenko, 1986; 
Borch, 1961, 1962) have also assumed that reinsurance markets are 
competitive and efficient so that the market supply of reinsurance effectively 
adjusts to consumer demand. Indeed, Cummins (2007) reports that 
although the reinsurance market can be susceptible to underwriting cycles 
and price variations over time, it is a global market and international 
investors tend to respond quickly to the capital needs of reinsurance 
markets. 
 
3. The financial data to be analysed in the present study derive from 
independently audited annual solvency filings made by insurance 
companies to the UK insurance industry regulator at the time, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA)6. Therefore, the data to be used in this study are 
assumed to be reliable.  
 
4. Observed cession rates (i.e., reinsurance purchases) are assumed to be 
representative of inherent demand for reinsurance, and not to be unduly 
affected by the prevailing market price of reinsurance. Implicit in this 
assumption is the view that premiums ceded each year reflect the demand 
for reinsurance arising as a result of portfolio assessment by managers, 
rather than period-specific (cyclical) movements in prices. This assumption 
is consistent with prior academic research pertaining to insurance (e.g., see 
Zou and Adams, 2006, 2008). This is a reasonable assumption because for 
correctly priced risks, a positive correlation is expected between annual 
amounts of premium and levels of indemnity coverage (Zou, 2003).  
                                            
6 On 1 April 2013 the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) became responsible for the 
prudential regulation and supervision of banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers 
and major investment firms. The Financial Conduct Authority, a separate body, is 




5. Very few companies operating in the UK non-life insurance market are 
listed entities (currently n ~ 25). Therefore, betas for six major classes of 
non-life insurance are estimated to facilitate the calculation of firm-level 
betas. It is assumed that product-market betas so calculated are common 
to all the firms. Furthermore, overall company betas based on business line 
level betas provide a reasonable representation of the risk profile of each 
firm. This approach is deemed appropriate as prior studies (e.g., Cummins 
and Phillips, 2005) have advocated such an approach where mark-to-
market accounting based estimates are not available. 
1.7 Scope of the Project 
The scope of the project is defined in two key regards as follows: 
1. The study focuses on UK-licensed property-liability insurance companies 
purchasing reinsurance in six main lines of insurance business: personal 
accident; motor insurance; property insurance; liability insurance; marine, 
aviation & transport insurance; and miscellaneous and financial loss 
insurance. Insurance syndicates operating in the Lloyd’s of London market 
are excluded from this study, as comparable financial data for these 
insurance carriers are not publicly available.  
 
2. The proposed time span of the study covers the 26 years, 1985 – 2010, 
which represents the earliest and latest years for which complete data are 
available to enable the analysis to be conducted in a timely manner. 
1.8 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised as follows:  
Chapter 1. Introduction: This chapter provides background information on the 
research project and identifies the main gaps and issues in the literature that need 
further investigation. The aim and objectives of the study, the contribution to 
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knowledge, and a description of research methods employed are also stated in 
this chapter. The underlying assumptions and the scope of this study are also 
addressed. The remainder of the thesis is divided into seven chapters as 
documented below. 
Chapter 2. Institutional Background: This chapter provides background information 
about the institutional environment in which UK non-life insurance companies 
operate.  The chapter also outlines the key elements of regulatory and accounting 
practices that prevailed during the period of analysis (1985-2010). In addition, the 
institutional merits of the UK’s insurance market as a research environment are 
examined in this chapter of the thesis. 
Chapter 3. Literature Review: This chapter of the research project identifies and 
reviews (critiques) the main theories that have been used in extant literature to 
explain the existence of, and ‘value-added’ provided by corporate risk 
management especially in the context of the insurance industry. From this review, 
the theory of optimal capital structure is selected as the most appropriate 
conceptual framework within which to guide and direct the empirical analysis.  
Chapter 4. Hypotheses Development: This part of the thesis elaborates upon the 
theory of optimal capital structure, and uses this exposition to derive and specify 
two main hypotheses to direct the empirical analyses conducted in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 5. Cost of Equity Metrics: This chapter reviews (critiques) the main cost of 
equity metrics documented in the accounting and financial economics literature. 
This review enables the selection of appropriate metrics to facilitate empirical tests 
of the hypotheses forwarded in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 6. Research Design: This chapter begins by examining the rationale for 
selecting statistical analysis as the research method for this study. The chapter 
then describes the dataset chosen for the analysis and the sample selection 
method employed. This is followed by a discussion of the procedure adopted for 
estimating the cost of equity of UK non-life insurers. Subsequently, definitions of 
variables used, respective models used to test the two hypotheses, and the 




Chapter 7. Empirical Results: This chapter analyses the results and evaluates 
them in relation to the test hypotheses and the existing literature. Initially, the data 
are described using descriptive statistics, followed by a bivariate analysis to 
establish the correlation between the variables used. Finally, regression analysis 
and various robustness and sensitivity tests (e.g. IV analysis) are conducted to 
test the two hypotheses relating the cost of equity of insurers to the purchase of 
reinsurance. 
Chapter 8. Summary and Conclusions: This chapter summarises the key results, 
draws conclusions from the empirical analysis, considers the limitations of the 
study and outlines the implications of the study’s findings for future academic 
research, and strategic commercial decisions and/or public policymaking. 
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 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND CHAPTER 2.
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the salient characteristics of the UK insurance industry 
over the 26 years duration of this study (1985-2010). The chapter begins by 
presenting the development of the UK non-life and life insurance sectors in terms 
of annual premiums written, and the role they play in the wider economy. The 
chapter also presents an overview of the current regulatory and accounting 
framework under which UK insurance companies operate and tracks its historical 
development. Additionally, this chapter establishes the suitability of the UK non-life 
insurance market as an environment within which to conduct this study. 
2.2 The UK Insurance Market 
Since its inception in the fifteenth century as a cluster of small firms dealing 
primarily in marine insurance, the insurance industry in the UK has grown to 
become one of the major insurance markets in the world (Hardwick and Guirguis, 
2007). Accounting for nearly 7 percent of the world wide premiums written 
(including both the life and non-life insurance sectors), the UK insurance market is 
currently the third largest in the world (after the US and Japan) and the largest in 
Europe (Seiler, Staib and Puttaiah, 2013). Representing around 16 percent of the 
annual premiums written in the continental European non-life market and 5.3 
percent of the world non-life insurance market makes the UK the second largest 
property-liability insurance market in Europe and the fourth largest in the world 
(after the US, Japan and Germany). Table 2.1 shows the development of the UK 
insurance market along with the European and worldwide insurance market during 




Table 2.1: The Development of Insurance Premiums: UK, Europe and the 
World 
Year 
















Total Insurance Market 
2000 2,444,903 786,089 246,899 10.10 31.41 
2001 2,415,720 767,432 219,421 9.08 28.59 
2002 2,632,473 846,697 236,833 9.00 27.97 
2003 2,958,359 1,035,838 254,363 8.60 24.56 
2004 3,264,158 1,206,191 292,199 8.95 24.22 
2005 3,445,816 1,335,057 336,158 9.76 25.18 
2006 3,674,892 1,455,509 361,790 9.84 24.86 
2007 4,127,586 1,764,685 539,468 13.07 30.57 
2008 4,220,070 1,703,713 395,687 9.38 23.22 
2009 4,109,635 1,614,385 312,165 7.60 19.34 
2010 4,335,687 1,615,190 300,242 6.92 18.59 
2011 4,566,163 1,625,442 312,843 6.85 19.25 
2012 4,612,514 1,535,176 311,418 6.75 20.29 
Non-life Insurance Market 
2000 926,503 282,924 60,319 21.32 6.51 
2001 969,745 299,620 65,668 21.92 6.77 
2002 1,098,412 346,207 77,076 22.26 7.02 
2003 1,275,616 438,008 93,143 21.27 7.30 
2004 1,397,522 501,095 99,003 19.76 7.08 
2005 1,442,258 522,830 105,126 20.11 7.29 
2006 1,549,100 573,703 104,899 18.28 6.77 
2007 1,685,762 649,538 115,725 17.82 6.86 
2008 1,780,776 707,615 109,515 15.48 6.15 
2009 1,742,193 660,968 95,446 14.44 5.48 
2010 1,819,310 658,573 99,671 15.13 5.48 
2011 1,954,445 686,938 104,110 15.16 5.33 
2012 1,991,650 658,732 105,500 16.02 5.30 
Source: Adapted from Baez and Staib (2007); Birkmaier and Codoni (2002, 2004); Codoni 
(2001); Enz (2006); Lorenzo and Lauff (2005); Schlag and Codoni (2003); Seiler et al. 
(2013); Staib and Bevere, (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). This table presents total (gross) 
annual premiums written, expressed in nominal values of US Dollars, at Worldwide, 
European and UK National Levels, for the period 2000-2012. The percentage market 
share of the UK at worldwide and European levels is also reported. 
As is evident form the data presented in Table 2.1, the UK’s share of both the 
world insurance market and the European insurance market has gradually 
reduced over the last decade. Despite this apparent loss of market share, the UK 
has maintained its rank as the third largest insurance (total) market and fourth 
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largest property-liability insurance market in the world. Interestingly, the non-life 
insurance sector performed better than the total UK insurance market over the 
2001-2012 period as shown in Table 2.2. During this period, the total UK 
insurance market experienced large negative inflation adjusted growth rates in 
several years, whereas the non-life market experienced either positive or relatively 
benign negative annual growth rates. Moreover, the UK insurance market has one 
of the highest levels of insurance penetration in the world. According to Seiler et 
al. (2013), insurance penetration (measured by expressing annual premiums 
written as a percentage of GDP) in the UK is more than 11 percent with non-life 
insurance premiums amounting to nearly 3 percent of the GDP in 2012.  
Table 2.2: Growth of the UK Insurance Market, 2001-2012 
Year 





















2001 152,243 -7.1 -8.7 45,564 14.4 12.3 
2002 157,636 3.5 1.9 51,305 12.6 10.8 
2003 158,418 -1.3 -2.6 56,996 11.1 9.6 
2004 159,515 0.7 -0.6 54,047 -5.2 -6.4 
2005 184,730 15.3 13.0 57,770 6.3 4.2 
2006 196,320 10.2 7.7 56,922 -1.5 -3.7 
2007 269,494 25.8 22.9 57,811 1.6 -0.7 
2008 213,529 -20.8 -23.5 59,108 2.2 -1.3 
2009 199,450 -6.6 -8.6 60,983 3.2 1.0 
2010 194,205 -2.5 -5.6 64,470 6.1 2.8 
2011 195,141 0.5 -3.8 64,940 0.7 -3.6 
2012 196,444 0.7 -2.1 66,550 2.5 -0.3 
Source: Adapted from Baez and Staib (2007); Birkmaier and Codoni (2002, 2004); Codoni 
(2001); Enz (2006); Lorenzo and Lauff (2005); Schlag and Codoni (2003); Seiler et al. 
(2013); Staib and Bevere (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). This table presents total (gross) 
annual premiums written, expressed in nominal values of Pounds Sterling in the UK 
insurance market, for the period 2001-2012. Nominal and inflation adjusted annual 
percentage growth rates for this period are also reported. 
The UK insurance industry currently controls financial assets valued approximately 
at £2.7 trillion, and contributes to the UK economy by directly investing nearly 54% 
of this amount in the UK economy in the form of various financial investments 
(Office for National Statistics, 2013). The UK insurance industry is additionally a 
major exporter for the UK economy with premium income valued at £41 billion 
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coming from overseas, of which nearly £14 billion are attributed to general 
insurance business (Association of British Insurers, 2012c)7. The non-life 
insurance market in the UK can be divided into two major constituencies, namely 
the domestic insurance market and the London market. The domestic insurance 
market caters to the insurance needs of households and businesses in the UK, 
whereas the London market is largely international with a significant proportion of 
business attributable to reinsurance. The London market includes Lloyd’s and the 
company market. The purpose of the company market is to allow brokers to place 
risks through a number of corporate insurers. On the other hand, prospective 
policyholders cannot approach a Lloyd’s syndicate directly, and the business must 
be placed only through authorised Lloyd’s brokers. This apparent segregation of 
these markets however does not prevent some overlap between the respective 
markets. For example, a large or unique risk may simultaneously be placed with 
corporate insurers in the company market and Lloyd’s syndicates (General 
Insurance Manual, 2008). Given such a vibrant insurance market, there are 
currently about 700 insurance operatives authorised to conduct business in the 
UK’s non-life insurance market (Association of British Insurers, 2012c). Details of 
the structure of the UK’s insurance market are also provided in Table 2.38.  
 
The data presented in Table 2.3 underscore the point that the UK’s insurance 
industry has not been static during this period. The absolute number of operatives 
in the general insurance sector is far higher than the ones operating in the long 
term insurance sector, which might signify the fact that there are many specialist 
insurers in the general insurance business who tend to operate within their 
respective areas of expertise. Prior to 2005, the number of regulated firms was 
based on categories the FSA inherited from its predecessor sectoral regulators, 
                                            
7 Figures do not include premiums written by insurance companies that are not members 
of Association of British Insurers, and premiums written in Lloyd’s market. 
 
8 However, only about 300 out of the 700 or so non-life insurers are actively writing 
commercial insurance business. The remainder are comprised of closed funds in run-off, 
trust funds, branches of overseas insurance entities and branches/‘fronting’ companies of 
overseas financial entities authorised to operate in the UK under international trade 
agreements (e.g., various promulgations of the EU’s Non-Life insurance Directives). 
These branches/’fronting’ companies are subject to insurance regulations in their home 




while post-2005 the FSA annual reports presented the data based on the primary 
business carried out by each regulated firm allowing for year-on-year comparisons 
to be made. For this reason, an abrupt change in the number of regulated entities 
is encountered from the year 2004 to the year 2005 in Table 2.3, and makes pre-
and-post 2005 figures incomparable. Furthermore, a clear pattern of decrease in 
the number of regulated insurance entities after the year 2005 suggests that the 
industry has, in recent years, undergone a consolidation through mergers & 
acquisitions, and market exits. As with the number of companies, the size of the 
market (estimated using annual premiums underwritten) has also been dynamic 
over the period of study. 
 






























2001 441 5 81 67 594 56 160 810 - 
2002 443 5 81 66 595 56 161 812 - 
2003 440 5 83 64 592 54 160 806 - 
2004 420 4 83 61 568 45 159 772 - 
2005 431 69 307 63 870 60 422 1352 - 
2006 412 64 301 59 836 50 232 1118 83 
2007 384 68 279 57 788 47 215 1050 82 
2008 372 63 273 54 762 46 209 1017 79 
2009 361 60 263 51 735 44 193 972 78 
2010 349 54 248 50 701 43 190 934 72 
Source: Financial Services Authority, 2002-2010. This table provides the number of 
insurance companies (including Lloyd’s firms) and brokers operating in the UK during the 
2001 – 2010 period. Property-liability insurers and brokers are divided into 4 categories: 
UK firms; EEA companies with a head office outside the UK but supervised in the UK; 
EEA companies with a head office outside the UK with home state control; companies, 
whose head office is not in the EEA area. Data on the number of Lloyd’s firms before 
2006 are not reported in FSA Annual Reports or publicly available Lloyd’s sources. 
General (non-life) insurance covers a wide range of risks usually through the use 
of fixed term contracts (policies) which are utilised by both businesses and 
individuals. Owing to the variety of risks covered, the general insurance industry is 
characterised by several different lines of business, chiefly among which are 
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motor; personal accident; property; general liability; pecuniary loss;  marine, 
aviation and transport (MAT) insurance; and reinsurance. Table 2.49 presents 
variations observed in annual premiums written by lines-of-business for the period 
2006 to 2011. These data show that motor, and property insurance are the most 
significant lines-of-business in terms of annual premiums generated. Interestingly, 
the contribution of non-MAT reinsurance towards the total figure has substantially 
increased over time, which may be due to a combination of several factors such as 
the emergence of new risks, demand for increased capacity and contingent 
capital.  
Table 2.4: UK General Insurance Premiums by Risk Type 




Motor 10,320 10,527 10,696 9,910 10,585 11,658 
Personal 
Accident 
4,385 4,620 4,644 4,403 4,441 4,420 
Property 8,487 8,609 8,848 8,207 8,375 8,646 
General 
Liability 
3,273 3,353 3,834 3,242 3,011 3,100 
Pecuniary 
Loss 
3,999 4,101 3,658 2,705 3,092 3,205 
Total 30,464 31,211 31,680 28,468 29,505 31,029 
Home-
Foreign10 
1,076 1,236 1,603 1,451 1,747 1,769 
Non-MAT 
Reinsurance 
362 894 1,329 1,314 1,480 964 
Marine, Aviation & 
Transport (£ mil.) 
344 640 876 1,028 1,051 1,330 
Lloyd's 16,410 16,360 17,980 21,970 22,600 23,500 
Grand Total (£ mil.) 48,656 50,341 53,467 54,231 56,382 58,592 
Source: (Association of British Insurers, 2012a). This table presents total net annual 
premiums written, expressed in nominal values of Pounds Sterling in the UK insurance 
market, for the period 2006-2011. 
The UK non-life insurance market is dominated by large companies with the 
cumulative market share of the top ten insurance providers amounting to 
                                            
9 Figures include premium estimates for non-members of the Association of British 
Insurers and Lloyd’s syndicates. 
10 Home foreign general insurance business carried on in the UK primarily relating to risks 
situated outside the UK, but excluding marine, aviation and transport business, treaty 
reinsurance business and business where the risk commences in the UK. 
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approximately 67% of the annual premiums written in 2011. The top five non-life 
insurers, namely Aviva (13%), the Direct Line Group (10%), AXA (9%), RSA 
Group (9%) and Allianz (5%) account for more than 46% of the general insurance 
premiums written (Association of British Insurers, 2012b). Insurers employ a range 
of distribution channels to generate their revenues viz., insurance brokers, 
company agents, direct selling, bancassurance, and independent financial 
advisors (IFA’s). Independent intermediaries like insurance brokers and 
independent financial advisors play a crucial role in the insurance market which 
becomes evident from the fact that they were instrumental in getting 40% of non-
life and 78% of long-term risks placed respectively with the insurers in 2012 
(Association of British Insurers, 2012c). In 2011, direct sales accounted for 31% of 
premiums generated in the non-life insurance market, whereas only 13% of the 
long-term risks underwritten were non-intermediated (Association of British 
Insurers, 2012c). 
The market statistics presented above bring to the fore the strong influence the 
insurance industry exercises on the UK economy. Therefore, it’s important that this 
industry is well regulated and remains competitive in the international market. As 
the market size and composition have evolved over time, it’s only natural that the 
regulatory environment also follows suit. The next section thus discusses the 
salient regulatory features of the UK insurance industry and emphasises the 
regulatory environment prevailing during the years 1985 to 2010 that are covered 
in the present study. 
2.3 Regulatory Environment 
2.3.1 Historical Development 
Initial attempts to regulate the insurance industry in the UK can be traced back to 
1575 which marks the establishment of the Office of Assurances (in the Royal 
Exchange) to coordinate and control the writing of insurance (primarily marine 
insurance) (Daykin and Cresswell, 2000). With the development of life insurance in 
subsequent centuries, the Life Assurance Companies Acts were passed in the 
years 1870 and 1872 with the purpose of insulating life insurance business from 
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general insurance business in the case of composite insurance companies. Carter 
and Falush (2009) provide an account of the regulatory environment prevailing in 
the UK since the year 1900 in some detail. They point out that based on the 
principle of ‘freedom with publicity’, regulatory activity in the twentieth century is 
largely characterised by a policy of minimum intervention to encourage innovation, 
healthy competition, and the minimisation of the costs of regulatory burden. 
However, towards the final decades of the twentieth century, an emphasis on the 
protection of the interests of customers triggered some regulatory action not 
entirely in accordance with the aforementioned principle. For example, the 
protection of the interests of consumers is one of the objectives mentioned under 
the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000). 
The continuing failures of general insurance companies in the first decade of the 
twentieth century prompted recognition of the need to extend prudential 
regulations to the non-life insurance sector by the passage of the Employers’ 
Liability Insurance Companies Act (1907) (Carter and Falush, 2009). Following 
this, the enactment of the Assurance Companies Act (1909) underscored the 
extension of regulations beyond life insurance to include fire insurance; accident 
insurance (personal accident and sickness); employers’ liability insurance; and 
bond investment business. This act followed the main provisions of the 1870 
Assurance Act. In addition, it prescribed the form of the insurance companies’ 
revenue accounts and balance sheets. However, Lloyd’s and marine insurance 
were kept out of the purview of this act due to the specialist nature of the business 
and the separate Acts of Parliaments governing the Lloyd’s market. Subsequent 
acts such as the Industrial Assurance Act (1923), the Road Traffic Act (1930), and 
the Air Navigation Act (1936) brought industrial life assurance, motor insurance 
and aircraft insurance under the scope of the 1909 Act as separate classes of 
business. The 1909 Act was further strengthened by the enactment of the 
Assurance Companies (Winding Up) Acts of 1933 and 1935 by giving the erstwhile 
insurance industry regulator - the Board of Trade - powers to intervene in cases of 
financial distress and/or insolvency.  
 
In the aftermath of World War II, the Assurance Companies Act (1946) brought 
marine, aviation and transport insurance under a regulatory framework and 
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classified the insurance industry into two different classes: long term business, 
covering all life assurance and bond-investment business; and general business 
covering all of the other classes of business under the regulatory supervision of 
the Act. This Act was further consolidated by the passage of the Insurance 
Companies Act (1958), which required UK insurers to prepare separate revenue 
accounts for life assurance, industrial life assurance, employers’ liability insurance 
and bond investment business and for receipts from each class to be carried to a 
separate fund (Carter and Falush, 2009). However, insurance company failures in 
the 1960s and 1970s prompted the passage of Part II of the Companies Act 
(1967) and the Insurance Companies Amendment Act (1973). The advancements 
achieved by these Acts were to bring all the classes of insurance within the scope 
of regulations. The statutes also strengthened the powers of the Department of 
Trade & Industry (DTI) over the authorisation of new companies; increased the 
minimum paid up share capital as well as the solvency margin for general 
insurance companies; restricted the corporate ownership, directorship and control 
of insurance companies to ‘fit and proper persons’; and empowered the DTI to 
grant authorisations subject to certain restrictions11. These Acts were followed by 
the enactment of the Insurance Companies Act (1974) which was consolidatory in 
nature. The significance of the 1974 Act lies in in the fact that it was passed just 
after the UK became a part of the European Communities (which later came to be 
known as the European Union (EU)) in 1973. Hence, the 1974 Act was 
instrumental in aligning the UK regulation with the First Non-Life Insurance 
Directive (Council Directive - 73/239/EEC, 1973) that had already been negotiated 
by the six founding countries of the EU. According to Daykin and Cresswell (2000, 
p. 3) “The essence of the non-life establishment directive was to create a common 
solvency regime to underpin the mutual recognition of supervisory systems”. The 
key features of this Directive and subsequent EU Directives are discussed in 
section 2.3.3 below. The next significant piece of insurance legislation was the 
Insurance Companies Act (1982) which is discussed further in section 2.3.2 below. 
                                            
11 The ‘fit and proper’ person test ensures that the person holding a position of 
responsibility within the insurance company is honest, financially sound and competent to 
hold such a position. 
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2.3.2 Insurance Companies Act, 1982 
The Insurance Companies Act (1982) consolidated all of the previous legislation 
pertaining to insurance and introduced new regulations (e.g., providing rules for 
the transfer of business between insurers) as well. Hardwick and Guirguis (2007, 
p. 207) report that the “…overall objective of the legislation was to ensure that only 
‘fit and proper’ persons should transact insurance business”. The ‘fit and proper’ 
persons test for authorisation was extended to include underwriting agents; and 
the DTI was given new powers to withdraw authorisations. Companies were also 
required to disclose more information about their reinsurance transactions in 
relation to their general insurance business in their annual returns. The prudential 
supervision of UK insurance companies under the 1982 Act was originally carried 
out by the DTI, and later by the Treasury. Another important step in the regulation 
of the insurance companies was taken in 1996 when insurers were allowed to 
maintain ‘equalization reserves’12 after the passage of the Insurance Companies 
(Reserves) Act (1995). These reserves qualified for tax relief in respect of 
specified classes of insurance business (e.g., property insurance) exposed to 
catastrophe losses. 
2.3.3 The European Union Directives 
The EU directives, developed in consultation with member states, are based on 
the underlying principles of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services (Hardwick and Guirguis, 2007). As mentioned in section 2.3.2 
above, the first non-life insurance directive was passed in the year 1973. Under 
this regime, each UK-based insurance company was to be supervised in respect 
of its entire (worldwide) business by the supervisory authority in the member state 
where the head office was situated. Foreign domiciled companies (with a non-EU 
head office) were subject to different solvency margins. Relying on the monitoring 
of these solvency margin requirements by the home country supervisor, insurance 
companies could establish branches in other EU member states. Thus, the host 
country supervisor could focus only on the financial health of the branch of the 
                                            
12 An equalisation reserve helps to mitigate claims volatility in respect of non-life insurance 
business. The annual change in the equalisation provision is recorded in the profit and 
loss accounts for the year. 
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insurance company operating within its jurisdiction irrespective of the overall 
financial condition of the company. Daykin and Cresswell (2000, p. 3) report that 
“…the required solvency margin for general (property/casualty) insurance 
companies is calculated as 18% of the net premium up to 10 million Euros 
(formerly écus) of premium income, and 16% of the premium income above that 
level. An alternative basis of calculation involving 26% of the net incurred claims 
up to 7 million Euros, and 23% of claims above that level, applies if it yields a 
higher result”. They further state that it is a simplified estimation as reinsurance 
could only be taken into account in reducing the gross premium (or claims) by a 
maximum of 50%. However, there were no rules laid out by the directive pertaining 
to the valuation of either assets or liabilities, as these were left within the 
jurisdiction of the supervisory authorities and/or regulations of the individual 
member states. Apart from this, a clear basis for regulatory intervention by 
insurance industry supervisors was laid out in the 1973 EU directive, which was 
based broadly on the maintenance of the minimum margin of solvency. As soon as 
this minimum level of solvency margin was breached, the concerned regulator 
could ask the company to prepare and implement a plan for achieving the 
minimum solvency margin. Another trigger point embedded within this regime was 
set at one-third of the required minimum margin, subject to a minimum in absolute 
money terms (according to the class of business). This level was called the 
guarantee fund and if the excess of assets over liabilities fell below this level the 
company would be required by the regulator to prepare a short term financial 
scheme, which would imply a capital injection a or capital reconstruction, or sale of 
the business. The supervisor could withdraw a company’s license to underwrite 
new business in case it failed to establish such an arrangement expeditiously 
(General Insurance Manual, 2008).  
 
The second EU directive (Council Directive - 88/357/EEC, 1988) was instrumental 
in opening up the commercial insurance market within member states, which was 
just a minor advancement to the existing regime. Following this, a major 
breakthrough to create a single insurance market within Europe was achieved in 
1992 with an agreement being reached on the third Non-Life Directive (Council 
Directive - 92/49/EEC, 1992). This directive became effective on 1 July 1994 and 
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achieved “freedom of services“, enabling insurance companies to carry out 
business in host countries without establishing a branch in the host country. The 
differences in asset and liability valuations were also resolved in principle for 
general insurance business by the passing of the EU Insurance Accounts Directive 
(Council Directive - 91/674/EEC, 1991). However the interpretation of these 
principles may differ from country to country. For example, article 56 of the EU 
Accounts Directive requires that “…the amount of technical provisions must at all 
times be such that an undertaking can meet any liabilities arising out of insurance 
contracts as far as can reasonably be foreseen”, which is open to differing 
interpretations. However, the 1992 EU Directive did legitimise the discounting of 
provisions for general insurance, especially for business with a mean outstanding 
settlement term of four years or more, although the decision to implement it was 
left at the discretion of the member states. These Directives introduced a single 
European passport which allowed any properly authorised EU-headquartered 
insurance company to conduct business throughout the EU (Beckmann, 
Eppendrofer and Neimke, 2003). These third generation EU Directives were also 
instrumental in promoting the mutual recognition of authorisation and supervision 
agreements by the various states of the EU (Seatzu, 2003). This resulted in the 
creation of a large insurance market without any restrictions on price or product 
being offered, allowing for competition in the EU insurance market to flourish (Van 
Der Ende, Ayadi and O'Brien, 2006). 
 
The EU Reinsurance Directive (Directive - 2005/68/EC 2005) which became 
operational on the 10 December 2007 throughout the EU was also drafted along 
the same lines as previous EU Insurance Directives and created a single market 
for pure reinsurers within the EU member states. These three non-life insurance 
directives and the reinsurance directive will be recast into one new legislative 
provision, as part of the Solvency II framework when the latter becomes 
operational (currently estimated to be 1 January 2016). 
2.3.4 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000 
As has been mentioned in section 2.2, for many years the Insurance Division of 
the DTI carried out insurance regulation in the UK under the framework of the 
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Insurance Companies Act (1982) and subsequent regulations. The UK Treasury 
took over this responsibility in January 1998 and in January 1999 the supervisory 
activity was delegated by the Treasury to the FSA. In accordance with the new 
legislation called the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA), 2000 full 
responsibility for the supervision of financial institutions, including insurance 
companies, was assumed by the FSA in 2001. Following the passage of this Act, a 
risk based approach to calculating capital adequacy gained prominence. The FSA 
ensured that insurers maintain adequate financial reserves to meet any 
foreseeable liabilities and are run only by approved persons who are deemed to 
be ‘fit and proper’. This Act covers much of the details of all the previous 
legislation pertaining to the insurance industry apart from amalgamating various 
ombudsman schemes into the Financial Services Ombudsman Scheme as well as 
combining various compensation schemes, including the Policyholders' Protection 
Board, into the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Using this approach, 
the FSA sought to attain the following regulatory objectives as mentioned in the 
FSMA, 2000: 
1. Maintaining confidence in the investment markets; 
2. Improving consumer awareness; 
3. Helping to protect consumers; 
4. Reducing financial crime. 
 
However, the principles based risk assessment approach to regulation gained 
prominence in subsequent years, which is underscored by the adoption of 
Individual Capital Adequacy Standards (ICAS) by the FSA in 2005 in anticipation 
of the implementation of a more principles-based system of regulation as 
envisioned in the ‘Solvency ΙΙ’ regime (General Insurance Manual, 2008).  
2.3.5 Solvency II 
Due to the deficiencies of the existing risk-based approach which failed to 
differentiate between different types of risks in terms of timing and the scale of 
claims, the European Commission initiated work on a new set of regulations in 
200013. These new regulations followed a principles-based approach to risk 
                                            
13 For example, commercial insurance, such as aviation, marine and energy, can be more 
volatile compared with the motor line of insurance as the number of risks is relatively small 
and very large values are often concentrated in a single location (Thoyts, 2010). 
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assessment and regulation. This resulted in regulatory changes being 
implemented in a phased manner in the EU’s insurance markets. In the first stage, 
Solvency I regulations were implemented across Europe in January, 2004. 
Solvency I standards provided a rules-based set of minimum capital requirements, 
along with addressing many of the coordination issues among sovereign 
regulatory agencies. As the Solvency I regime is based on the First Non-Life 
Insurance Directive (Council Directive - 73/239/EEC, 1973), it offered relatively few 
modifications to the capital standards originally introduced by this directive.  
Given the shortcomings of Solvency I, a comprehensive set of regulations called 
Solvency II (Directive - 2009/138/EC, 2009) are being developed. Tarantino (2008) 
opines that the Solvency II proposals are likely to produce a more consistent 
solvency standard for insurers, while establishing a single set of rules governing 
insurer creditworthiness and risk management. The three pillar approach adopted 
by the Solvency II regime is very similar to Basel II banking regulations (KPMG, 
2002). The first pillar deals mainly with the financial requirements imposed under 
the Solvency II initiative. Designed to ensure that a firm is adequately capitalised 
to deliver policyholder protection, Pillar I specifies how the capital requirement is 
set and assessed and how the eligible capital resources of the firm are determined 
(Eling, Schmeiser and Schmit, 2007). The second pillar imposes higher standards 
of risk management and governance on firms. According to Linder and Ronkainen 
(2004), Pillar II emphasises the principles for the internal control and sound risk 
management of insurance undertakings, and enumerates conditions for 
supervisory intervention. This pillar also encourages insurance firms to initiate their 
Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) which requires them to undertake a 
forward-looking assessment of their risks and the adequacy of capital resources. 
The third pillar aims for greater levels of transparency for supervisors and the 
public (KPMG, 2002). By ensuring better and more up-to-date information on a 
firm’s financial position, Pillar III aims to instil greater market discipline resulting in 
greater market transparency. According to Eling et al. (2007) the market 
transparency so achieved will result in the reduced requirement of regulatory 
intervention. 
Even though Solvency II had been adopted by the EU in November 2009, its 
implementation has not been possible yet. Upon adoption, the initial 
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implementation date was set on November 1, 2012. Further amendments were 
introduced through the Short Directive (Omnibus II) in July 2012, and the original 
implementation date was changed to January 1, 2014. It is likely that the 
implementation date will further be postponed to January 1, 2016. As mentioned in 
section 2.3.4, the FSA had implemented the ICAS on January 1, 2005. To align 
the regulatory process with the ICAS, the FSA in 2004 had a project for a 
comprehensive risk management approach called ARROW (an acronym for 
Advanced Risk Response Operating Framework), which was later changed to 
ARROW II in 2006. Similar to Solvency II, the FSA’s ARROW framework consists 
of three components: the risk assessment of individual firms; the risk assessment 
for several firms or the market as a whole; and internal risk management to assess 
the operational risks within the FSA. Thoyts (2010) suggests that this framework 
ensures capital adequacy and sound risk management practices in insurance 
companies.  
2.3.6 Consumer Protection and Dispute Resolution 
As noted in section 2.3.1, ‘freedom with publicity’ was the governing principle 
behind the UK insurance regulations during most of the twentieth century. 
However, owing to some corporate failures there was a gradual shift from this 
principle in the direction of proactive regulation and protecting the interests of 
policyholders (mainly individuals). One key statute in this regard was the 
Policyholders Protection Act (1975) which led to the establishment of the 
Policyholders Protection Board (PPB) with powers to impose a levy on authorised 
insurance companies transacting the type of insurance concerned (and in certain 
cases on insurance intermediaries too) to enable the Board to make payments to 
private policyholders in respect of contracts effected in the UK with an authorised 
insurer that goes into liquidation or is unable to pay its debts. Later, this act was 
amended by the Policyholders Protection Act (1997). However, this again was 
replaced by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS), constituted 
under the FSMA (2000). 
 
Another source of financial losses experienced by the policyholders may be the 
negligence committed by an intermediary in placing the insurance policy or in 
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handling a claim. To protect against such losses, the Insurance Brokers 
(Registration) Act (1977) was passed, which required the intermediaries to register 
with the Insurance Brokers registration Council (IBRC) to be able to use the title 
‘insurance broker’. These registered brokers could be ordered by the IBRC to 
compensate policyholders who suffered financial losses due to brokers’ actions. 
Subsequently, the IBRC was abolished by the government and the General 
Insurance Standards Council (GISC) was formed, representing all sections of the 
industry in an attempt to promote self-regulation. The GISC was instrumental in 
creating unified standards for all methods of distribution within the insurance 
industry. In January 2005, the FSA took over the regulatory role of the GISC. 
 
Apart from the statutes mentioned above, another route to ensure consumer 
protection was provided by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), which was 
established following the enactment of the Fair Trading Act (1973). The OFT was 
required to keep a ‘close watch’ on business practices affecting consumer 
interests; to encourage businesses to comply with the competition and consumer 
law; and to recommend remedial action, where necessary. 
 
Focussing on the interests of personal policyholders, the insurance industry set up 
the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau (IOB) and the Personal Insurance Arbitration 
Service (PIAS). These bodies referred disputes for arbitration with awards being 
binding on both the parties in accordance with the Arbitration Acts, however, with 
limited right to appeal. On 1 December 2001, the Financial Ombudsman Service 
(FOS) was created under the FSMA (2000), which was modelled on the PIAS and 
acted as the single compulsory ombudsman for retail complaints about financial 
products and services, operating under the rules and procedures laid down by the 
FSA. From January 2005, the FOS was extended to include general insurance as 
well. 
2.4 Statutory Reporting 
General insurers are required to submit annual returns to the FSA for statutory 
solvency monitoring purposes. They are required to prepare a standard form of 
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revenue account for the year; a balance sheet as at the end of the year; and a 
profit and loss account for the year with respect to each of its financial years. 
Further, an insurer’s financial year must be for a 12 month period and subject to 
an external audit certification. The type of returns filed must also accord with the 
domicile status of the insurer as indicated in Table 2.5. Statutory returns are based 
on statutory accounting principles, which are balance-sheet oriented and 
emphasize the valuation of assets and liabilities on a `liquidation’ basis rather than 
on the `going-concern’ basis used for GAAP-based financial statements. These 
filings contain detailed information about various parameters such as distribution 
of assets held; provisions arising due to unearned premium; unexpired risks and 
outstanding claims; and information about reinsurance ceded and accepted. 
Techniques used for the annual valuation of the reported assets (e.g. mark-to-
market accounting for quoted securities) also have to be in accordance with the 
asset valuation regulations set by the FSA. To prevent an over-reliance on any 
one asset class by an insurer, the extent of the admissibility of different asset 
types is also stipulated by the FSA. For example, some assets are shown in the 
FSA return at less than the market value shown in the shareholder accounts. 
Some assets have no ‘admissible value’ at all for FSA return purposes, for 
instance, investment gold.  
 
On the other hand, technical provisions should be similar in both the shareholder 
accounts prepared under UK-GAAP and the FSA Return (General Insurance 
Manual, 2008). The regulations governing asset admissibility limit the options 
available to managers of the insurance companies in making discretionary 
investments. Thus, the approach used to calculate the technical provisions also 
becomes crucial from the regulatory perspective, lest the insurer should 
understate its liabilities. Daykin and Cresswell (2000) report that the FSA used a 
four pronged approach to ascertain the appropriateness of the technical 
provisions. First, it is the responsibility of the external auditor to confirm that the 
accounts are drawn in accordance with the GAAP/IFRS4. Second, specialist 
software is utilised by the FSA to conduct some preliminary analyses to ascertain 
the accuracy of the returns. Third, the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) 
may be called upon to conduct some detailed analyses in case there is uncertainty 
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regarding the adequacy of reserves. Finally, the FSA is authorised to ask the 
insurer to have a full-scale independent actuarial review of their technical 
provisions or overall balance sheet. However, current solvency regulations do not 
require the UK-based general insurance companies to have an appointed actuary 
or to take actuarial advice, although it is common for companies to consult 
actuaries. 
 
Table 2.5: Return Type by Domicile of Insurers 
Type of 
Company 
Location of Head Office 
United Kingdom Non-UK EEA State Rest of the World 
Pure 
Reinsurer 
Global return Global return Global return 
UK-deposit 
Insurer   
Global return and EEA 
branches return 
EEA-deposit 
Insurer   
UK branch return 
All other 
Insurers 
Global return Exempt 
Global return and UK 
branch return 
Source: General Prudential Sourcebook: Insurers (FSA 2001/12) 
 
The discounting of provisions for long tailed lines of business, such as liability 
insurance, is allowed under UK regulations, but the onus is on the insurer to 
demonstrate that accurate data and appropriate actuarial modelling techniques 
have been used for discounting (General Insurance Manual, 2008). It is also 
permitted that the technical provisions be set-up net of expected reinsurance 
recoveries. However, insurers are also required to simultaneously set up 
actuarially prudent bad debt provisions in case there is doubt about the 
recoverability of debts (e.g., reinsurance recoveries). Details of the most significant 
reinsurance exposures are also recorded in the annual statutory returns. An 
insurer’s exposure to major treaty and facultative reinsurers must be disclosed, 
and in turn, reinsurers must disclose major cedants. Supplementary statements 
attached to Forms 9 to 15 and 17 of the statutory filings are used for making such 
disclosures. Major reinsurers and major cedants are defined as those exceeding 
certain premium ceded limits and certain debt plus anticipated recoveries limits 
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respectively (General Insurance Manual, 2008). For example, for proportional 
treaty reinsurance these are 2% of gross annual premiums, and for a non-
proportional treaty, 5% of total non-proportional premiums written. The statement 
must show the name and address of the reinsurer or cedant, and the amount of 
any premium payable, debt of the reinsurer to the insurer and deposits received 
from the reinsurers. The extent of any connection between the parties must be 
shown. 
2.5 UK’s General Accounting Framework 
One of the key events marking the evolution of an accounting framework for UK 
insurers has been the adoption of the European Insurance Accounts Directive 
(Council Directive - 91/674/EEC, 1991). Before the adoption of this directive, the 
accounts of a UK general insurance company were similar to those of other 
trading companies and included a balance sheet, general business revenue 
account, and a profit and loss account (General Insurance Manual, 2008). The 
1991 Insurance Accounts Directive (IAD) proposed a pre-set format for financial 
reporting for the entire insurance industry, and also laid out rules regarding the 
valuation of assets and liabilities. Disclosures too had to be in accordance with the 
prescribed rules, which also provided for specific situations, for example the 
discounting of claims provisions. Daykin and Cresswell (2000, p. 5) also aver that 
“…assets are required to be valued at market value, or a proxy for market value 
where no ready market exists”. This enabled different stakeholders viz., creditors, 
debtors and policyholders to compare the financial strength of insurers across the 
EU, thereby assisting in the development of the single internal market in financial 
services. Initially, the member states of the EU were given discretion in choosing 
alternative practices for asset valuation (fair value accounting or historical cost 
based accounting). However, the valuation became uniform all over the EU in the 
year 1999 with fair value accounting gaining prominence. Unlike other industries in 
which small and medium sized businesses (with an annual turnover less than or 
equal to £41million) are exempt from using the services of independent auditors, 
all the UK-based insurance companies have to get their annual report and 
accounts audited by independent auditors irrespective of their size.  
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Insurance Companies Accounts Regulations (SI1993/3246, 1993) under the 
purview of the Companies Act (1985) paved the way for the implementation of the 
IAD in the UK. Under these regulations, the old Schedule 9A CA 1985 was 
replaced by a new Schedule 9A, with effect for financial statements for financial 
years commencing on or after 23 December 1994 (General Insurance Manual, 
2008). This new schedule, which closely followed the IAD and prescribed the form 
and content of the accounts of insurance companies and groups; was split in two 
parts dealing with individual annual accounts and consolidated annual accounts 
respectively. Further, the profit and loss account for general insurance companies 
was divided between technical and non-technical accounts. Under the IAD regime, 
member states were given an option to exempt some companies from preparing 
non-technical accounts (based on size); however, in the UK this option was not 
exercised. Under current accounting rules for UK non-life insurance companies, 
their technical accounts generally report the underwriting result akin to a trading 
account whereas the non-technical account contains information on profit and loss 
at the firm level (Daykin and Cresswell, 2000). 
Another organisation that influences the financial reporting by insurance 
companies in the UK is the Association of British Insurers (ABI) through its 
publication called the Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP). Although not 
mandatory, these recommendations are generally followed by the UK insurance 
industry and are useful in explaining the confluence of the GAAP, the company 
law and wider regulatory environment. The ABI issued SORPs in 1990, 1998, 
2003, and most recently in December 2005. The latest SORP recommended the 
use of an annual basis to determine underwriting results by general insurers with 
funded accounting being effectively prohibited14 (General Insurance Manual, 
2008). 
                                            
14 The annual and funded bases of accounting refer to the way profits are recognised by 
the insurers. The annual basis requires the profits and losses of business written during 
the financial year to be recognised at the end of that financial year by setting up provisions 
for outstanding claims, unearned premiums and unexpired risk provisions, and by 
deferring an appropriate portion of the acquisition costs. Under the funded basis, the 
recognition of profits (but not losses) is deferred for up to three years after the end of the 
financial year in which the business incepts. 
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While annual and funded bases are the only bases under UK GAAP for insurance 
accounting, there are also two methods of reporting the underwriting performance 
of a general insurance business for regulatory return or other statistical or 
management purposes – namely the accident year basis and the underwriting 
year basis. The accident year basis measures performance in relation to the 
events and earnings of a financial period, irrespective of when the relevant policies 
were incepted. The underwriting year basis measures performance in relation to 
the ultimate losses and premiums written in respect of policies incepting in the 
relevant financial period, irrespective of when the events (premiums, claims and 
expenses) occur (General Insurance Manual, 2008).  
From January 1, 2005, all listed companies within the EU were required to adopt 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) when preparing 
consolidated group accounts following the implementation of EU Regulation 
(1606/2002). Under this directive, non-listed insurance groups or individual 
insurance companies can voluntarily use IFRS standards when preparing 
consolidated or individual accounts. Currently, IFRS 4 issued in 2004 by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is in force in the UK, which sets 
out the reporting requirements for insurance contracts. IFRS 4 applies to both, 
direct insurance and reinsurance contracts issued by an insurer, and to 
reinsurance contracts which it holds, and covers issues such as the accounting 
treatment of changes in reserves and disclosure. Moore, Drab, Christie and Shah 
(2004) suggest that IFRS 4 is the first step towards comprehensible and 
comparable financial statements underpinned by a single set of global accounting 
standards. However, the ABI SORP and UK GAAP remain relevant for the 
financial reporting of UK insurance companies as IFRS 4 requires insurers to 
continue to use the GAAP approvable in their Home State (General Insurance 
Manual, 2008). Sections 395 and 396 of the Companies Act (2006), along with 
Schedules 3 and 6 (part 3) to the Large and Medium Sized Companies and 
Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations - SI2008/410 (2008) prescribe the 
format for UK property-liability insurers’ financial statements. These documents 
make insurers’ financial statements compliant to UK GAAP. In addition, it is a legal 
requirement in the UK to follow the specific accounting format as laid out in these 
documents. Under existing UK insurance industry GAAP, insurers may continue to 
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report liabilities without discounting, but must continue to discount if that is the 
existing practice. Further, in the case of group companies, the same accounting 
standards should be followed for preparing the accounts of the parent and the 
subsidiary. However, if the insurer is using IFRS, UK company law allows an 
exemption from the UK GAAP. In light of the fact that the ABI SORP is based on 
UK company law, the accounts of UK-licensed insurance companies are likely to 
remain in the prescribed format until Phase II of the IASB’s project sets a new 
standard (expected to be issued in 2014) for insurance accounting (General 
Insurance Manual, 2008). 
2.6 Taxation 
For regulatory purposes, insurance is classified as long-term (e.g., life) business 
and general (property-liability) business. Historically, companies transacting life 
insurance and various other types of investment and savings business were taxed 
on their investment income for the benefit of the policyholders and investors, and 
companies carrying on general insurance business on the balance of their profits. 
For composites, life insurance is treated as a separate business according to 
provisions made in section 431H (2) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 
(ICTA), 1988, which distinguishes between life insurance and other insurance 
businesses. 
Before 1998, general insurers were taxed as any other company trading in the UK 
under the provisions of Case I of Schedule D of the ICTA88/S18, on the full 
amounts of profits and gains. In the absence of statutory guidance on computing 
the annual profit or gains of a trade, precedents from case law have formed the 
basis of taxation regime (General Insurance Manual, 2008). Cases addressing the 
relationship between the taxable and commercial profits have been instrumental in 
the establishment of the principle that the full annual profits or gains are to be 
determined by ordinary principles of commercial accounting, provided that there is 
no express statutory rule which requires otherwise. However, one important 
distinction between insurers and non-insurers is that FRS 12 (in respect of 
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provisioning) does not apply to the insurance contracts (General Insurance 
Manual, 2008).  
Subsequently, general insurers were subject to the Finance Act (1998), section 42, 
with requirement that for Case I, the profits were to be computed “on an 
accounting basis which gives a true and fair view”. Later, section 42 of the Finance 
Act, 1998 was amended to incorporate the term ‘generally accepted accounting 
practice’ (GAAP), by section 103 of the Finance Act (2002), which also introduced 
a new section 836A into the Income and Corporation Taxes Act (1988) providing a 
definition of GAAP. However, the Income and Corporation Taxes Act (1988), 
section 836A too was subsequently repealed by the Finance Act (2005), which 
revised the legislation to deal with International Accounting Standards. The 
Financial Reporting Council (the UK’s independent financial reporting regulator) 
also made it clear that the ‘true and fair view’ remained a cornerstone of financial 
reporting in the UK and the companies adopting IFRS are also subject to this 
requirement. Thus, Case I principles apply to general insurance with some 
adaptations to the particular circumstances of insurance, for example, the non-
taxable assessment of annual surplus emerging on mutual insurance business, 
and establishment of technical provisions under rules different from the generally 
applicable FRS 12 (General Insurance Manual, 2008). Thus, the taxation of 
general insurers is, with certain exceptions, largely dependent on the balance of 
their overall profit & loss account (taking into account both the underwriting and 
investment profit or loss) drawn in accordance with UK GAAP or IFRS 4 principles 
as discussed in section 2.4.  
Despite the distinction in treatment of different organisational forms (viz. stock or 
mutual) under the tax system, the overall tax schedule for every type of UK 
insurance company is progressive (convex) with increasing annual reported 
income resulting in a higher marginal rate of taxation. This is an important feature 
in the context of this study, as taxation becomes one of the determinants of the 
purchase of reinsurance by insurers in the UK in the wake of a convex tax regime. 
In the same vein, Abdul-Kader, Adams and Mouratidis (2010, p. 496) explain that 
“...under a convex schedule, risk transfer via reinsurance enables insurers to 
reduce income volatility and lock into a certain level of future earnings that is taxed 
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more favourably than would otherwise be the case with risk retention”. Similarly, 
Mayers and Smith (1990, p. 21) assert that “...since insurance firms typically face 
a significant probability of taxable income within the convex region, the purchase 
of reinsurance can reduce the firm's expected tax liability by reducing the volatility 
of pretax income”. Thus, apart from risk management, reinsurance becomes a 
useful tool for tax management as well. 
2.7 UK as an Environment within which to Conduct this Study 
As mentioned in section 2.2 of this chapter, the UK’s non-life insurance market is a 
large international insurance market. The amount of revenue generated and 
investments made by the insurers and reinsurers in the UK economy make the 
findings of this study potentially non-trivial for a number of stakeholders, viz., 
shareholders, managers and regulators. As is evident from the discussions 
presented in section 2.3 of this chapter, the regulation in the UK is targeted at 
maintaining the confidence of investors and protecting the contractual rights of the 
policyholder-customers. The insurance industry regulations have evolved to 
become more comprehensive with the implementation of a risk-principles based 
approach to solvency over the period of this study. However, regulation in the UK 
has remained a ‘lighter touch’ compared with the risk-based capital solvency 
requirements prevailing in the US. Therefore, the evolution of the UK’s regulatory 
regime has not resulted in regulatory requirements intervening with the industry’s 
capability to innovate and introduce new products in the market. The effect of this 
difference in regulatory approach could be interesting in terms of comparing the 
results of this study and US-focused research of a similar nature.  
A unitary (homogenous) regulatory regime is another key institutional feature of 
the UK insurance market. This is in contrast to the US insurance market where 
regulation is the responsibility of the State-based regulators. Standards issued by 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) are used in the US 
to coordinate regulation activity between the States. However, as these standards 
are not mandatory, there are some regulatory differences between the States. 
Moreover, the US-based insurers are subject to premium rate regulation, which is 
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not the case in the UK (Nelson, 2000). Thus, the premiums charged by the 
insurers in the UK’s non-life insurance market are governed mainly by market 
forces (e.g., competition). These attributes of the UK’s non-life insurance market 
facilitate potentially ‘cleaner’ tests of research questions put forward in this study. 
As mentioned in section 2.5 earlier, accounting practices in the UK’s non-life 
insurance sector have kept pace with changes in the regulations. Since 2005, non-
life insurers in the UK are required to produce their annual accounts in accordance 
with the UK GAAP or IFRS 4, which intend to present a ‘true and fair’ view of the 
financial condition of the company. These set of accounts are also used for 
calculating the tax liability of the insurers. The ‘fair value accounting’ followed 
under the UK GAAP/IFRS 4 tries to value assets and liabilities at, or close to, their 
true market values; therefore it can induce volatility in the claim reserve, tax 
liability and capital adequacy calculations. The amount recoverable under a 
reinsurance treaty however, is independent of common valuation parameters 
(such as interest rates); hence, purchase of reinsurance can be instrumental in 
reducing the volatility induced by mark-to-market accounting. Moreover, the supply 
of reinsurance in the UK insurance market is not distorted by discrimination 
against foreign reinsurers as is the case in the US (Cole and McCullough, 2006). 
Browne and Ju (2009) report that the foreign reinsurers in the US are required to 
fully fund the claims arising in the current period and the reserves for future claims 
from US-cedants in the form of funds on deposit/trust accounts or a letter of credit. 
These requirements can distort the supply of reinsurance in the US insurance 
market, whereas the UK non-life insurance market is free of any such supply-side 
distortions. Furthermore, the extent of the reinsurance cover purchased is a free 
managerial decision in the UK non-life insurance sector, in contrast with some 
other jurisdictions, such as China, where the purchasing of reinsurance is 
mandatory. These regulatory features potentially make the results obtained in this 
study free of regulation induced biases. 
Given the large number of players in the general insurance market competing for 
the same set of investors and customers, reinsurance can be a useful tool for 
signalling the financial health of an insurer, capacity building, and strategic capital 
and risk management. Given the size of the market; homogeneity of the 
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regulations; and independence of managers to purchase reinsurance from 
statutory requirements, the UK is considered to be ideal environment in which to 
conduct this study. Thus, reinsurance as a capital and risk management tool and 
its interaction with the cost of capital become important considerations for 
commercial as well as regulatory applications in the UK insurance market.  
2.8 Conclusion 
Insurance is an important and substantial part of the UK economy. Given its 
importance in respect of its social as well as economic impact, it is only inevitable 
that the UK insurance industry should be well regulated and solvent. The 
regulatory environment has changed over the time period covered by this study, 
from that of ‘freedom with publicity’ to a more ‘principles-risk based’ approach. 
This trend is likely to continue and regulations are likely to become less formulaic 
and more insurer-specific in future with the advent of Solvency II (in 2016). 
Maintaining a healthy solvency margin nevertheless remains the corner-stone of 
the UK’s regulatory framework and statutory reporting plays a quintessential role in 
establishing that UK insurers are solvent and remain ‘going concerns’. The use of 
reinsurance and the consideration of the cost of capital are therefore important in 
maintaining the future financial viability of general insurers in both the UK and 
elsewhere. This chapter also outlines the merits of the UK as an institutional 
environment for examining the link between reinsurance and the cost of capital. 
The theoretical context within which this study will be conducted is now explored in 
the next two chapters of this thesis. 
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 LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 3.
3.1 Introduction 
Many theories have been put forward in the financial literature to explain the 
interaction between risk management and firm value (cost of equity). Chief among 
them are the expected-utility theory, the portfolio theory, the option pricing theory, the 
signalling theory, transaction cost economics, the agency theory and the theory of 
optimal capital structure. These theories utilise various frameworks and concepts, 
such as utility maximisation, risk aversion and the efficient market hypothesis, to 
establish how risk management can add to corporate value. Assumptions made by 
these theories vary considerably from one theory to another; hence there is a lack of 
consistency in explaining the nature of reinsurance markets. Moreover, these theories 
are also subject to the positive versus normative tension inherent in the rest of 
economics. In the context of this chapter, these theories will be used as positive-
descriptive theories to characterise the risk management – firm value relation. 
However, the nature of descriptive and prescriptive theories is first described in 
section 3.2 below. 
3.2 Positive – Descriptive Theories 
Lipsey and Chrystal (2011) argue that the main aim of a theory is to either describe 
the way the world works or the way the world should work. If a theory tries to answer 
the first question, then it is called a positive-descriptive theory; otherwise it is 
described as a normative-prescriptive theory. Theories of the latter kind require value 
judgements, which invariably involve issues of personal opinion, hence cannot be 
settled by recourse to facts (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2011). Therefore, a researcher is 
unable to assess the validity of normative statements or theories without making a 
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value judgement. In words of Jensen (1983, p. 320) “…answers to the normative 
questions always depend on the choice of the criterion or the objective function which 
is a matter of values. Therefore normative propositions are never refutable by 
evidence”. In contrast, positive theories attempt to describe the matters of fact, which 
may be actual or alleged. In the realm of positive theory, a researcher hypothesizes 
about some aspect of the behaviour of the world, which can be refuted if the evidence 
is found to support the contrary. Not only this, even if a positive theory involves a 
value judgement, it does not require invoking a value judgement to test it. These 
features of positive theory have made it an instrument of choice in the fields of 
scientific inquiry including economics and finance. Within the fields of 
economics/finance, the term ‘positive’ has been used to describe many aspects of a 
theory. For example, Coddington (1972) asserts that the term ‘positivist’ is a synonym 
for non-evaluative, non-metaphysical, non-hypothetical, non-speculative, testable, 
observable, operational, and predictive. These attributes bring studies in economics 
and finance closer in character to those in natural sciences. In the same vein, Keita 
(1997) reports that due to its relationship with positivism, scholars view contemporary 
economic research as qualifying for a cognitive status of being scientific.  
Without knowing the way the world works, it is impossible to decide the best way for it 
to work. Hence, answers to positive questions are necessary inputs for informed 
normative judgements, such as policy decisions. On the other hand, opponents of the 
positive theory argue that choices made by researchers in respect of research 
question, environment, methodology and the objective function are value judgements; 
so a research study can never be absolutely positive. To counter this, proponents of 
positivism point out that the function relating the value of an objective function to the 
values of other variables in a model arises from positive theory. As Jensen (1983, p. 
321) states “…while the choice of the objective or maximand … is a value judgement 
and therefore a normative issue, knowledge of the valuation function itself (that is, the 
function that relates the value of the maximand to the values of the endogenous and 
exogenous variables) is a positive issue and requires a theory”. Given these 
considerations, it is no surprise that the positive-descriptive school of thought has 
been employed extensively in the field of financial economics research. By the same 
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token, Smith (1986) adds that positive-descriptive thought has become the central 
theme of insurance and financial services (e.g., banking) research since the 1950s. 
The following is now a review of these positive-descriptive economic theories that 
have been applied to explain the effect of risk management on the financial condition 
of a firm. 
3.3 Analysis of Positive-Descriptive Theories 
The extant literature uses various models and frameworks to analyse and explain the 
corporate purchase of reinsurance. The risk exchange model, the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM), the option pricing model and principal-agent models are chief 
amongst them. Key theories motivating these models are the expected utility theory, 
corporate finance theory and associated hypotheses/theories based on market 
imperfections. Each of these underlying frameworks is described in following sub-
sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.7. 
3.3.1 Expected Utility Theory 
Developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), the expected utility theory 
postulates that investors are risk-averse utility maximisers15. Investors’ risk-aversion 
dictates the expected utility functions to be concave, and defines the decision rule 
under uncertainty as a trade-off between risk and return. More specifically, a risk-
averse investor is expected to either maximise return at a given level of risk, or to 
minimise risk at a given level of return. Thus, the risk-return trade-off is an important 
feature of expected utility theory. Prior research has used risk-aversion as one of the 
fundamental factors to explain the purchase of insurance by individuals and 
corporates (e.g., see Schlesinger, 1981; Szpiro, 1985). Therefore, expected utility 
theory provides a conceptually useful basis to understand insurance markets. Studies 
attempting to explain the insurer-reinsurer relation using an expected utility framework 
treat insurers as risk-averse organisations searching for trading possibilities within the 
                                            
15 Utility is a scale of measurement of the satisfaction derived from having monetary wealth.  
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insurance markets. The academic literature lists two basic approaches used to 
analyse reinsurance within the utility maximisation framework. According to Eden and 
Kahane (1988, p. 247), the first approach assumes that reinsurance exists as a loss-
sharing arrangement between the insurer and reinsurer in ‘hierarchical chains’, while 
the second approach views reinsurance as part of a risk-sharing pool used to 
redistribute the risks underwritten. Assumptions implicit in both these views of the 
reinsurance is that all companies evaluate their portfolio using their respective utility 
functions and that the claims are normally distributed. Combining these assumptions 
with alternative approaches enumerated by Eden and Kahane’s (1988) optimal 
reinsurance arrangements (e.g., proportional or non-proportional) can be identified.  
The seminal work on traditional actuarial models, which emphasises the risk pooling 
aspect of reinsurance markets, is attributed to Borch (1960; 1962). Assuming a 
Pareto-optimal allocation of risk, Borch (1962) showed that reinsurance can be seen 
as a risk-pooling arrangement where each company pays a share of each claim 
proportional to their risk tolerance. This model of insurance markets is known as the 
risk exchange model. According to the risk exchange model, insurance markets are 
envisioned as markets of ‘pure exchange’ comprising insurance companies looking to 
optimise their portfolio of insurance contracts via risk-sharing. In these markets, the 
risks underwritten by each firm are characterised by two elements. The first element, 
Fj(xj), represents the probability that the total amount of claims (Lj) contained in 
insurer j’s portfolio will not exceed a certain threshold level xj. The second element, Sj, 
denotes the funds available to the company to pay these claims. Hence, the expected 
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Before the risk sharing takes place, the company ‘j’ is liable to pay only for the claims 
arising from its own portfolio. The situation however will be different after the 
exchange of risk in the reinsurance markets, as risk-pooling will result in the 
redistribution of the liabilities of insurance companies. The reinsurance treaties arising 
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from the risk exchange within the pool of ‘n’ companies can be represented by a set 
of ‘n’ functions, where each function yj(x1,x2,…,xn) is the amount to be paid by 
company ‘j’ if claims on respective portfolios amount to x1,x2,…,xn. Since the 
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At the conclusion of these treaties, the utility function of each of these companies can 
be represented as: 
  R jjjj xdFySuU )())(()( xy    ( 3.3 ) 
F(x) in equation 3.3 above represents the joint probability distribution of x1, x2,…, xn; 
and x and y denote the vectors [x1,…,xn] and [y1(x),…,yn(x)] respectively. Assuming 
companies to be utility maximising rational agents, only the set of treaties which 
maximise the utility for all the insurers will be accepted. In other words, the set of 
treaties represented by vector y will not be accepted if there exists, for all ‘j’, another 
set of treaties with a corresponding vector ỹ, such that 
)~()( yy jj UU      ( 3.4 ) 
If there exists a set of treaties y such that no alternative set ỹ satisfying inequality 
(3.4) above can be found, then treaties in y set are said to be ‘Pareto-optimal’. 
Assuming utility functions to be of an exponential form, which represent constant 
absolute risk aversion, Borch (1962), Baton and Lemaire (1981), Lemaire and 
Quairiere (1986) amongst others conclude that proportional reinsurance is an optimal 
risk sharing arrangement. Under similar assumptions in conjunction with the 
assumption of hierarchical reinsurance markets, Gerber (1984) arrives at the same 
conclusion. However, these risk exchange models do have drawbacks, which must 
be described here. 
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The first drawback of expected utility based models is that they require the utility 
function of a specific form (e.g. exponential or quadratic) to be assumed for the 
decision maker. As Doherty (2000) explains, for expected utility theory to be applied, 
it is necessary to calculate the expected utility of the decision-maker according to the 
precise form of his/her utility function. In practice, however, the precise form of the 
utility function cannot be determined. Helten and Beck (1983) point out that risk 
exchange models fail to explain the frequent use of mixed coverage or non-
proportional reinsurance arrangements. Eden and Kahane (1988, p. 249) question 
the assumption of risk aversion by arguing that “…diversified corporations with large 
numbers of shareholders must demonstrate risk neutrality: non-neutral utility 
considerations should not be employed, therefore, to explain the insurer-reinsurer 
interface”. Doherty and Tinic (1981) add that expected utility-based arguments 
overlook the capital markets where the financial claims of insurers are traded. Garven 
(1987) further argues that expected utility theory does not take into account key 
environmental factors, such as the state of market competition and regulation. 
Schelsinger and Doherty (1985) also point that the expected utility framework ignores 
the interaction between different sources of risk. These shortcomings therefore 
prevent expected utility theory from providing a suitable explanation for capital 
structure and risk management decisions made by the corporations.   
3.3.2 Portfolio Theory 
Based on a set of simplifying assumptions about the behaviour of individual investors, 
Markowitz (1952), in his seminal work, derived the portfolio theory of risk. Like the 
expected utility theory, the portfolio theory also assumes investors to be rational and 
risk-averse utility maximisers. As Ryan (2007, p. 85) explains “…it is assumed that all 
investors are strictly rational in that they seek to maximise their own utility and have 
the ability to do so in a consistent and transitive way”. Portfolio theory further 
assumes that markets are free of frictional costs, such as transaction costs and taxes. 
In markets characterised by these assumptions, rational investors hold numerous 
risky assets in pursuit of an efficient portfolio. According to Jensen and Smith (1984), 
a portfolio is said to be an efficient portfolio if it provides both the maximum expected 
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return for a given level of risk and minimum risk corresponding to an expected level of 
return. Based on these criteria, the risk reduction through diversification leads to an 
increase in the value of the portfolio. 
The key insight of portfolio theory is that portfolio risk can be reduced by 
diversification. In words of Doherty (2000, p. 87) “…diversification it seems, helps us 
to avoid, or at least minimize, the probability of extreme outcomes. The same 
mechanism helps to explain how insurance functions and can be put to work to 
identify strategies for corporate risk management”. According to the portfolio theory, 
an important property of risky assets is that they respond to changes in market 
conditions in ways which are statistically measurable (Ryan, 2007). Thus, within the 
framework of portfolio theory, statistical parameters, such as mean and variance, can 
be used to measure the return and risk of an investment. In this scenario, portfolio 
optimisation can be achieved through the trade-off of the mean and variance of the 
multivariate distribution arising from a combination of various risky assets in a well-
diversified portfolio. These arguments suggest that managing portfolio risk is of 
paramount importance for individual investors, but do not explain the use risk 
management at the corporate level. Following is a discussion of corporate risk 
management from the perspective of portfolio theory.  
Both the CAPM (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964) and Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) work 
on the capital structure of a firm, are consistent with the portfolio theory. CAPM is 
widely used to estimate the corporate cost of capital (e.g. see Arnold and 
Hatzopoulos, 2000; Botosan, 2000), and is based on the idea that the market 
compensates only for the non-diversifiable market-wide risks as firm-specific 
(idiosyncratic) risks are diversified away by rational investors by constructing 
diversified portfolios. Under this paradigm, a firm’s cost of equity (market value) is 
determined solely by the sensitivity of the firm’s stock return to systematic risk 
(Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005). CAPM beta is the metric that captures the sensitivity 
of the firm’s stock return to systematic risk within this framework. Similarly, the 
‘irrelevance proposition’ of Modigliani and Miller (1958) states that capital structure 
and firm value are mutually independent, implying that capital structure does not have 
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any bearing on risk management. This is because firm-specific risks can be 
diversified away by the investors on their own account, and so risk reduction by the 
use of reinsurance is redundant. Using similar reasoning, Main (1982) suggests that 
risk management (reinsurance) can lead to a value reduction for shareholders due to 
the costs involved in risk management (reinsurance)-related transactions. These 
arguments therefore lead to the notion that risk management at best can be a zero 
NPV transaction with the scope for turning into a value-destroying negative NPV 
transaction.  
There are however many exceptions to the predictions made by the portfolio theory. 
For example, studies such as Mayers and Smith (1990) and Main (1982) report that in 
practice, corporate insurance purchases are common, even amongst large and 
widely-held corporations. These observations point towards the limitations of portfolio 
theory in explaining the existence of reinsurance markets. An important limitation of 
the CAPM is that it overlooks the risk that the firm may become insolvent. Fairley 
(1979) argues that it is extremely difficult to treat the risk of insolvency within the 
framework of the CAPM. Insolvency risk however is an important predictor of the 
purchase of reinsurance by the insurers (e.g. see Browne and Hoyt, 1995; Mayers 
and Smith, 1990). According to O'Brien (2006), the management of idiosyncratic 
risks, such as through the use of reinsurance, is taken into account by business 
practitioners while valuing individual firms, as it can add value for shareholders by 
reducing uncertainty in future cash flows. Therefore, the inability of portfolio theory to 
account for important considerations in risk estimation and valuation render it 
inappropriate for analysing risk management through the use of reinsurance, and its 
impact on the cost of the equity of an insurer. 
3.3.3 Option Pricing Theory 
Insurance firms can be viewed as leveraged entities with the majority of their debt 
(liability) being raised in insurance markets through premiums paid by policyholder-
customers (Hancock, Huber and Koch, 2001). Insurance policies used to raise this 
‘debt capital’ have many option-like features, as the payments to policyholders are 
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contingent upon the occurrence of certain predefined events. Within the framework of 
option pricing theory, the value of these contingent claims can be modelled using five 
factors – the price of the underlying asset, the risk of the underlying asset, the risk-
free rate of return, the exercise price, and the time to maturity (e.g., see Black and 
Scholes, 1973; Cox, Ross and Rubinstein, 1979; Merton, 1973). The key 
assumptions made by option pricing theory are that financial markets are arbitrage-
free, frictionless and perfect. Due to its applicability to the pricing of most financial 
assets, option pricing theory finds its application in almost all areas of corporate 
finance (Cox et al., 1979; Weston and Copeland, 1992). Several researchers have 
implemented the option pricing model to insurance pricing (e.g. see Cummins, 1990, 
1991; Doherty and Garven, 1986). Using the put-call parity condition of European 
type options16, Cummins (1990), and Cummins and Phillips (2000) have derived the 







   ( 3.5 ) 
In equation (3.5) above, A denotes the value of the insurer’s assets; L is the value of 
the insurer’s liabilities at the expiration date; rf is the risk-free interest rate; C(A, L, τ) is 
the value of the call option on assets A at strike price L with time to expiry τ; and P(A, 
L, τ) is the value of put option on assets A at strike price L with time to expiry τ. Thus, 
option pricing theory is capable of incorporating the insolvency risk in explaining the 
nature of the insurance markets. Indeed, Cummins and Sommer (1996) developed a 
model based on option pricing theory which predicts a positive relationship between 
insurer capital and insolvency risk. 
Option theory enables inquiry into the insurance markets at the firm level as well. For 
instance, Black and Scholes (1973) posit that the equity of a levered firm can be 
viewed as a call option on the market value of the firm with strike price equal to the 
face value of the firm’s liabilities. As long as the market value of the firm exceeds the 
liabilities, the equity of the firm is valuable to shareholders. However, if the liabilities 
exceed the market value of the firm, then the option expires out-of-money and the 
                                            
16 A European type option can only be exercised at expiry date, whereas an American type 
option can be exercised at any time before expiry date. 
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ownership of the firm is transferred to the debtholders (policyholders) of the firm who 
are able to salvage only a proportion of their losses. This feature of the limited liability 
of equity is valuable to shareholders and is referred to as “the default put option” by 
Doherty (2000). Therefore the equity of an insurance firm can be valued by adding 
the value of this put option to the difference of market value of the firm and its 
liabilities (Doherty, 2000). On the other hand, the ‘fair price’ of insurance can also be 
obtained by subtracting the value of the shareholders’ default put option from the 
present value of policyholders’ losses. That is: 
),,(  LAPLe rf       ( 3.6 ) 
The price calculated using equation (3.6) is consistent with the view of Hsieh, Chen 
and Ferris (1994), who argue that holding an insurance policy is similar to holding a 
put option written by the insurer. Further, Doherty (2000) contends that managing the 
value of the default put option held by shareholders lies at the heart of corporate risk 
management. Since the value of the default put option affects the value of the claims 
held by both the shareholders and the policyholders on the firm’s assets, a game 
ensues between these (rational) parties to ‘coerce’ the value of the default put option 
in their favour. As shown by equations (3.5) and (3.6) above, the value of the default 
put option is dependent on the value of the liabilities along with the value of assets 
and time to expiry of the option. As the value of liabilities increases, so does the risk 
associated with the firm’s earnings and the value of the default put option. This leads 
to an increase in the cost of the capital of the firm along with a decrease in the fair 
price of insurance policies issued by the firm. This may lead to a reduced market 
share and profitability of the insurer. Therefore, option pricing theory can provide 
useful insights into the nature of (re)insurance markets.  
The options theory, however, is not a panacea. Rubinstein (1974) points out that 
application of the option pricing theory is limited to options with underlying assets that 
can consistently be valued with some degree of certainty. Unlike options written on 
tradable financial assets (e.g., shares), options with insurance contracts as underlying 
assets are not readily tradable in capital markets. Doherty (2000) suggests that due to 
the different distributional characteristics of return on insurance risks and other readily 
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tradable financial securities, the application of option pricing theory could be 
inappropriate in case of insurance markets. Due to these considerations, the 
application of option pricing theory in the context of the current study is deemed to be 
inappropriate. 
 
3.3.4 Signalling Theory 
Based on the notion of information asymmetry between insiders (managers) and 
outsiders (investors) the signalling theory posits that the former has more information 
than the latter (e.g. see Bhattacharya, 1979; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Ross, 1977). 
Due to various reasons, such as increasing the traded value of the firm and/or 
decreasing the cost of capital, managers have incentives to signal inside (‘good 
news’) information to other stakeholders, especially investors. Generally used 
instruments for signalling are dividend policy, capital structure mix and risk 
management policy (e.g., see Brennan, 1995; Talmor, 1981). While managers are 
eager to inform the market about any value enhancing positive news, they attempt to 
minimise the impact of any value destroying negative information along with 
protecting confidential proprietary information Botosan (2000).  
The use of different instruments for signalling has given rise to various hypotheses 
based on signalling theory. From the perspective of the capital structure mix, 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis postulates that issuing debt can be used to 
mitigate agency problems and simultaneously signal the managerial confidence in the 
future earnings potential of the firm to meet its debt repayment obligations. In the 
same vein, Botosan (1997, 2000) avers that the effect of accounting (financial) 
disclosures on the cost of capital can be explained by signalling theory. Easley and 
O'Hara (2004) also propose that the improved quality of information disclosure 
reduces the cost of capital by ‘levelling the playing field’ for investors. Similarly, it has 
been reported in the literature that risk management tools, such as (re)insurance, are 
used by managers to signal firm quality (e.g. see DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995; Tufano, 
1996). The reason why hedging can act as a signalling device is due to the fact that it 
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can reduce the effect of external forces, such as macroeconomic factors or natural 
catastrophes, on a firm’s earnings, therefore enhancing the informational value of the 
financial statements prepared by the firm. As Doherty (2000) suggests, corporate risk 
management can reduce the volatility induced in earnings due to transient events, 
resulting in earnings estimates that reflect the true underlying value of the firm.  
Campbell and Kracaw (1990) contend that risk management can be used to signal 
the surety of return to stakeholders other than shareholders, e.g. debt holders. It is an 
important consideration for insurers as their customers account for a very large 
proportion of their liabilities. Based on these arguments, Levy and Lazarovich-Porat 
(1995) suggest that signalling theory creates a link between observed management 
practices and financial theory, thus reducing the gap between the theory and practice. 
According to Paul (1992), signals that reduce uncertainty about a firm’s ability to 
provide a given expected return on investment are more highly valued by investors. 
Wakker et al. (1997) contend that policyholder-customers are likely to pay higher 
premiums for policies issued by an insurer that has a higher probability of paying for 
incurred losses. Therefore, as reinsurance can improve the ability of an insurer to 
meet its liabilities, it can be used as a signalling device. As a result, signalling theory 
could provide a plausible explanation for the purchase of reinsurance by primary 
insurers.  
Despite its appealing features, signalling theory has received some criticism in the 
financial literature. For example, Levy and Lazarovich-Porat (1995, p. 39) opine that 
“…it is difficult, if not impossible, to test signalling effects empirically”. Brennan (1995) 
points out that the choice of objective function ascribed to insiders (managers) 
remains arbitrary within the framework of signalling theory. He further adds that 
signalling theory does not make clear why one signalling device or a combination of 
signalling devices is preferred over others. Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) also caution 
against the susceptibility of signalling theory based hypotheses to endogeneity 
amongst variables and sample selection bias. In line with the assertion made by 
Puelz (1992), that signalling theory finds limited application in empirical research, this 
framework is thus deemed unsuitable to be used in the context of the present study. 
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3.3.5 Transaction Cost Economics 
Williamson (2005, p. 41) defines Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) as “…an effort to 
better understand complex economic organization by selectively joining law, 
economics, and organization theory”. He further elaborates that by employing discrete 
structural analysis, TCE describes firms as governance structures, which are 
concerned with the allocation of economic activity across alternative modes of 
organisation (markets, firms, bureaus, etc.). The choice of these governance 
structures in a firm are dictated by three behavioural characteristics of the firm’s 
stakeholders - bounded rationality, opportunism, and risk neutrality17 (Chiles and 
McMackin, 1996). According to Blair and Kaserman (1983), transaction costs are 
dependent on the interaction between bounded rationality, opportunism and 
transaction specific factors (e.g., asset specificity). Many scholars argue that there 
exist multiple governance structures to organise economic transactions (e.g. see 
Williamson, 1979). These structures include many hybrid intermediate modes within 
the extremes of centralised hierarchies and fragmented individual market contracting-
based structures. Shelanski and Klein (1995) argue that the main tenet of the TCE is 
that managers and other stakeholders strive to align contractual relationships with the 
adopted governance structure so as to minimize the costs of transacting business. 
They further add that due to TCE’s applicability to a wide range of transactions, it 
finds application in numerous fields, viz. corporate finance, marketing, regulation, 
amongst others.  
Reinsurance is essentially a financial contract that provides the insurer with 
contingent post-loss finance (Mayers and Smith, 1990). Froot (2007) states that the 
benefits and costs of a corporation holding risk underpin most of the financial policy 
decisions.  Similarly, Grillet (1992) argues that risk management decisions could be 
perceived as integral components of the capital structure optimisation process 
because a firm can increase its debt capacity by reducing the costs of financial 
                                            
17 Limitations arising due to inability of the rational economic agents in defining, describing, or 
pre-specifying responses to all future contingencies lead to bounded rationality (e.g. see Hart, 
1995). Williamson (1979, p. 41) defines opportunism as “…a variety of self-interest seeking 
but extends simple self-interest seeking to include self-interest seeking with guile”. 
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distress through risk management. In the case of the insurance industry, transacting 
reinsurance is simultaneously a capital structure as well as a risk management 
decision, which can be analysed using the TCE framework. By the same token, 
Bjuggren (1995) analyses the nexus between capital structure, costs of financial 
distress and insurance and concludes that the degree of asset specificity may be the 
motivating factor for corporate purchase of insurance. Since reinsurance redistributes 
the risks underwritten by the insurers, it can be viewed as a mechanism for improving 
the efficiency of governance structures within the domain of the insurance industry. 
Moreover, by providing advisory services to cedants especially in the case of unique 
risks, reinsurers can improve the pricing technology used by the insurers. Further, the 
monitoring of insurance company mangers by reinsurers can lead to a reduction in 
the agency costs between managers and investors. In the same vein, Skogh (1991) 
states that external monitoring by insurers inhibits the opportunistic behaviour by 
managers of the insured entity.  
Despite its conceptual appeal, a few major limitations of TCE have been reported in 
the academic literature. Due its limited economic view of individual and firm 
behaviour, TCE neglects some important factors involved in the corporate insurance 
purchasing decision, such as the risk reduction effects of business diversification and 
the regulatory status of the firms (Speklé, 2001). The key variables required in any 
TCE based study, (viz. the uncertainty and frequency of loss events), are difficult to 
measure consistently across firms and so a TCE framework is not easily applicable to 
empirical research (Shelanski and Klein, 1995). Moreover, Williamson (1988, p. 589) 
points out that “…by contrast with the formal modelling apparatus associated with 
much of the financial economics literature, the transaction-cost economics approach 
to corporate governance and corporate finance is of a relatively preformal kind”. 
Uncertainties regarding the importance of transaction costs in influencing corporate 
risk management decisions such as insurance, leave substantial scope for more 
precise analysis (Main, 2000). These limitations thus rule out the use of TCE in the 
context of the current study. 
53 
 
3.3.6 Agency Theory 
Like TCE, agency theory assumes economic agents to be risk-averse and self-
interested utility maximisers governed by bounded rationality (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Agency theory further assumes that the relationships between different groups of 
economic agents, such as investors (principals) and managers (agents), are 
established through contracts (Baiman, 1990). Due to the separation of ownership 
from operational control, there is potential for information asymmetry which leads to 
contracting problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976)18. This could lead to inefficient contracts that allow agents to take decisions that 
are not perfectly aligned with principals’ interests. Therefore, the key tenet of agency 
theory is that “…the principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization 
of information and risk bearing costs” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 59). 
In agency theory, there are two key agency relationships; first, between owners and 
managers, and second between debtholders and owners. Scordis and Porat (1998) 
suggest different utility functions for principals and agents as the key reason for the 
divergence of interests of owners and managers. Tihanyi and Ellstrand (1998) add 
that due to the inability of managers to diversify their employment risk, they may have 
a different attitude to risk compared with shareholders. Similarly, Eisenhardt (1989) 
suggests that agency problems between managers, owners, and creditors can arise 
from differences in the nature of their economic claims. For instance, in the case of a 
leveraged firm with efficient executive compensation contracts, managers may take 
financing and/or investment decisions that favour equityholders at the expense of 
debtholders. As Doherty (2000) asserts, managers/owners can use asset substitution 
and/or underinvestment to reduce debtholders’ utility. Thus, to control the 
opportunistic behaviour of cooperating groups, contracting constituents use 
monitoring (e.g., audits) and contracts to protect their respective economic interests. 
In the case of insurance companies, the agency relationship between managers, 
                                            
18 Adverse selection in this context arises from incomplete information available to the 
owners/investors when appointing managers for the insurance company. Thus, adverse 
selection can result in the appointment of manager(s) whose interests are not perfectly 
aligned with those of the owners. This can give rise to the problem of moral hazard as 
managers can take imprudent risks which are detrimental to the firm-value.   
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owners and debtholders is made more complex by the fact that the majority of their 
debtholders are also their customers. Insurance policyholders are the vulnerable 
group in this arrangement due to their inability to diversify the insured risk over many 
insurers (Froot, 2007). Regulators in this context can be seen as the monitors who 
protect the interests of the policyholder-customers against their disadvantage. 
Regulation, however, imposes some costs (e.g. regulatory reporting) on the insurers, 
which are likely to be passed on to the customers, thus increasing the cost of 
insurance. Further, regulation is unlikely to alleviate completely agency incentive 
conflicts between owners and the managers. Nevertheless, reinsurance can provide 
surety of claim payments to policyholders, and monitor the activities of insurance 
company managers to minimise the risk of asset substitution and/or underinvestment.  
Proponents of agency theory point out that hypotheses postulated using agency 
theory based constructs are empirically testable (e.g. see Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Moreover, they have been successful in explaining the corporate purchase of 
insurance (e.g. see MacMinn, 1987; Mayers and Smith, 1981, 1982, 1987; Zou, 2010; 
Zou and Adams, 2008). Garven and MacMinn (1993) argue that the corporate 
purchase of insurance reduces the severity of asset substitution and underinvestment 
problems, which in turn reduces their market cost of capital19. Grillet (1992) contends 
that by providing post-loss job security to managers, insurance can lower the agency 
conflicts between managers and owners. Further, Han (1996) adds that corporate 
insurance can facilitate efficient incentive compensation that aligns the interests of 
managers with that of the owners. These analyses based on agency theory have led 
to various hypotheses that have been empirically tested by several studies (e.g. Core, 
                                            
19 The underinvestment problem is likely to arise when a highly levered insurance firm suffers 
unexpectedly severe losses. In such circumstances, shareholders may be motivated to 
exercise their default put option under limited liability rules and ‘walk away’ from the firm 
leaving policyholders with unrecoverable losses (i.e., the so-called ‘debt over-hang’ effect). 
However, reinsurance can help mitigate the underinvestment incentive by providing post-loss 
financing for the assets destroyed/impaired by catastrophe (e.g., see Garven and MacMinn, 
1993). Reinsurance can also control the asset substitution problem whereby the 
shareholders/managers of insurance firms may seek to increase asset risk after writing 
policies with (fixed claimant) policyholders (e.g., see Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For 
example, ex-post asset risk shifting (and other moral hazard effects) can be controlled by the 
terms and conditions of reinsurance policies as well as the monitoring and auditing activities 
of reinsurance companies (e.g., see Doherty and Smetters, 2005). 
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1997; Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Mayers and Smith, 1990). Despite its appealing 
features, such as the ability to facilitate empirical research, agency theory has not 
been without its critics. For example, Nilakant and Rao (1994) suggest that human 
attributes of trust and fairness in business relationships are overlooked by agency 
theory. Baiman (1990) argues that principal-agent models are highly stylised and 
simplified. Leland (1998) also points out that the asset substitution problem does lead 
to agency costs, but their importance is rather small in comparison to the other 
determinants (e.g., leverage) of capital structure and risk management choices made 
by the firm. In view of these limitations of agency theory, it is unsuitable to be used as 
the framework for the current study.  
3.3.7 Theory of Optimal Capital Structure 
As noted earlier in sub-section 3.2.2, Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) seminal work 
establishes that in efficient markets with symmetric information, the value of the firm 
is independent of its capital structure. Implicit in this view of the financial markets are 
assumptions that debt can be raised at a risk-free rate, no agency costs exist, and 
that investment and financing decisions are independent of each other (that is, 
investment decisions precede the financing decisions, rather than being taken 
simultaneously). Under these perfect market conditions, risk management has no 
value-enhancing effect on shareholders’ wealth, as in efficient markets shareholders 
can diversify risks by holding diversified portfolios of investments. However, relaxing 
the assumption of efficient markets reveals that capital structure decisions do have a 
bearing on the risk management strategies and on the value of the firm and vice 
versa (e.g. see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982; Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1994; Leland, 1998). In the same vein Froot (2007, p. 273) asserts that 
“…most financial policy decisions, whether they concern capital structure, dividends, 
capital allocation, capital budgeting, or investment and hedging policies, revolve 
around the benefits and costs of a corporation holding risk”. Therefore, it is necessary 
to include various frictional costs in any credible model attempting to explain the 
observed capital structure of firms.  
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Using a different combination of frictional costs, various models study the interaction 
amongst the key variables that determine the capital structure of a firm. For instance, 
Kraus and Litzenberger’s (1973) model focuses on the tax-advantage/bankruptcy 
costs trade-off, whereas Jensen and Meckling (1976) concentrate on the agency 
costs of debt. The research on optimal capital structure has, over the years, 
gravitated towards two prominent classes of models, namely, trade-off models and 
pecking order models. As the name suggests, the key tenet of trade-off theory based 
models is that in imperfect markets the benefits of increased leverage are associated 
with some costs, and the optimal capital structure balances these costs and benefits 
(e.g., see Titman, 1984). Models considering single-period cost-benefit choices of 
capital structure are known as static trade-off models, whereas models considering 
multi-period cost-benefit trade-offs are termed as dynamic models. Pecking order 
theory on the other hand assumes that (cheaper) internal sources of finance are 
preferred by managers over (more costly) external sources for funding new 
investments. This ‘pecking order’ of sources of finance arises due to information 
asymmetries between managers and investors (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Irrespective 
of the differences between the trade-off theory and the pecking-order theory, they are 
both capable of analysing a wide array of environments and variables. For instance, 
parameters related to bankruptcy costs, financial distress costs and agency costs, 
which lead to the existence of optimal capital structure, can all be accounted for within 
the optimal capital structure framework. This versatility imparts conceptual appeal to 
the optimal capital structure framework. 
If viewed as stand-alone models, the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory 
both have certain limitations. For example, static trade-off models consider financing 
and investment decisions to be independent of each other (Fischer, Heinkel and 
Zechner, 1989). Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) show that static trade-off models 
have low explanatory power in explaining the variation in the capital structures of 
firms over time. On the other hand, Frank and Goyal (2003) provide evidence that 
pecking order theory is not robust to the inclusion of conventional leverage factors in 
empirical models. However, collectively these models are capable of identifying and 
incorporating important determinants of capital structure. Accordingly, it is considered 
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that on balance, the theory of optimal capital structure provides the most appropriate 
and viable framework to facilitate the empirical inquiry proposed in this study. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The main positive-descriptive theories relevant to this study have been reviewed in 
this chapter. Positive-descriptive theories are chosen because they provide the most 
credible and compatible framework to analyse the effects of the purchase of 
reinsurance on the cost of the equity of non-life insurers. 
The theory of optimal capital structure is adjudged to be the most appropriate 
framework for the present study. This is because it is capable of incorporating various 
frictional costs arising due to market imperfections into analyses. Moreover, the 
optimal capital structure framework incorporates the idea that capital structure and 
risk management decisions are co-determined. This is an important feature in the 
context of this study as reinsurance is essentially a risk management mechanism. 
Further, numerous studies have suggested that risk management (reinsurance) can 
lower the frictional costs arising due to market imperfections. These studies provide a 
useful benchmark to compare and evaluate the results obtained in this study of UK 
non-life insurers. The major classes of the theory of optimal capital structure and their 
ability to further analyse the reinsurance-cost of equity relation are further examined 




 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT CHAPTER 4.
4.1 Introduction 
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed in Chapter 3, this 
chapter develops two main testable hypotheses that will be tested empirically in 
subsequent chapters. The present chapter discusses the theory of optimal capital 
structure and the role of risk management in the context of the financing and 
investment policy of a firm. This analysis identifies the necessary conditions that 
make risk management a value-added activity. Following this, the value creation 
process in the insurance industry is discussed, leading to an exposition of the 
interaction between the value creation process and reinsurance. This provides the 
context within which to examine further the relation between reinsurance and the 
cost of equity capital in the UK’s non-life insurance market. 
4.2 Optimal Capital Structure 
Under Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance proposition, the value of the firm 
is dependent only on its investing decisions and is not affected by its cost of 
capital. Subsequent work by Modigliani and Miller (1963) incorporates market 
frictions, such as taxes, into their analysis. As a result of such imperfections, some 
costs such as contracting costs, and bankruptcy costs become embedded within 
markets, which in turn results in an increase in the costs of external financing. This 
rationale implies that given market imperfections, there exists an optimal capital 
structure for each firm. The concept of optimal capital structure has since been 
synthesized and analysed in numerous academic studies, giving rise to two 
prominent theories of capital structure, namely – the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory. Both of these theories are explained in the following sub-




4.2.1 Trade-off Theory 
The static trade-off theory of capital structure is based on the idea that for an 
optimal capital structure of a firm to exist, it is necessary for certain market 
imperfections to prevail and be reflected in the capital structure choices made by 
the firm. For example, under the assumptions of static trade-off theory, optimal 
capital structure arises as a consequence of the actions of firms striving to balance 
the benefits of a leveraged capital structure (e.g., tax shield advantages) against 
the costs arising from leverage (e.g., increased bankruptcy risk). As Bradley, 
Jarrell and Kim (1984, p. 857) explain “…the optimal capital structure involves 
balancing the tax advantage of debt against the present value of bankruptcy 
costs”. Many studies (e.g., Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1976; Titman, 
1984) exploring the capital structure optimisation process through trade-offs 
between tax advantages and bankruptcy costs imply that this process effects the 
value of a firm through multiple channels. This is because, apart from bankruptcy 
costs, agency costs of debt and the loss of non-debt tax shields have also been 
linked to high leverage. For example, enhanced agency costs of debt may arise in 
the case of a highly levered firm if the managers, on behalf of shareholders, dilute 
the ‘quality’ of productive assets by investing in overly risky projects that 
undermine the ability of the firm to service its debt obligations (i.e., the so-called 
asset substitution problem). In the same vein, Ryan (2007, p. 209) lists three key 
variables, namely, the cost of equity, tax, and the default premium, through which 
leverage can affect the traded value of a firm. However, the validity of the relation 
between these variables and capital structure is an empirical issue that needs to 
be tested. Moreover, the empirical results reported in the financial literature do not 
uniformly support the static trade-off model. For example, Graham, Lemmon and 
Schallheim (1998) find that firms with higher marginal tax rates have higher 
leverage than firms with lower marginal tax rates, whereas Hovakimian, Kayhan 
and Titman (2012) report that higher marginal tax rates correspond to lower debt 
ratios in their sample drawn from the US corporate sector.  
However, the limitations with static trade-off models are that they assume the 
financing and investment decisions of a firm to be single period (hence static) 
choices and exogenous to each other. Such limitations can be overcome by using 
dynamic trade-off models of optimal capital structure which take into account not 
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only the present costs and benefits, but also the expected future costs and 
benefits of adjusting capital structure. The findings of Hovakimian et al. (2012) are 
consistent with the predictions of dynamic trade-off models presented in Fischer et 
al. (1989), and Leland (1994). This implies that recapitalisation costs are high in 
comparison with costs of single-period optimal capitalisation. To capture the effect 
of recapitalisation costs, transaction costs are incorporated in dynamic trade-off 
models along with bankruptcy costs. However, the assumptions made by different 
versions of dynamic trade-off models vary from model to model. Some models 
assume investment decisions to be independent of financing decisions (e.g., 
Goldstein, Ju and Leland, 2001; Strebulaev, 2007) whereas others assume them 
to be co-determined (e.g., Hennessy and Whited, 2005; Titman and Tsyplakov, 
2007). Models treating financing and investment policies of the firm as co-
determined conclude that the optimal capital structure of a given firm is path 
dependent20 (e.g., Hennessy and Whited, 2005). Aside from this finding, dynamic 
models have significantly contributed to the identification of parameters and 
processes governing the choice of optimal capital structure such as current and 
expected profits, retained earnings and the mean reversion of leverage (e.g., see 
Frank and Goyal, 2007). Retained earnings and leverage also are important 
considerations in the pecking order theory of capital structure that is outlined 
below in sub-section 4.2.2. 
4.2.2 Pecking Order Theory 
According to the `pecking order theory’ put forward by Myers (1984), firms prefer 
internal rather than external sources of finance for funding new investments. The 
theory postulates that amongst the sources of external finance, debt is preferred 
over equity. Myers and Majluf (1984) explain that such a ranking of capital sources 
arises due to the information asymmetries between managers and investors in the 
firm. The result of such information asymmetry problems is that managers attempt 
to issue financial securities when they believe that a firm’s assets are overvalued 
by the market, but the price of the security falls on such announcements as 
investors anticipate a lack of complete information on the firm’s prospects. Since 
                                            
20 Hennessy and Whited (2005) explain that since current financing choices of a firm are 




managers are aware of this sub-optimal financing situation, they could forgo some 
value-enhancing positive NPV projects. Such an argument leads to the ‘pecking 
order’ of different financing mechanisms, which, in turn follows the ascending 
order of adverse selection costs incurred using alternative means of financing in 
the presence of information asymmetry problems in financial markets.  
However, the mechanism explained above is not the only one that gives rise to a 
‘pecking order’, as the transaction costs associated with different sources of 
finance may also lead to a preference ranking of alternative sources of capital. 
Therefore, information asymmetry is at best a sufficient, but not a necessary 
condition for a financing ‘pecking order’ to exist. Indeed, this ambiguity in 
explaining observed financing patterns of corporate financing is evident in 
empirical research that has tested the explanatory power of this theory. For 
example, in the US corporate sector, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find that 
the pecking order theory has good explanatory power, whereas Frank and Goyal 
(2003) provide contrary evidence. To remedy this shortcoming, some authors have 
used modified versions of the pecking order theory which incorporate financial 
distress costs (e.g., Lemmon and Zender, 2010) in their empirical examinations. 
However, this treatment does not necessarily result in unambiguous evidence in 
support of the pecking order theory – for example, Fama and French (2005) 
provide results that contradict the confirmatory conclusions of Lemmon and 
Zender (2010).  
Agency costs have also been suggested in the literature as a possible cause for 
the existence of the pecking order. In their seminal work, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that managers, being self-interested agents, pursue private benefits, 
such as job security and perquisite consumption, which gives rise to agency 
problems between shareholders and the management. They further point out that 
debt holders have priority over a firm’s assets in the event of financial distress, and 
as such, there is the potential for another set of agency conflicts to arise between 
shareholders and creditors of the firm. Under these conditions, shareholders have 
an incentive to invest in highly risky assets (a process called ‘risk-shifting’), at the 
expense of the creditors to the firm and solutions to these agency incentive 
conflicts, such as performance based compensation and/or debt covenants are 
expensive to set-up and so add to agency costs. Attempts by the firm to balance 
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different types of agency costs can thus lead to a pecking order of financing, 
identical to the one described above. Agency costs may thus be used to explain 
the pecking order of different sources of finance. However, Myers (2003) cautions 
that this explanation works well in the case of small companies with substantial 
share holdings of managers and employees, but not for large widely held 
corporations, as their employees and managers generally hold a very small 
fraction of the total firm value. Nevertheless, agency costs are useful for explaining 
the existence of optimal capital structure. Indeed, Leary and Roberts (2010, p. 
333) state that “…we find a marked increase in pecking order behaviour as the 
potential for agency conflicts increases. Moving from firms likely facing low agency 
costs to those facing high agency costs corresponds to an average increase in 
predictive accuracy of almost 20 percentage points”.  
Irrespective of the on-going debates over the validity of various theories of capital 
structure, the objective here is to identify the variables that might give rise to the 
optimal capital structure. The analysis presented above has pointed out that costs 
arising due to market imperfections are the key drivers of managers’ efforts to 
achieve optimal capital structure. The key costs identified are the cost of financial 
distress, bankruptcy costs, agency costs and transaction costs. Therefore, a 
technique that allows firms to optimise on these costs and minimise the costs of 
external sources of finance can be valuable to the firm. It is in this regard that risk 
management can add value to the firm. This is now being discussed in the next 
section 4.3. 
4.3 Risk Management and Value Creation 
In their influential work on the modern theory of corporate risk management, 
Mayers and Smith (1982) argue that risk management can add value to a firm if it 
allows them to mitigate some of the frictional costs arising in imperfect markets. As 
mentioned previously in section 4.2, a firm facing increased frictional costs, such 
as the costs of financial distress, is more likely to incur agency problems leading to 
sub-optimal investment decisions. Therefore, it follows that prudent risk 
management can mitigate these problems by reducing the cost of external finance, 
and the potential for agency incentive conflicts thus promoting investments in 
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value enhancing projects. In the same vein, Doherty (2000, p. 9) adds that 
“…hedging complements other sources of financing, internal and external, to 
replace destroyed assets and new investments”. Such reasoning has given rise to 
a sizable body of literature that links corporate financing decisions to risk 
management (e.g., see DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995; Froot, 2007; Froot, Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1993). However, business risks can vary between different firms and 
across industrial sectors. Therefore, to explain the value added by risk 
management at the firm level, it is imperative that the value creation process of 
concerned industry is well understood. To facilitate this exposition, the value 
creation process in the insurance industry is now discussed below.  
The mechanism by which insurers create value is well explained in Hancock, 
Huber and Koch (2001, p. 8), which has been reproduced succinctly here. They 
suggest that an insurance company can be likened to a leveraged investment fund 
that generates funds (debt) through insurance markets (instead of capital markets) 
by selling insurance policies (instead of issuing bonds) and invests them in 
financial assets in accordance with statutory and regulatory requirements. This 
structure spells competitive advantages as well as disadvantages for the 
insurance industry. In comparison to other investment funds, non-life insurers are 
potentially at a disadvantage on the investment front for two main reasons:  first, 
double taxation is imposed on the shareholders (corporate tax on insurers’ 
earnings as well as personal tax on any dividend income); and second, limitations 
imposed by the regulators on investment portfolio allocation decisions. In contrast, 
the scenario is invariably different on the fund generation side and thus a potential 
source of value added by the insurance industry. Doherty and Tinic (1981) 
observe that insured parties by definition are risk-averse and unable to diversify 
away the risk they are endowed with at the market rates in the capital markets. As 
a result, insurers are able to charge premiums above their actuarially fair values, 
i.e., at a price higher than their economic/production costs and one that includes 
loadings for insurers’ profits and reserve margins. Policyholder customers are 
willing to pay this price as long as it is below the utility they attribute to insurable 
assets. It thus follows that insurers are able to ‘borrow’ loss contingent capital from 
insurance markets at favourable rates in comparison to raising finance on the 
capital markets (Froot, 2008). This mitigates the disadvantages faced by insurers 
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on the investment front. Therefore, efficiently managing and pricing the risk 
inherent in the contingent claims sold in the insurance markets forms the core 
function of the insurance business. This reasoning further implies that, prudent risk 
management is the ‘bed-rock’ on which insurance industry is built. The rest of the 
chapter elaborates upon this statement and advances two principal hypotheses to 
be tested in this study. 
4.4 Reinsurance and the Cost of Equity 
Based on the arguments made earlier in section 4.3, one can conclude that 
reinsurance can add value only if it enables insurance companies to optimise on 
the frictional costs arising due to market imperfections. However, this view 
understates the utility of reinsurance as it is intrinsically different from other 
financial hedges (e.g. derivative instruments) in at least four key regards. To 
understand how the first difference arises, one needs to first define a financial 
hedge in the context of a non-financial firm. For instance, Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993, p. 267) define corporate hedging as, “…the use of off-balance-
sheet instruments – forwards, futures, swaps, and options – to reduce the volatility 
of firm value”. Reinsurance on the other hand is well accounted for in the financial 
statements submitted to the regulator by an insurer, with the claims recoverable 
from the reinsurers being counted as one of the admissible assets used in 
calculating the capital adequacy requirements of insurers. Therefore, reinsurance 
is a hedge instrument that is well-integrated with the capital structure of an insurer 
rather than an off-balance sheet item. The second reason that makes reinsurance 
different from the financial risk hedging is the fact that since reinsurance involves 
the transfer of ‘pure downside risks’ it is a pure hedge (indemnity) instrument 
which cannot be used for speculative purposes (Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008).  
Moreover, Campello, Lin, Ma and Zou (2011) note that some firms may opt out of 
their hedging positions once they have secured sufficient capital from lenders; 
however, this option is not possible with reinsurance. This gives rise to the third 
difference between reinsurance and other financial hedges as once agreed, the 
reinsurance contract (treaty) is legally binding both on the primary insurer (the 
cedant) and the reinsurer. Fourth, reinsurance treaties often provide ancillary 
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advisory services, such as the pricing of emerging or unusual risks, and/or claims 
handling. These ‘real services’ can provide added-value for the shareholders and 
policyholders of insurance firms. Given these differences, reinsurance can be 
valuable to insurance companies, not only by reducing the cost of external finance, 
but also in other respects. These are described further in sub-sections 4.4.1 and 
4.4.2 below.  
4.4.1 Decision to Reinsure 
Krvavych and Sherris (2006) assert that frictional costs (e.g., taxes) mean that the 
shareholder value is more likely to be enhanced by managing underwriting risks 
than by creating value from managing investment portfolios. Harrington and 
Niehaus (2003, p. 125) define underwriting risk as “…the risk that prices and 
reported claim liabilities will be inadequate as compared to realized claim costs”. In 
other words, the underwriting risk is effectively the result of the interplay between 
estimated claim costs and the uncertainty in their estimation. Since policyholder-
customers of an insurance company are also its major capital providers (creditors), 
the management of underwriting risk is also important from a strategic product-
market perspective. By the same token, Froot (2007) suggests that insurers and 
reinsurers are not only subject to the investment risk, but also to the product 
market imperfections arising due to the inability of policyholder-customers to 
efficiently diversify insurable risk. This reasoning implies that exposure to financial 
distress will subject an insurer to reduced new business growth and hence loss of 
profitability, as well as increase in the market cost of capital. Evidence provided by 
Wakker et al. (1997) and Merton (1993) suggests that policyholder-customers 
deeply (and disproportionately) discount the premium for an insurance policy 
issued by an insurer with an increased probability of default (ruin). Doherty and 
Tinic (1981) further demonstrate that the cost of capital of insurance firms can be 
reduced by purchasing reinsurance and their traded value is increased because 
policyholders are willing to pay higher premiums for enhanced financial strength. 
This proposition is consistent with empirical results from the US property-liability 
insurance industry reported in Sommer (1996)21. Froot (2008) also notes that 
                                            
21 Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003) point out that the frequency, severity and timing of 
claims settlement can vary between lines of insurance business. For example, property 
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reinsurance is important because compared with investors the policyholder-
customers of insurance companies are less efficient at diversifying risk, and that 
reinsurance provides such fixed financial claimants with the certainty of 
indemnification in the event of an insured loss. Reducing the probability of ruin 
through reinsurance could also enable direct insurers to create value for their 
shareholders by increasing their underwriting capacity (Adams, 1996; Blazenko, 
1986), and reducing current and expected taxes (Abdul-Kader et al., 2010; Adams 
et al., 2008; Garven and Loubergé, 1996), In this sense, determining the decision 
to reinsure can also be viewed as a financing (capital structure) choice decision 
(Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Hoerger et al., 1990). The foregoing analysis 
therefore implies that: 
H1: Other things being equal, insurers using reinsurance have a lower cost 
of equity than non-users. 
4.4.2 Extent of Reinsurance 
Sung (1997) reports that the mispricing of assumed risks by primary insurance 
writers can result in a sub-optimally diversified risk pool as well as engender 
increased agency costs and other market failure problems (e.g., increased risks 
associated with moral hazard and bankruptcy). Likewise, Doherty and Lamm-
Tennant (2009, p. 57) contend that “…it makes sense for primary insurers to retain 
the primary or “working” layers of the risks they underwrite, while passing the “tail 
risks” or excessive geographical or product concentrations to reinsurers.” Hence 
reinsurance can be an important risk management mechanism for improving the 
risk bearing capacity of primary insurers (Mayers and Smith, 1990; Adams, 1996). 
                                                                                                                                    
claims are usually settled within a short timeframe, while liability (tort) claims can take 
several years to resolve. This means that insurers with insurance lines with longer claims 
delays and/or potentially severe losses are expected to benefit from holding onto their 
invested funds for a longer time than insurance firms that have lines of business with 
shorter settlement periods and/or generally smaller claims. However, because of the 
uncertainty relating to the timing and quantum of losses in long-tail lines, and the 
associated enhanced probability of ruin, the amount of reinsurance purchased is likely to 
be greater in insurance companies that have significant long-tail business than in insurers 
with short-tail lines and more predictable claims. Hence, the reinsurance-cost of capital 
relation could be influenced by the line of business. Additionally, Garven and Lamm-
Tennant (2003) contend that the demand for reinsurance is expected to be greater, the 
lower the correlation between insurers’ returns on their investment portfolios and higher 




Recent advances in finance theory explicitly recognise that frictional costs and 
other market imperfections (e.g., taxes) are important factors motivating the 
purchase of reinsurance (Mayers and Smith, 1990). Froot et al. (1993) provide a 
framework for analysing risk management decisions in terms of market frictions 
and the impact of financing policy on firms’ investment decisions. They argue that 
cash flow volatility can be costly for shareholders and that by stabilising cash flows 
following unexpected shock events, risk management techniques (reinsurance) 
enhances the value of (insurance) firms by enabling managers to realise positive 
NPV projects in their firms’ investment opportunity sets. Plantin (2006) also argues 
that because of reinsurance companies’ close contractual relationships with direct 
insurers and their regular monitoring of insurers’ underwriting and claims 
settlement systems, reinsurance can serve as an important signalling device to 
investors as to insurers’ future financial condition. Shimpi (2002) further contends 
that the contingent capital properties of (re)insurance can help lower annual 
combined loss ratios (i.e., claims plus expenses including commissions as a 
proportion of net premiums written) as well as reduce the required level of retained 
equity capital. This attribute can help signal surety to investors thus reducing the 
cost of capital and increasing returns for shareholders. The implied market 
signalling benefits of reinsurance can help direct insurance writers to reduce their 
equity cost of capital. Froot (2008) points out that holding too much equity in 
insurance firms is not only expensive for investors but also increases the risk of 
resource misuse and excessive perquisite consumption by managers (see also 
Tufano, 1998). In other words, the frictional cost of capital in insurance firms can 
arise from agency incentive conflicts between management and owners (Laux and 
Muermann, 2010). Laux and Muermann (2010) further argue that as stock 
insurance firms invariably raise equity prior to selling policies, competition in 
insurance markets limits the amount of equity capital that can be raised at a cost 
that maximises their expected return on investment. However, as a contingent 
capital mechanism, reinsurance can relax equity limits and help optimise the 
allocation of capital in insurance firms in a way that financially benefits 
shareholders (Froot, 2007). Moreover, reinsurance can become economically 
advantageous to a direct insurance writer in the face of information asymmetries 
and agency problems such as the underinvestment and asset substitution 
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incentives (Doherty and Smetters, 2005; Jean-Baptiste and Santomero, 2000; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mayers and Smith, 1990). In other words, primary 
insurers are likely to reinsure when frictional costs exceed loadings for reinsurers’ 
profits and expenses (Garven and MacMinn, 1993). On the other hand, 
reinsurance, if purchased in excess of the optimal level required by the insurer, 
can result in ‘deadweight costs’ because of the transaction costs and reinsurer’s 
profit loadings (Froot, 2008). As long as the benefits of risk hedging via 
reinsurance outweigh the costs, then purchasing more reinsurance should lead to 
a reduction in the cost of equity, and vice versa. This analysis thus suggests that 
the relation between hedging and the cost of capital is likely to be non-linear. In a 
similar vein, Purnanandam (2008) argues that the propensity to use hedging 
increases with leverage, but this relationship reverses for extremely high levels of 
leverage. Indeed, Zou (2010) finds empirical evidence of a concave (inverted U-
shape) relation between the purchase of property insurance and firm value (as 
measured by Tobin’s q) in Chinese publicly listed companies (PLCs). Since firm 
value is inversely related to the equity cost of capital, one would expect the 
relationship between the cost of equity and extent of reinsurance to be convex (U 
shaped). Therefore the second test hypothesis is: 
H2: Cost of equity of an insurer decreases with an increase in the level of 
reinsurance but reverses at high levels of reinsurance (ceteris paribus). 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter highlights that risk management (reinsurance) is an integral part of 
the capital structure of an insurer, and that reinsurance has a tangible effect on the 
equity cost of capital of a firm. Specifically, two hypotheses relating the cost of 
equity to reinsurance are put forward in this chapter. The first hypothesis 
investigates the effects of the decision to reinsure on the cost of equity, and 
predicts that reinsured insurers are expected to have a lower cost of equity. The 
second hypothesis relates the volume of reinsurance purchased to the cost of 
equity capital of an insurer, and postulates that the extent of reinsurance 
purchased and the cost of equity share a non-monotonous relationship. More 
specifically, it is predicted that the cost of capital traces a U-shaped curve as a 
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function of reinsurance. Models used to test both these hypotheses are presented 
in Chapter 6. This chapter also elaborates on other firm-specific factors that are 
likely to have an influence on the relationship between reinsurance and the cost of 
the equity of insurers. Proxies for such factors are used as control variables in 
testing the respective hypotheses. Before that, it is necessary to identify an 
appropriate method for estimating the cost of equity of an insurance firm and this 
will be examined in the next chapter of this thesis. 
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 COST OF EQUITY METRICS CHAPTER 5.
5.1 Introduction 
The cost of capital can be defined in different ways. From the managerial perspective, 
the cost of capital is the rate used to discount the future cash flows of a project under 
consideration; and from the investors’ perspective, it is their expected rate of return 
commensurate to the risk undertaken. Therefore, estimating the cost of capital is 
important for making investment decisions, and corporate valuations. Since this study 
specifically examines the link between reinsurance and the equity cost of capital 
(given that conventional debt holdings in insurance firms is low), it is important that 
the metrics used to evaluate the relationship are reliable. The extant literature 
describes various methodologies that can be utilised to estimate the cost of capital. 
The techniques used for estimating the cost of capital can broadly be classified as 
valuation models and asset pricing models. Valuation models are generally used to 
make ex-ante forecasts of the equity cost of capital, whereas the asset pricing models 
lead to ex-post estimates of the equity cost of capital. To identify the most appropriate 
cost of capital estimation techniques a review of these methodologies is presented in 
section 5.2 below. 
5.2 Valuation Models 
The present value of any asset can be approximated by the discounted value of the 
future cash flows associated with it (Lintner, 1965). This approach is also known as 
the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) technique. Moreover, the implied value of the 
discount rate (cost of capital) can also be calculated if other parameters used in the 
valuation are known. Put differently, under the valuation model approach, the cost of 
capital is defined as the discount rate that equates expected future cash flows with 
the present value of an asset. Based on the information used, the estimate may either 
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be the cost of equity or the firm-level cost of capital. To be precise, if dividends, the 
growth rate of dividends and the current share price are available inputs, the cost of 
equity can be estimated; whereas if firm-level data on free cash flows, their growth 
rate, and current value of the firm are used, then one obtains a measure of the firm-
level cost of capital. DCF is essentially a financial market-based model that makes 
two key assumptions. First it is assumed that cash flows grow at a steady rate beyond 
a certain forecast (time) horizon; and second, that the firm/stock has an infinite life-
time.  Schmid & Wolf (2009, p. 342) suggest that these assumptions are more likely 
to hold in the case of mature industries like the property & liability insurance industry, 
which explains the widespread use of this model in that sector. According to Myers 
and Borucki (1994), DCF is the most widely used metric to estimate the cost of equity 
capital of regulated firms in the US and is also used extensively by insurance industry 
regulators. Not only this, DCF is a useful technique for insurance premium 
calculations (i.e., the ratemaking process) and has other desirable properties such as 
value additivity, and its ability to avoid accounting distortions and double counting 
(Cummins, 1990, p. 83)22. Assuming a steady-state growth rate of ‘gn’ for free cash-
flow ‘FCF’ is achieved after n years and the weighted average cost of capital is 




















   ( 5.1 ) 
A simpler version of the same model can be obtained by assuming a perpetually 
constant growth rate for associated cash flows. For this assumption to hold, two key 
conditions must be satisfied. First, the growth rate used in the model must be less 
than or equal to the growth rate in the economy, as no company/industry can 
perennially outperform the market because competition wipes out any abnormal 
return in the long run. Second, the reinvestment rate used to arrive at free cash flow 
estimates must be consistent with, or must have been derived from, the long-term 
growth rate. This is so because if the reinvestment rate is not a function of expected 
                                            
22 Value additivity refers to the notion that value of a firm can be obtained by adding the net 




growth, the free cash flow to the firm needs to be estimated using accounting 
statements, which are sensitive to the ratio of capital expenditure and non-cash 
adjustments such as depreciation. This arises as using net capital expenditures and 
changes in net working capital as an alternative to estimate reinvestment rates 
requires one to set the ratio of capital expenditure to depreciation equal to the 
industry average for a given year23. Such an approach also requires that the change 
in net working capital generally be positive, as negative change in net working capital 
creates a cash inflow which might be feasible in the short term or in a particular 
industrial sector (e.g. retailing) but may be inaccurate if perpetuity assumption is 
invoked. On the other hand, where the reinvestment rate is estimated from the growth 
rate, which in turn is a function of the return on capital, firm value can be highly 
sensitive to changes in the estimated return on capital. Despite these limitations, DCF 
is nevertheless an important technique to estimate the cost of capital, and it is used 
widely both in the academic literature as well as in business practice (Brealey, Myers 
and Allen, 2011). Similar assumptions made in the context of cash flows to the 
shareholders can also be used to estimate the cost of equity. The dividend discount 
model is one such example and this is outlined in sub-section 5.2.1 below. 
5.2.1  Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
Assuming a perpetually constant growth rate of g for dividend per share ‘D’ and the 





ke       ( 5.2 ) 
Equation 5.2 above is also referred to as the ‘dividend growth model’. A widely used 
variant of the DDM is the ‘Gordon dividend growth model’, attributed to Gordon 
(1959). The Gordon model assumes that: (1) the industry in question returns cash to 
shareholders; (2) dividends paid are a fixed proportion of annual earnings; and (3) 
                                            
23 According to Brealey, Myers and Allen (2011, p. 785) short term or current assets and 
liabilities are collectively known as working capital. Net working capital is defined as the 
difference between current assets and current liabilities. 
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dividend payments grow at a steady rate perpetually. The first assumption also 
encompasses share repurchases in case the shares being bought-back are retired 
(i.e., not being redistributed among employees and staff). As noted above, these 
assumptions are more likely to hold in the case of mature industries like the UK’s non-
life insurance industry. Owing to its simplicity, this model is quite popular in practice, 
but has few notable limitations (Brealey et al., 2011). First, this model cannot be used 
for firms that do not pay dividends, or are not publicly listed. Also, a constant growth 
rate of dividends implicitly assumes that distributable earnings grow perpetually at a 
steady rate, which is unlikely to hold in reality. Moreover, this model requires a long 
time series of dividend forecasts as the effect of future dividends on valuation 
diminishes at a slow rate. However, a model that overcomes these limitations of DDM 
is the abnormal earnings growth (AEG) model. This model is described next in sub-
section 5.2.2. 
5.2.2  AEG Model 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) relax the second and third assumptions relating 
to the Gordon growth model (noted in sub-section 5.2.1 above) to establish expected 
earnings per share and its growth as determinants of firm value. In particular, they 
assume that dividends paid per share ‘D’ need not be a fixed proportion of earnings 
per share ‘EPS’, and that there exists a distinct short term growth rate ‘gs’, apart from 
a long-term perpetual growth rate ‘gp’, which asymptotically decays to a perpetual 
growth rate with rate of decay ‘δ’. Their study goes on to derive the AEG model to 
estimate cost of equity capital ‘ke’ from the valuation relation so obtained. Gode and 




























 ( 5.3 ) 
They further elaborate that the abnormal change in earnings within the framework of 
AEG is defined as the change in earnings in excess of the return on net reinvestment 
during the period, i.e. ke (EPS1 – D). Penman (2005) lists two main advantages 
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provided by the AEG. First is that AEG valuation does not require ‘clean surplus’ 
accounting and so it can be applied on a per share basis24. Second the AEG model 
allows for more general growth rates, especially in the case of finite horizon valuation 
with truncation. He further adds that AEG assumes a growth rate for residual earnings 
that declines geometrically to a lower rate in the future (e.g., towards the annual 
growth rate of GDP), which is more likely to hold in reality. Even with these 
advantages, the AEG model is still a valuation model and hence subject to the 
inherent limitations of all valuation models (e.g., requirement of mark-to-market 
accounting data). Besides, as AEG avoids the need for ‘clean surplus’ accounting, it 
remains unclear which definition of earnings is appropriate to use so that all the 
available information is incorporated in the valuation. For example, the use of 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) is incorrect as 
EBITDA does not incorporate the effect of depreciation and creditors’ claims on 
earnings, which if considered, results in a reduction in a firm’s free cash flows as well 
as dividends to the shareholders. Another model that makes similar assumptions as 
AEG, and provides some cursory guidance on the definition of earnings to be used is 
called the residual income valuation (RIV) model. The RIV model is described next in 
sub-section 5.2.3. 
5.2.3 RIV Model 
The RIV model relies on ‘clean surplus’ accounting to value the equity of a firm. 
However, in reality such a condition is difficult to observe owing to the provisions of 
GAAP that form the basis of financial reporting by firms (including insurers) operating 
in the UK, and indeed elsewhere. In essence, the concept of ‘clean surplus’ is 
embodied by comprehensive income (CI), and Sutton (2004, p. 131) defines it as the 
overall change in net assets (NA) in the year, excluding the effects of dividends (D) 
and changes in share capital (ΔSC). Thus for year t: 
                                            
24 Penman (2007, p. 269) explains that the notion of clean surplus refers to the condition that 
all the items of income appear on the income statement, and the net income so obtained is 
the only item transferred to the equity statement. 
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ttttt DSCNANACI   )( 1    ( 5.4 ) 
In the equation (5.4) above, the change in share capital is defined as the difference 
between the capital increase and capital decrease in year t. Such an approach is 
aimed at eliminating the non-comprehensive, hence ‘un-clean’, nature of the net 
income reported in the income statement produced under GAAP25. Apart from the 
accounting identity shown in the equation (5.4), the RIV framework assumes that the 
current value of the firm is the discounted value of the future residual income 
generated by its productive assets. Moreover, the specification of the valuation model 
following the RIV framework is dependent on the assumptions made about the 
terminal value of a firm. For example, Claus and Thomas (2001) assume that the 
residual earnings grow at a constant rate beyond the forecast horizon, whereas 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) assume that return on equity (ROE) will 
linearly decay to an industry-based ROE in 12 years. Subject to the maintained 
assumptions listed above, the current share price ‘P0’ can be expressed as a function 
of book value ‘B’ per share, steady state growth in clean surplus ‘g’, realised return on 




























   ( 5.5 ) 
A major contribution of the RIV model is that it incorporates widely available 
accounting information into the estimation equation, which at the same time is the 
source of its major criticism. This is due to the fact that residual surplus accounting 
cannot be applied on per share basis in case there are anticipated share transactions 
such as exercise of employee stock options. As Penman (2005, p. 370) states 
“…value from anticipated share transactions executed at more or less than fair value 
are not captured in a RIV valuation”. Therefore, per share values used in valuations 
may result in erroneous valuations and non-optimal estimations of the implied cost of 
equity. Another criticism of models using analysts’ forecasts of earnings for valuation, 
                                            
25 Frequently, unrealised gains or losses on securities available for sale; unrealised gains or 
losses on revaluation of fixed assets; foreign currency translation gains and losses; and gains 
and losses on derivative instruments are amongst the main items that go unreported in the 
income statement, thus making it non-comprehensive. 
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such as AEG and RIV, is that the forecasts used may be biased in the first place. For 
example, Easton (2006) points out that the estimates obtained may themselves lead 
to biases in estimating the cost of capital as analysts making sell (or buy) 
recommendation implicitly forecast negative (positive) abnormal returns, which results 
in a lower (higher) cost of capital than its true value. Easton (2004) however,  derives 
a valuation model based on the ratio of price to earnings (PE) ratio and the short-run 
earnings growth rate, called price-earnings growth (PEG) ratio that reduces the bias 
induced by biased growth forecasts.  
5.2.4 Price Earnings Growth (PEG) Model  
The PEG model is derived from the AEG model; indeed, Easton (2004) presents it as 
a special case of AEG model described in Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). The 
key insight from Easton (2004) is that the difference between accounting earnings 
and economic earnings characterises the role of accounting earnings in corporate 
valuation. Using current prices, and three elements of earnings forecasts, namely 
forecasts for the next period earnings, short-run earnings growth and the change in 
earnings growth rate beyond the forecast horizon; Easton (2004) derives a method for 
estimating the implied rate of return. There are three different sets of assumptions 
that are employed to arrive at three different formulations, least restrictive of which is 
being reproduced here. Assuming unequal forecasts for accounting and economic 
earnings, and that abnormal growth in accounting earnings do not remain constant in 
perpetuity, Easton’s (2004) PEG model uses a third growth variable that captures 
changes in forecasts of abnormal growth in accounting earnings beyond the forecast 
horizon. This can then be used to adjust the difference between forecasts of 
accounting and economic earnings so that an estimate of expected rate of return (or 
valuation) can be obtained. Assuming no temporal arbitrage condition, and denoting 
current price, forecasted earnings, expected abnormal growth in accounting earnings, 
dividend and required rate of return by P, EPS, AGR, D and ke respectively, the PEG 



























  ( 5.6 ) 
Moreover, by defining a perpetual rate of change in abnormal growth in earnings 
ΔAGR beyond the forecast horizon, the equation (5.6) above can accommodate a 
finite forecast horizon. For example, if one assumes that earnings forecasts are 

















   ( 5.7 ) 
If one further assumes that the next period’s forecast for abnormal growth in earnings 
is an unbiased estimator of abnormal growth in earnings in all subsequent periods, 
then the rate of change in AGR, denoted by ΔAGR, equals 0. The cost of equity, ke 
can then be estimated as the positive root (negative cost of capital is meaningless) of 














kk ee    ( 5.8 ) 
However, a special case arises if along with ΔAGR, the dividend forecast for the next 
period is also assumed to be nil (D1=0). Under this condition, the cost of equity is 
equal to the square root of the inverse of the product of PEG ratio and 100. 








    ( 5.9 ) 
Due to its close association with the PEG ratio, the equation (5.9) is sometimes 
referred to as the PEG model for estimating the cost of equity and the equation (5.8) 
is referred to as the modified PEG model (MPEG) as it incorporates the dividend 
forecast along with earnings growth in estimation. Botosan and Plumlee (2005) find 
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that the cost of equity estimated using the PEG model is consistently associated with 
five commonly accepted firm-level risk proxies – namely, market risk, leverage, 
information risk, firm size and growth. Lee, Walker and Christensen (2006) also find 
that the PEG model tends to be more suited in the European corporate context as it 
does not depend on the ‘clean surplus’ assumption. Despite these advantages, the 
PEG model has certain limitations, such as the requirement that earnings forecasts 
and growth must be positive and that this limitation could bias samples towards less 
risky firms thus producing unreliable estimates of the cost of equity (Lee et al., 2006). 
Penman (2007, p. 222) also cautions against the use of forecast growth rates in ex-
dividend earnings instead of cum-dividend earnings, and single year estimates of 
anticipated growth as it ignores information about subsequent growth. Apart from 
these restrictions, there are other considerations that determine the utility of the PEG 
model and other valuation models in estimating the cost of equity capital of a non-life 
insurance company which will be explained in greater detail in section 6.4 of Chapter 
6. Another class of models that is used extensively in the insurance industry are asset 
pricing models (Cummins and Harrington, 1988). These models are considered in 
section 5.3 below. 
5.3 Asset Pricing Models 
Like valuation models, asset pricing models also stem from the basic premise that the 
price of an asset is the discounted value of its expected payoff. Cochrane (2005) 
defines two fundamental costs of capital estimation approaches that derive from asset 
pricing theory – namely, absolute pricing and relative pricing. Under the absolute 
pricing approach, an asset is priced by reference to its exposure to fundamental 
sources of macroeconomic risk, such as market risk. Good examples of this approach 
are the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) approach, the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) and related factor models. However, in practical applications, the absolute 
approach does not work and as a result, relative pricing is required. For example, the 
CAPM prices assets relative to the market, without explaining what determines the 
market value and accompanying risk premium or beta (Roll, 1977). On the other 
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hand, the relative pricing attempts to value an asset, given the prices of some other 
assets, which is elegantly reflected in the option pricing technique of Black and 
Scholes (1973). A more detailed discussion of these models is presented in sub-
sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.3 below.  
5.3.1 The CAPM 
The development of the CAPM is attributed to Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). In 
these studies, the CAPM arises as a consequence of an analysis of the process by 
which investors construct efficient portfolios26. By assuming that investors can lend 
and borrow at the risk free rate, it is possible to identify an efficient portfolio having 
the highest ratio of risk premium to standard deviation which dominates all the other 
portfolios. Implicit in such an analysis is the key assumption that expected return on a 
security depends on the risk stemming from economy-wide influences and is not 
affected by specific (idiosyncratic) risk (Brealey et al., 2011). Under the CAPM 
framework, the rate used to discount the future cash flows of an asset must 
incorporate the time value of money and the risk inherent due to uncertain future 
payoffs. The CAPM incorporates the concept of the time value of money by using the 
risk-free rate of return, usually defined as the yield on government securities. On the 
other hand, the risk inherent in an investment is characterised by the covariance of its 
return with the market risk premium. The market risk premium is the excess return 
gained by investing in the market instead of a risk-free asset. Assuming the risk 
aversion of investors remains unchanged over time, historical excess returns can 
provide a reasonable estimate of market risk premium. For estimating the market rate 
of return, generally, return implied by broad based share price index is used. If Ri, Rf 
and Rm represent the expected return on an asset, risk-free rate and market rate of 
return respectively, then according to CAPM: 
                                            
26 Portfolios that offer the highest expected returns for a given standard deviation are known 






















   ( 5.10 ) 
The parameter βi in equation (5.10) is a measure of systematic risk reflecting the 
variability of returns of a firm’s shares in relation to the market as a whole. 
Mathematically, it is equivalent to the ratio of covariance, σim, between the returns of 
an individual stock and the market portfolio, and the variance in the returns on the 
market portfolio σm
2.  Aside from its simplicity and widespread use, the CAPM has 
some notable limitations. First, being a single factor model, it overlooks other factors 
that might affect the returns. In fact, Fama and French (1995) find that firm size and 
book-to-market ratio are important factors in determining expected returns. In a 
subsequent study, Fama and French (1997) propose a new model for the cost of 
equity estimation, known as the Fama-French Three Factor (FF3F) Model, by 
incorporating risk factors that help to control for the effects of firm size (market 
capitalisation) and growth prospects (the book-to-market equity ratio) factors into the 
CAPM. Representing risk premia for market factor, size factor and growth factor by 
RPm, RPs and RPb respectively; and sensitivity of stock returns to these factors by βm, 
βs and βb respectively, the FF3F model is expressed as: 
bbissimmifi RPRPRPRR ***     ( 5.11 ) 
The FF3F model in the equation (5.11) predicts that large firms will tend to have 
relatively lower costs of equity than small firms because of their generally lower risk 
profile. The book-to-market ratio is often interpreted as providing a market risk 
premium to account for possible financial distress (Fama and French, 1995), 
Therefore, other things being equal, firms whose investment opportunity set 
comprises more growth options than assets-in-place are expected to have higher 
costs of equity than other firms. However, Brealey et al. (2011) report that sensitivity 
to these risk factors varies by industry. Not only this, factor betas might change over 
time, which limits the FF3F model’s applicability in case of companies with shorter 
return series. For example, Cummins and Phillips (2005, p. 449) assert that the FF3F 
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model requires lengthy estimation periods of 30 years or more to derive robust 
results. 
 
Some other major limitations with the CAPM and its multifactor variant, the FF3F 
model have also been highlighted in academic finance. For example, Lee and 
Cummins (1998) argue that the CAPM is not only a single-period model and so 
cannot deal with cross-temporal variations in firms’ risk profiles (e.g., betas), but that 
it is also founded on assumptions of perfect information in markets and multivariate 
normal securities’ returns, which are unlikely to hold in reality. Therefore, alternative 
metrics have been developed in an attempt to overcome the acknowledged 
deficiencies of the CAPM. For instance, Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (2007) recast 
the CAPM into a form that explicitly allows for multiple firms whose cash flows are 
correlated. They show that the ratio of expected future cash flows to the covariance of 
the firm’s cash flows with market cash flows is a key determinant of the cost of equity 
capital and that public information in the market reduces the risk premium and hence 
the cost of equity. Another model that overcomes the single factor limitation of CAPM 
is the APT model. The key features of the APT model are presented in next sub-
section 5.3.2.  
5.3.2 APT Model 
Unlike the CAPM, Ross’s (1976) APT model does not raise the question about 
portfolio efficiency, but rather assumes that returns on a firm’s stock depend 
collectively on macroeconomic risk factors along with idiosyncratic events unique to 
the firm. Ryan (2007) explains that the main idea behind APT is that for any given 
security or portfolio, it is possible to create another synthetic portfolio of identical 
risks, and in competitive markets, under the law of one price, the return offered on 
these portfolios should be identical too. Based on this ‘no arbitrage’ argument, two 
key conclusions can be drawn. First, that all security returns should be linear with 
respect to the factors which capture the various risks of those securities. Second, that 
it is possible to create a risk-free portfolio by combining securities which taken 
together have zero risk relative to macroeconomic factors driving risk in the market, 
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once firm-specific risk has been diversified away. This feature is similar to that of the 
CAPM, which postulates that risk arising from pervasive macroeconomic factors 
cannot be eliminated, whereas diversification eliminates specific risk related to a 
firm’s portfolio. Accordingly, APT holds that the expected risk premium on a stock 
should depend on the expected risk premium associated with each of the 
macroeconomic risk factors (RPj) and the share’s sensitivity (βji) to each of these 
factors (Brealey et al., 2011). Mathematically this relation can be expressed as:  
nniiifi RPRPRPRR *...** 2211     ( 5.12 ) 
Lee and Cummins (1998) show that the APT model represented in the equation 
(5.12) above produces more reliable cost of equity estimates than the CAPM; but they 
report that it is rarely used in practice for various reasons. These reasons include the 
heavy constraints that the APT model places on data (e.g., the requirement for 
synchronous and frequently traded share price data) and the difficulty of determining 
macroeconomic factors’ effects on securities’ returns within and between industries 
and countries, and also over time. Various developments on the CAPM and APT 
models have been reported in the literature. For example, Wei (1988) develops a 
hybrid of the CAPM and APT metrics and demonstrates that this hybrid model is an 
important advancement on the simplified CAPM. However, the hybrid model still 
retains many of the shortcomings of the CAPM and APT concepts such as the single 
period context and potentially confounding institutional and economic sector effects 
arising due to the assumption of the normality of returns required for deriving this 
model. Wen et al. (2008) suggest that the CAPM should not be used when 
companies’ equity returns are not normally distributed. Consequently, they use the 
non-parametric Rubinstein-Leland (R-L) model (Rubinstein, 1976; Leland, 1999) to 
calculate the cost of equity for US property-liability insurance companies.  
5.3.3 Rubinstein-Leland (R-L) Model  
He and Leland (1993) show that the CAPM-based beta does not capture skewness 
and other higher order moments of the return distribution that may be valuable to the 
investors. Leland (1999) adds that a risk measure must capture an infinite number of 
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moments of the return distribution. Rubinstein’s (1976) study presents a pricing 
formula for the valuation of uncertain income streams assuming a power utility 
function for the investor and lognormal return for the market portfolio. It must be noted 
here that the assumption of lognormality does not apply to the returns on individual 
assets constituting the market portfolio, as a portfolio of assets with lognormal returns 
will not itself have lognormal return. However, the R-L model being non-parametric, 
provides robust estimates for the price of any asset with any arbitrary distribution, and 
is thus able to capture an infinite number of moments (Wen et al., 2008). Accordingly, 
if X1 is the terminal payoff, Rm the return on market portfolio; Rf the return on risk-free 
asset; b the degree of risk aversion of the assumed power utility; Cov(u,v) covariance 
of any two variables u and v; and E(.) the expected value operator, then the current 





































   ( 5.13 ) 
Based on equation 5.13 above, Leland (1999) derives a linear risk-return relationship 





















   ( 5.14 ) 
By setting the degree of risk aversion ‘b’ equal to 4, Wen et al. (2008) calculate the 
cost of capital of US-based property-liability insurers using R-L model and the 
CAPM27. Their study finds systematic differences in the estimated cost of equity using 
                                            
27 Leland (1999) suggests that the degree of risk aversion of a representative investor can be 
viewed as the “market price of risk”, and can be estimated by dividing the market’s 
instantaneous excess rate of return by the variance of the market’s instantaneous rate of 
return. Accounting for the effects of human capital and the mean reversion character of stock 
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the two methods for non-life insurers having returns with severe departures from 
normality and/or insurers that are relatively small in size.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed various methods that may be utilised to estimate the cost of 
equity capital. These models are classified as valuation based models or asset pricing 
models. Valuation models generate the ex-ante cost of equity estimates using 
forecast data, whereas asset pricing models generate ex-post estimates using 
historical returns. Although valuation models in general correlate better with the 
common risk proxies, they are data intensive and their applicability is subject to the 
availability of relevant data which might not be available for relatively smaller 
companies and privately held corporations. On the other hand, asset pricing models 
require less input, but correspond less to common risk proxies. Therefore, none of the 
models emerges as the unequivocal frontrunner to be adopted as the best available 
technique, as all of them have certain appealing features and a few limitations. The 
applicability of each model in the context of the present study will be determined by 
the availability of input data, and the relevance of assumptions made by the model in 
the case of the insurance industry. The determination of the best cost of equity metric 
for the present study will be considered in the Research Design section (Chapter 6) of 
this thesis.  
                                                                                                                                         
index, Campbell (1996) estimates the value of risk aversion parameter ‘b’ to be 3.63. For 




 RESEARCH DESIGN CHAPTER 6.
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a rationale for the selection and application of an 
appropriate method for the empirical research undertaken in this study. In section 
6.2 an overview of the appropriate research methods is presented along with the 
justification for the research methods used. A description of the data sources, and 
the sample selection method employed are provided in section 6.3. Section 6.4 
then outlines the procedure adopted for estimating the cost of equity, while section 
6.5 defines and elaborates on the motivation for including the relevant variables 
used in this study. The respective models used to test the two hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 4, along with appropriate econometric procedures employed 
to implement these models, are detailed in sections 6.6 and 6.7. Finally, section 
6.8 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Research Methods 
Statistical analysis, questionnaires, and face-to-face interviews are the prime 
candidates for collecting and analysing the data required in the context of 
empirical research. The latter two methods are versatile as they are suitable for 
both quantitative as well as qualitative research, while statistical analysis is 
appropriate only for quantitative research (Sarantakos, 2005). According to Hoyle, 
Harris and Judd’s (2002), data collected through questionnaires suffer from poor 
data quality (accuracy and completeness) and often low response rates. 
Interviews too have limitations as they are prone to biased answers from 
respondents and measurement errors arising due to the misinterpretation and/or 
incorrect framing of questions (Snow and Thomas, 1994). Statistical analysis, on 
the other hand, is considered to be the most robust and appropriate technique to 
test hypotheses derived from theory. This is because statistical results can be 
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generalised and reproduced rendering them more robust and defensible under 
scrutiny (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Sarantakos, 2005). Although it would be 
ideal to use field-based methods in conjunction with statistical analysis, time and 
cost constraints rule out the use of these methods in the current study. Not only 
this, a low response rate using field-based methods can curtail the size of the 
sample drawn from non-life insurance companies operating in the UK. A small 
estimation sample can make inferences drawn from this study to be deemed 
unreliable. Accordingly, statistical analysis emerges as the most appropriate 
research method to be employed in this study. 
 
Statistical analysis is the best approach for this study for at least two other 
reasons. First, since the study (like most studies published in academic finance 
literature) is empirical in nature, it is essentially quantitative, and therefore more 
amenable to the tools of statistical analysis. Second, as stated above, the results 
obtained by using statistical analysis being generalisable, fit well with the sated 
hypotheses of this study. This is because the hypotheses presented in this study 
generalize the observed behaviour of the individual firms to that of the average 
firm operating in the industry. Moreover, given the use of independently audited 
secondary data, statistical analysis is likely to produce more reliable and unbiased 
results, which may not be the case with data collected using field-based methods. 
6.3 Data Sources 
Data used in this study are derived from two sources. The first data sources are 
the regulatory returns filed by the licensed general insurance companies operating 
in the UK to the insurance industry regulator – the FSA. SynThesys Non-Life 
Insurance Database provided by Standard & Poor’s (2011) compiled the 
regulatory returns filed by 469 insurance and reinsurance companies operating in 
the UK non-life insurance market between 1985 and 2010. This database was 
carefully selected based on the aptness of the data provided and the cost of the 
database subscription in the context of this study. The time-window of this study 
mirrors the earliest and latest years for which the data were available when the 
empirical analysis was carried out. However, the SynThesys database does not 
provide consolidated returns of group companies as regulations require 
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independently operating and reporting insurers to file their returns individually, 
rather than on the basis of their group membership. Additionally, not all firm-year 
cases included in the database are usable (e.g., as a result of the negative values 
of accounting items (e.g., the negative values of gross annual premiums written) 
and missing observations). Therefore, as in Petroni (1992), and Gaver and 
Paterson (1999) amongst others, certain restrictions were imposed on the 
complete set of observations to derive a sample with plausible values of certain 
key parameters as described next. Only firm-year observations for which total 
assets, total gross premiums written, primary and direct gross premiums written, 
total capital resources, cash, capital reserve requirements, claims incurred, 
policyholders’ surplus, paid-in capital and premiums ceded were reported to be 
positive, are included in the estimation sample. Further, this sample’s ‘filtering 
procedure’ also required that the return on assets be greater than -1 for the firm-
year to be included in the sample.  
 
This ‘filtering procedure’ generated a sample of 380 firms (5075 firm-year 
observations) that were proactively writing primary insurance in at least one year 
over the study period. The resulting sample was further reduced, as only the firms 
having a premiums ceded to gross premiums written ratio of less than or equal to 
one were included in the sample. Again, this step was taken to eliminate 
implausible values, because a cession rate of higher than 100% is symptomatic of 
either a firm in ‘run-off’ or a case of misreporting. Adopting this procedure removes 
128 firm-years, leaving 4,947 firm-years (379 firms) in the sample. To ‘force’ the 
data to be longitudinal (panel) in nature, the firms that do not have at least two 
consecutive years of observations are excluded from the estimation sample. This 
results in a sample of 363 firms with 4,773 observations. The second database 
used in this study is the Datastream (2012) database provided by Thomson 
Reuters, which was used to collect data required for calculating the cost of equity. 
Specifically, data on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) Non-Life 
Insurance Index were used to calculate returns for the UK non-life insurance 
sector28, whereas the FTSE All Share Index was used for calculating the market 
                                            
28 As the name suggests, the FTSE 350 Nonlife Insurance Index is a market-capitalisation 
weighted index of all the companies in the non-life insurance sector of the FTSE 350 
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return29. Details of the procedure employed to calculate cost of equity capital are 
provided in the following section (6.4).  
6.4 Cost of Equity Estimation 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, there are various techniques for calculating the cost of 
the equity of a firm, but their application is often constrained by the availability of 
the requisite data. It has been reported in the academic literature that market-
based accounting methods provide the most accurate estimates of the cost of 
equity as these estimates tend to correspond well with the usual risk proxies (e.g., 
see Botosan and Plumlee, 2005). Since these techniques are by definition market 
based, these techniques are useful only for publicly quoted firms. This is so 
because the long time series of earnings and/or dividend forecast data required for 
estimating the equity cost of capital using these techniques are available only for 
widely held listed firms. Insurance (composite and pure non-life insurers) firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) however, represent only a small 
proportion (27 out of 701 licensed firms in 2010) of the total population of UK-
licensed general insurers30. Results obtained using a sample of only 27 firms 
would not be generalisable; hence in the interest of maintaining a representative 
sample of a decent size, the idea of applying estimation techniques using market-
based accounting was discarded. Following this, a technique had to be chosen 
from different estimation models based on asset pricing theory. The selection 
procedure is described as follows. 
The first cost of equity model considered was the APT model of Ross (1976), 
which, according to Lee and Cummins (1998), produces reliable estimates of the 
cost of equity, but is rarely used in practice. They further explain that the reason 
                                                                                                                                    
Index. The index was developed with a base value of 1,000 as of December 31, 1985 
(Datastream, 2012). 
 
29 The FTSE All-Share is a market-capitalisation weighted index representing the 
performance of all eligible companies listed on the London Stock Exchange’s main 
market, that pass screening for size and liquidity. The FTSE All-Share Index covers 
approximately 98% of the UK’s total market capitalisation (Datastream, 2012). 
 
30 However, other listed insurance firms (e.g. Allianz) in the sample are quoted in the stock 
exchanges based in the country of their respective parents. 
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for this is the severe restrictions placed on data by the APT model, such as the 
requirement of frequent trading. Moreover, the APT model does not identify the 
key macroeconomic risk factors that must be considered in estimation (e.g., the 
market risk, inflation risk, exchange rate risk etc.). In view of these restrictions, the 
APT model was not selected for estimating the cost of equity. The next cost of 
equity model to be considered was the widely used CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965). The CAPM has certain desirable qualities in the context of this 
study. First, even though CAPM is fundamentally a market based technique, it can 
nevertheless be applied for non-listed firms if used in conjunction with the ‘full 
information beta’ (hereafter FIB) technology described in Kaplan and Peterson 
(1998). Indeed, Cummins and Phillips (2005) successfully apply the CAPM using 
FIB technique in the case of US-based non-listed property-liability insurers. They 
further assert that such methodology can be used for calculating the cost of capital 
of mutual companies as well. Consequently, the CAPM does not impose severe 
limitations on the data in terms of organisational form or the listing status of the 
insurance firm. As discussed in section 5.3.1 of Chapter 5, there are, however, 
certain limitations of CAPM as well. For example, it is a single period model so 
cannot take into account changes in risk profile of the firms over time; the CAPM 
also makes unrealistic assumptions of the normality of security returns.  
One of the limitations of CAPM, i.e. the assumption of return normality, can be 
overcome by using the R-L model attributed to Rubinstein (1976) and Leland 
(1999). The R-L model was therefore considered next. The R-L model assumes 
the log-normality of market returns, but does not make any distributional 
assumptions regarding the returns of a particular stock. Wen et al. (2008) 
operationalise the R-L model for US property-liability insurance companies, and 
report that the R-L model, being distribution-free, provides better estimates (in 
terms of proximity to realised returns) of portfolio return for insurers with highly 
skewed returns, and/or a relatively small size. Moreover, like the CAPM, FIB 
methodology can be used with the R-L model thus preserving the sample size. 
Given these attributes, the R-L model was used as the primary method for 
estimating the cost of the equity of firms in the aforementioned sample. The CAPM 
however was also used to provide a secondary benchmark estimate in order to 
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facilitate comparative analysis and checks for the robustness of the hypotheses. 
The nature of the FIB procedure is considered next. 
The FIB procedure to compute industry-level betas outlined in Kaplan and 
Peterson (1998) was used in this study to estimate the industry level betas for 
each line of business. In turn, these values were used to calculate the firm level 
betas. Cummins and Phillips (2005, p. 447) state that the “…FIB methodology 
produces cost of capital estimates that reflect the line of business composition of 
the firm”. They further explain that in arbitrage free markets the value of a firm can 
be considered as the sum of the values of individual assets (lines of business) 
owned by the firm. Therefore, it follows that a firm’s beta can also be represented 
as the sum of beta coefficients of individual lines weighted by their corresponding 
weights representing their proportional contribution to the firm’s market value. Due 
to individual lines not being traded in the market, the market value of individual 
business lines is not known. Therefore, following Kaplan and Peterson (1998), 
revenues for six lines of business at the industry and firm level are used in this 
study to proxy for the relative weight of each line at the industry-level and firm-
level respectively31. Within the framework of the FIB, the initial step using the R-L 
metric is to calculate industry level beta corresponding to each of the available 




























   ( 6.1 ) 
As is evident from the equation (6.1) above, the three key inputs required for 
estimation are Ri - the return on a portfolio of non-life insurance companies; Rf – 
the return on the risk-free asset and Rm – the return on the market portfolio. The 
proxies used for all these variables were obtained using data from Datastream 
(2012). As mentioned in section 6.3, the FTSE 350 Non-life Insurance Index was 
used to proxy Ri, the monthly return on the industrial sector. Data on this index are 
                                            
31 Owing to the availability of coherent data six major groups of insurance business are 
classified as different lines in this study. These are: personal accident; motor insurance; 
property insurance; liability insurance; marine, aviation & transport insurance; and 




available from December 1985 onwards. The risk-free rate, Rf was estimated using 
the monthly return on the UK government Treasury Bill of one month maturity as it 
precisely matches the duration of returns on the insurance industry index and the 
market index. Similarly, the return on the FTSE All-Share Price Index was used to 
approximate the monthly market return. It is important to note here that there is a 
mismatch of the duration of data available on the FTSE 350 Non-Life Insurance 
Index, which is based on data from December 1985 and the data available from 
SynThesys Non-Life, which provides data from 1985 onwards. Therefore to avoid 
losing one year’s data in the estimation, the bootstrap method utilising the full 
sample of available returns was employed to estimate the yearly industry beta for 
each year from 1985 to 2010 (see Appendix A). However, industry beta can also 
be calculated using the CAPM with the same set of variables used for estimating 
betas using the R-L model and employing the following equation:  
)( fmfi RRRR       ( 6.2 ) 
Yearly industry betas so obtained from the equations (6.1) and (6.2) were then 
regressed on the annual weights of each of the individual lines over the estimation 
period with the constant term suppressed. If βt represents annual industry beta for 
year ‘t’; βj represents beta of an individual line ‘j’; and ωjt represents weight of line j 







     ( 6.3 ) 
Suppression of the constant term ensures that the estimation procedure conforms 
to value-additivity property assumed in the FIB framework, as the industry beta 
must be equal to the weighted sum of the individual line betas (e.g., see Cummins 
and Phillips, 2005). Line betas, represented by βj, so obtained are then used to 






ijtjit       ( 6.4 ) 
In equation (6.4) above, ωijt represents the weight of by-line business premiums 
written by a firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’ as a proportion of the annual gross premiums written 
by the firm in that year. In the next step in this procedure, using the yearly betas 
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for individual firms, the risk premia for individual firms for each year in the study 
period were calculated using the following mathematical relationship: 
)( fmitit RRRP       ( 6.5 ) 
In the equation (6.5) above, the market risk premium is represented by the 
difference between the return on the market portfolio and the risk free asset, 
denoted by Rm and Rf respectively. Using the long-run average of risk premium is 
used as short term estimates of risk premium could be confounded by period 
specific environmental (e.g., macroeconomic) events (Koller, Goedhart and 
Wessels, 2010). Therefore, to incorporate the long period estimates of risk 
premiums in this research project, the risk premium of 5.23% as reported in Table 
I of Kyriacou, Madsen and Mase (2006, p. 347) is used. Kyriacou et al. (2006) 
calculate the historical risk premium using UK-specific data from the year 1900 to 
2002. As suggested in the academic literature, the arithmetic mean is employed in 
their study to arrive at this estimate (e.g. see Koller et al., 2010, p. 239). The 
yearly risk premia so calculated for each firm in the estimation sample serve as the 
dependent variable in testing each of the two hypotheses proposed. Other 
variables used in testing these hypotheses are described in section 6.5 below. 
6.5 Explanatory Variables 
All the variables described below are defined in the context of the sample (4,773 
firm-years with 363 firms) that corresponds to the sampling procedure described in 
section 6.3. All the variables used in this study are summarised in Table 6.1. 
6.5.1 Reinsurance 
Since this research study primarily aims to explain the effect of reinsurance on the 
cost of the equity of the insurers, the principal explanatory variables (decision to 
reinsure and the extent of reinsurance) used in this research are derived from the 
premiums ceded to the reinsurers. To test the ‘reinsurance decision’ hypothesis 
(H1), an indicator variable, named REINID, which takes value 1 if a firm cedes any 
premiums to a reinsurer and 0 otherwise, is used. In the current study, 347 sample 
firms (nearly 96% of all the firms in the sample) use reinsurance with 
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approximately 95% of the firm-year observations (4,512 out of 4,773) indicating 
the use of reinsurance. To gauge the extent of reinsurance used by insurers 
relative to the gross premiums written at the total business level, the ratio of 
premiums ceded to gross premiums written (hereafter reinsurance ratio) is 
employed. The variable label REINS denotes the reinsurance ratio given in Table 
6.1 below. The squared value of reinsurance ratio is incorporated along with the 
reinsurance ratio to test the non-linear dependence of the cost of equity on the 
reinsurance ratio.  
Table 6.1: Definition of Variables 
This table defines variables used in testing the hypotheses postulated in this 
study. All the variables pertain to the values for firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’. 
Name Denotes Definition 




Indicator variable for use of reinsurance, takes value 1 
if used, 0 otherwise 
REINSit Reinsurance Ratio 
Ratio of premiums ceded to gross premiums written at 




Square of the reinsurance ratio as defined above 
LEVit Leverage 
Difference between total assets and policyholders' 
surplus scaled by total assets 
SIZEit Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
CAPit Growth 
Ratio of difference of capital resources available and 
capital resource requirements to capital resources 
LIQit Liquidity Cash scaled by total claims incurred 
HINDXit Herfindahl Index 
Sum of squares of the ratio of by-line premiums written 
to total premiums written at the firm level  
6.5.2 Leverage 
Prior research suggests that many factors can explain the observed risk premia. 
For example, in the seminal works of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) leverage 
is considered to be an important factor in determining the cost of equity, and that 
the cost of equity increases with an increase in leverage. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), and Jensen (1986) further contend that agency costs are also associated 
with debt, and as such, indirectly affect the cost of equity. Prior research studying 
the link between the cost of equity and firm risk characteristics (e.g. see Botosan 
and Plumlee, 2005) also uses leverage as one of the determinants of the cost of 
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equity. Following these studies, leverage is used here as one of the explanatory 
variables for observed risk premium. In the context of this study’s leverage, LEV, is 
defined as the difference between total assets and policyholders’ surplus scaled 
by total assets32.  
6.5.3 Size 
Fama and French (1995) demonstrate that size, and the book-to-market value 
ratio of a firm are significant factors in determining the risk premium demanded by 
investors. In Fama and French’s (1997) FF3F model, firm size is inversely related 
to the cost of equity. Such a relationship between firm size and the cost of equity 
arises because larger firms have greater access to capital markets than smaller 
firms, plus, they are more diversified in terms of both geographical and product-
markets. Berk (1995) also suggests that the market value and firm risk are 
inherently inversely related. In the same vein, Botosan, Plumlee and Wen (2011) 
define firm size as the natural logarithm of the market value of the firm. However, 
this measure is not possible in this study as most of the firms in the estimation 
sample are not publicly traded. Therefore, the natural logarithm of the total assets 
reported in the statutory annual returns filed by the insurers has been used to 
proxy for the size of the firm. It is considered that this is a reasonable proxy for two 
main reasons. Firstly, insurers are required by regulation to regularly (at least 
annually) mark their assets to market values for statutory solvency monitoring 
purposes, and second, a large proportion of insurers’ assets are marketable 
securities which in any case are reported at, or close to their true market values. 
6.5.4 Growth 
Many studies report the book-value-to-market-value of equity ratio (BE/ME) to be 
positively related with the equity risk premium.  Models explaining higher average 
returns on high BE/ME stocks, such as the APT model of Ross (1976), contend 
that the observed higher returns on high BE/ME stocks are compensation for an 
additional fundamental risk factor. Within the purview of this stream of research, 
BE/ME can thus be envisioned to represent the inherent growth opportunities of a 
                                            




firm. Davis, Fama and French (2000) also provide historical evidence in favour of 
this argument. However, due to the unavailability of BE/ME for most of the firms in 
the estimation sample a different proxy for growth capacity of the insurer is used in 
this study. UK based insurers are required to report their capital resources as well 
as their capital resource requirements to the insurance industry regulator in their 
annual statutory solvency returns. The regulations demand that the insurer must 
be able to meet its capital resource requirements using its own capital resources. 
Thus, an insurer with a higher difference between its capital resources and the 
stated capital resource requirements will have a lower risk profile and higher 
capacity to grow its gross premiums written and/or the underwriting profit. 
Therefore, to capture this growth component of risk, the difference between capital 
resources and capital resource requirements scaled by capital resources, denoted 
as CAP, is used in this study. 
6.5.5 Liquidity 
Insurers being financial intermediaries face significant liquidity risks on their 
balance sheets (Borde, Chambliss and Madura, 1994). BarNiv and Hershbarger 
(1990) also suggest that liquidity risk is an important component of the potential 
financial distress costs of an insurer. The liquidity risks arise due to the possibility 
that insurers’ investments (usually in marketable securities which are exposed to 
interest rate risk, market risk, and credit risk) will not be able to meet an increased 
demand for liquidity in the aftermath of a major catastrophe event. Borde et al. 
(1994) also report that liquidity has a positive and statistically significant relation 
with an insurer’s risk. This view supports the argument that an insurer’s liquidity 
level can lead to a more risky investment strategy. To account for this possibility, a 
variable representing the liquidity level of an insurer is also included in the 
estimation. The ratio of reported cash assets to claims incurred, denoted LIQ, is 
thus used to measure liquidity risk. As in Borde et al. (1994) the relation between 
liquidity risk and the cost of equity is predicted to be positive.  
6.5.6 Product Diversification 
One of the important considerations in determining firm-level risk is the level of 
product-market diversification of the firm. For example, Cole and McCullough 
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(2006, p. 176) assert that, “…differences in the lines of business sold affect a 
firm’s investment opportunities, earnings volatility, and overall level of risk”. 
Indeed, in their study Drew, Naughton and Veeraraghavan (2004) find that 
idiosyncratic volatility is priced in the stock market. Since a diversified insurance 
firm is likely to have lower volatility returns, a Herfindahl index (HINDX) is used in 
this study to measure product diversification in accordance with the prior research 
(e.g., see Mayers and Smith, 1990). This variable (HINDX) is defined as the sum 
of squares of the premiums generated by individual lines of business as a 
proportion of the total premiums written at the total business level. In other words, 
for a firm ‘i’ operating in ‘N’ different lines of insurance in a given year ‘t’, the 
Herfindahl index can be calculated as: 



















   ( 6.6 ) 
A small HINDX (significantly less than 1) represents a highly diversified company, 
whereas for a ‘pure-play’ company this index is equal to one. Since a diversified 
company is expected to be less risky, the cost of equity is expected be an 
increasing function of HINDX.  
6.5.7 Additional Controls for Risk 
Apart from reinsurance, other techniques of risk management such as derivatives 
and catastrophe bonds33 (CAT bonds) also are used by insurers. Several studies, 
such as Hentschel and Smith (1997), Cummins, Grace and Phillips (1999), 
Cummins, Phillips and Smith (2001) have examined the use of derivatives by US-
based insurers for hedging asset volatility, liquidity, and exchange-rate risks. 
Hardwick and Adams (1999) document the use of derivatives by UK-based life-
insurers for the same reasons. These studies suggest that exposure to volatile 
cash outflows caused by liability lawsuits and property catastrophes along with the 
exposure to economic fluctuations (e.g., interest rate movements) on the asset 
side of their balance sheets motivates the purchase of derivatives by the property-
                                            
33 Cummins, Doherty and Lo (2002, p. 559) define CAT bonds as financial instruments 




liability insurers. In light of the fact that reinsurance can also be used by the 
primary insurers to hedge against the cash-flow volatility caused by future liability 
lawsuits and/or property catastrophes, these studies hypothesise that the 
derivatives are used as a substitute to the reinsurance. However, Cummins, 
Phillips and Smith (2001, p. 81) conclude that the “…insurers with relatively low 
risk tolerance are likely to use more derivatives and more reinsurance.” Therefore, 
their results suggest a complementary relation between the use of reinsurance 
and derivatives by the primary insurers. In the same vein, Cummins (2008, p. 23) 
opines that “…CAT bonds are not expected to replace reinsurance but to 
complement the reinsurance market by providing additional risk-bearing capacity”. 
Despite their growing popularity, to date, the use of derivatives has remained 
limited to only a minority of insurers. Prior studies indicate a substantial difference 
in the number of users of reinsurance and derivatives. For example, Cummins, 
Phillips, and Smith (1997) report that only 7% of the US based property-liability 
insurers used derivatives in 1994, while the use of reinsurance is much more 
widespread. Although an exact corresponding figure is unavailable in the case of 
the UK’s non-life insurers, a similar proportion of companies is expected to use 
derivatives. Out of more than 4,000 firm-year observations used in this study only 
about 500 correspond to the use of derivatives. On the other hand, nearly 95% of 
the observations confirm the use of reinsurance. This lack of variability in 
derivatives data makes it unfeasible to introduce a variable representing use of 
derivatives in the regression analysis conducted in this study. 
6.6 Model Specification 
6.6.1 Decision to Reinsure 
Having defined the dependent and explanatory variables, the next step is to 
specify the model to test the two proposed hypotheses reported previously in 
Chapter 4, section 4.4. To test the first hypothesis, which relates the cost of equity 
to the managerial decision to reinsure, the following model is specified: 
itititititititit HINDXLIQCAPSIZELEVREINIDCOE    ( 6.7 ) 
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Equation (6.7) is similar (but not identical) to the models used by Botosan and 
Plumlee (2005), and Botosan et al. (2011) to compare the relative accuracy of the 
cost of equity estimates obtained using different techniques. The model in the 
equation (6.7) above is based on the idea that the risk undertaken by investors 
must be priced in the cost of equity, hence the factors that can affect this risk must 
be accounted for in the model. All the variables appearing in the equation (6.7) 
above are described in Table 6.1, while the last term εit, in the equation (6.7) 
represents an error term that accounts for unobserved firm specific effects (e.g., 
variations in managerial quality) αi, time specific shocks (e.g., macroeconomic 
changes) νt and a random (white noise) error term ηit. That is: 
ittiit        ( 6.8 ) 
In the presence of firm specific effects, the ordinary least squares estimator (OLS) 
is biased and inconsistent (Greene, 2003). For instance, firm-effects introduce a 
downward bias in estimates of standard errors. This downward bias in standard 
errors results in an upward bias in the magnitude of estimated t-statistics, which in 
turn leads to a statistical significance being assigned to variables that may not be 
significant (Greene, 2003). There is potential for the firm effects to be present in 
the dataset used in this study, hence it is required that the clustering of standard 
errors within firms is accounted for in regressions. Thus, to alleviate this concern 
the standard errors corrected for clustering within firms are used (Wooldridge, 
2002).  
There is, however, another possibility that there are some unobserved time 
specific factors that affect the relation between the variables entering the 
regression analysis. Insurance being a cyclical industry is prone to time specific 
events, which can lead to a correlation of error terms across the cross-section of 
firms in a given year. For example, in the aftermath of a major catastrophe, capital 
levels in the insurance industry are depleted and so the cost of capital, as well as 
premiums charged in the market rise. Again, OLS standard errors are biased 
downwards in the presence of time specific effects and thus they can be controlled 
by clustering the standard errors across time (Wooldridge, 2002). In case both 
types of shocks are present, then it is required that the standard errors used are 
robust to clustering across both cross-sectional and temporal dimensions of panel 
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dataset (Petersen, 2009). To ensure that the standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the current study uses the Newey and 
West (1987) estimation procedure which controls for arbitrary heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation. Moreover, year-dummies are used in the estimation to control 
for time specific effects.    
6.6.2 Extent of Reinsurance 
According to the second hypothesis put forward in Chapter 4 section 4.4, the 
relation between the cost of equity of insurance firms and the extent of reinsurance 
is expected to be non-linear. The extent of reinsurance for the purpose of testing 
the second hypothesis is defined as the reinsurance ratio (see Table 6.1). To 
capture the element of non-linearity, the square term of the reinsurance ratio is 
introduced into the equation. Such an approach is consistent with previous 
research such as Zou (2010), who uses the square of the level of corporate 
insurance purchased to account for non-linearity. Thus, to test the extent of the 












  ( 6.9 ) 
However, reinsurance is a key element of the capital structure of insurance 
companies, so there is potential for endogeneity in the specified model (Cole and 
McCullough, 2006). For example, a higher degree of corporate leverage can lead 
to a higher demand for reinsurance, which in turn can increase the underwriting 
capacity of the insurer leading to a further increase in leverage. Eventually this is 
likely to result in a higher cost of capital. To alleviate concerns about prospective 
endogeneity, an instrumental variable approach is also used in this study. An 
instrumental variable possesses the property that it is a good predictor of the 
endogenous variable, but is uncorrelated to the main dependent variable (Greene, 
2003). Specifically, three instruments are used in the current study in the 
‘reinsurance volume model’. These are: 1) reserving errors from the previous year; 
2) an indicator variable if the earnings of the firm are in the convex region of the 
corporate marginal rate of tax, and 3) the annual return on assets. The motivation 
for using these three instruments is covered in section 6.7 below. 
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6.6.3 Alternative Techniques for Non-linear Estimation 
The reinsurance-volume decision model proposed in this study hypothesises a 
non-linear relation between the cost of equity and the extent of reinsurance. The 
current study uses a linear estimation model after transforming the original 
quadratic variable (REINS2) to account for the hypothesised non-linear relation.  
Apart from this method, there are a few other econometric techniques including 
spline regression , the dummy variable approach, time counters, intervention 
analysis, interrupted time series, and piecewise linear models that can be used for 
a non-linear estimation. The applicability of these techniques depends on the 
characteristics of the non-linear relation under investigation. For example, if a 
continuous variable appears to change its trajectory over time in response to some 
event or policy, then this change is either abrupt or smooth. If the dependent 
variable changes abruptly following a policy change, then an interrupted time 
series design (to capture intercept shifts) might be appropriate. However, if a 
gradual change in the dependent variable is encountered, then a spline model is 
preferable because of its ability to capture the smooth change of slope in joining 
two regression lines (before and after the event/policy change) without a break. 
Indeed Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998) refer to spline regression models as 
“piecewise linear regression” because they effectively piece together two or more 
linear regressions. Marsh and Cormier (2002) explain that spline models are 
essentially dummy variable models subject to one or more continuity restrictions. 
They further explain that if the location of the knots is unknown then nonlinear 
least squares must be used adding to the complexity of the procedure. Not only 
this, the complexity of this procedure increases further when the number of knots 
is unknown. This is indeed the case in the current study as the point of inflection, 
and the number of these points is unknown. In view of this fact, a simpler linear 
estimation technique based on the linear transformation of quadratic variables is 
considered to be the best available technique. 
6.7 Instrumental Variables and Implementation 
An insurer that under-reserves is more likely to be financially distressed and so 
subject to a greater risk of bankruptcy. As reinsurance is a form of contingent 
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capital, other things being equal, a financially troubled insurer is thus more likely to 
use reinsurance than insurers who are in a sound financial condition. Indeed, 
Petroni (1992) provides evidence that there is a higher probability of under-
reserving by financially distressed insurers in the US property-liability insurance 
industry. Cole and McCullough (2006, p. 174) also assert that, “…if an insurer has 
positive loss development, or has been under-reserving, then the insurer is likely 
to demand more reinsurance in an effort to mitigate potential financial constraint”. 
Accordingly, it follows that reserving errors can, at least in part, explain the use of 
reinsurance, and therefore, a reserving error variable is a potential instrument for 
the extent of reinsurance. Moreover, the academic literature provides no evidence 
that a reserving error is directly related to the cost of equity, and so it has all the 
properties of a ‘good instrument’. In this study, reserving errors are estimated 
using the KFS method developed in Kazenski, Feldhaus and Schneider (1992), 
scaled by reported capital resources are used as the measure for reserving 
errors34. Further, the KFS method of estimating reserving errors is one of the most 
common methods of estimating reserving errors (Grace and Leverty, 2012). 
According to the KFS method, for an insurance firm ‘i’ reserving errors 
corresponding to the estimated losses in year ‘t’, can be calculated ‘n’ years after 
year ‘t’, using the following equation: 
nti,ti,ti, Losses IncurredLosses IncurredError Reserve   ( 6.10 ) 
Reserving errors calculated using the equation (6.10) above show the difference 
between the expected losses in a given year and the actual payments made 
corresponding to those losses in a future year. A negative error would then be 
evidence of under-reserving. Accordingly, the reserve error variable is expected to 
be negatively related to the demand for reinsurance. In this study, the errors are 
calculated one year in the future (i.e., n = 1). Hence, the inclusion of this variable 
results in the loss of one year of data (i.e., the latest year for which data are 
available for a particular firm), as the figures for future values of incurred losses 
corresponding to the latest year were not available at the time of analysis. 
Therefore, without the loss of generality, the ratio of reserving error to reported 
                                            
34 Refer to Appendix B for a detailed explanation of the KFS method used in the present 
study to calculate the reserving errors. 
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capital resources, denoted RESERRit, is used as an instrument for the reinsurance 
ratio.  
Corporate tax has also been suggested in the academic finance literature as a 
determinant of corporate hedging. According to Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003) 
reinsurance facilitates investment in tax-exempt assets, viz. municipal bonds, by 
reducing the probability of large unexpected losses. Smith and Stulz (1985) 
suggest that in a progressive tax regime (such as in the UK) corporate hedging 
enables firms to reduce their expected tax liabilities. By showing that reinsurance 
reduces fluctuations in an insurer’s earnings leading to a reduction in tax liability, 
Mayers and Smith (1990) provide empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
Therefore, taxable income in the convex region of the tax schedule can be used as 
an indicator for the purchase of reinsurance. Consequently, this study uses an 
indicator variable, named CTAX, which takes value 1 if the earnings before tax for 
an insurer fall in the convex region of the tax schedule, and 0 otherwise. As in the 
case of reserving errors, this variable is not directly related to the cost of equity of 
an insurance firm; nonetheless, it is a reasonable predictor for reinsurance 
purchases, and so a valid instrument variable that can be used in the present 
study. 
The return on assets (ROA) is also a potentially important consideration in 
determining the extent of reinsurance purchased by a primary insurer. An 
insurance firm with a stable and positive ROA is less likely than other insurance 
firms to face financial distress/bankruptcy, as it is better able to absorb losses 
arising from low-frequency but high-severity events. Therefore, it is expected that 
a more profitable insurer is less likely to reinsure in order to maintain its capital 
adequacy than a less profitable insurer. Following Cole and McCullough (2006), 
ROA thus enters the regression analysis as the third instrumental variable for the 
extent of reinsurance purchased by an insurer. Like the previous two instruments, 
prior research has not established any direct causal relation between ROA and the 
cost of equity of an insurer.  
Using these three instrumental variables, namely, reserving errors, indicator 
variable indicating taxable earnings in convex region of the tax schedule, and 
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return on assets, along with other variables from the structural equation (6.9), the 











( 6.11 ) 
The last term uit of the reduced form equation (6.11) denotes the error term of the 
first-stage IV estimator. Similar to the structural equation (6.9), to control for 
downward biased standard errors resulting from heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation, the Newey and West (1987) estimation procedure is employed in 
the first-stage regressions. Table 6.2 below summarises the three IVs used in this 
study: 
Table 6.2: Instrumental Variables 
This table defines variables used in testing the hypotheses postulated in this study. All the 
variables pertain to the values for firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’. 
Name Denotes Definition 
RESERRit Reserve Errors 
Reserve errors estimated using the KFS 
(Kazenski et al., 1992) method and scaled by 




Indicator variable taking value 1 if earnings are in 
convex region of the tax schedule, 0 otherwise 
ROAit Return on Assets 
Sum of underwriting income and investment 
income divided by total reported assets 
 
The instrumental variable (IV) approach followed here utilises a two stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimator. Wooldridge (2002) explains that if instruments used in 
the reduced form equation and exogenous regressors in the structural equation 
are expected to be uncorrelated with the error term of the structural equation, then 
the 2SLS estimator is the most efficient among the class of IV estimators. As 
mentioned above, the instruments employed in the present study are so chosen 
that they can be assumed to be independent of the equity cost of capital. Hence it 
is reasonable to expect that the IVs used in this study along with exogenous 
variables from equation (6.9) are indeed independent of the error term in the 
equation (6.9). As the name suggests, the 2SLS estimator involves two stages of 
estimation. In the context of the current study, the value of the endogenous 
variable, REINSit, was predicted using the reduced form equation (6.11). The 
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predicted values so obtained were then inserted in the structural equation 6.9 to 
estimate the effect of the extent of reinsurance purchased on the cost of equity of 
an insurer. As has been mentioned in the preceding section 6.6, both the stages of 
estimation employ standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Moreover, the estimation procedure controls for time specific 
effects by including year-dummies in the regression analysis. 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter started by providing a discussion of the prospective research 
methods and an explanation of the reasons for choosing the statistical methods 
used. The next section described the sources of data and the sample selection 
process. Following this, two models were specified to test the two main research 
hypotheses put forward previously in Chapter 4, along with a detailed discussion 
of the motivation for, and definition of, the variables used in the regression 
analysis. Further, to overcome any concern of potential endogeneity a 2SLS IV 
technique is deemed to be an optimal solution. Three suitable instruments (i.e., 
reserve errors, tax convexity, and return on assets) for the key explanatory 
variable, the reinsurance ratio, are put forward along with a discussion of the 
implementation strategy using a 2SLS approach. The empirical results arising from 
the multivariate analysis are now discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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 EMPIRICAL RESULTS CHAPTER 7.
7.1 Introduction 
Risk management in general, and reinsurance in particular, as a value-added 
activity have been examined using various theories in the literature as reviewed in 
Chapter 3. This review facilitated the formulation of two hypotheses put forward in 
Chapter 4 of the thesis. These hypotheses examine the relationship between the 
cost of equity and reinsurance purchased by an insurer. Using the statistical 
procedures described in Chapter 6, these hypotheses are tested and the results 
reported in this chapter. The current chapter compiles these results along with the 
relevant statistics pertaining to the estimation sample used in the study. 
Specifically, univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analyses are presented using 
descriptive (summary) statistics, correlation analyses, and regression analyses, 
respectively.  
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
According to the sample selection criteria detailed in Chapter 6, section 6.3, the 
estimation sample used in this study contains 386 firms observed over 26 years 
(1985 to 2010) resulting in 4,916 firm-years of observations with which to conduct 
the statistical analysis. The univariate statistics pertaining to continuous variables 
in this sample are presented in Table 7.1. This table reports the mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of each variable. Moreover, the 
number of available observations (N), number of individual firms to which these 
data belong (n), and the average time period for which each of the firms was 
observed (T) are also reported in the last column of Table 7.1. This table also 
decomposes the standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of each of the 
variables at overall, between and within level. The overall statistic takes account of 
all the observations available for a particular variable without segregating the 
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Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Unit/Scale Level Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
RP Per cent overall 5.65 5.67 0.53 4.63 6.91 N : 4916 
between 
  
0.52 4.63 6.90 n :  386 
within 
  
0.20 4.52 7.54 T : 12.74 
RP_CM Per cent overall 5.49 5.49 0.22 4.96 5.99 N : 4916 
between 
  
0.22 4.96 5.99 n :  386 
within 
  
0.07 5.01 6.06 T : 12.74 
REINS Ratio overall 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.00 1.00 N : 4629 
between 
  
0.24 0.00 1.00 n :  367 
within 
  
0.14 -0.34 1.18 T : 12.61 
REINS2 Ratio overall 0.17 0.07 0.22 0.00 1.00 N : 4629 
between 
  
0.21 0.00 1.00 n :  367 
within 
  
0.13 -0.44 1.09 T : 12.61 
LEV Ratio overall 0.24 0.13 0.44 0.00 14.50 N : 4916 
between 
  
0.33 0.00 4.09 n :  386 
within 
  
0.34 -3.85 10.66 T : 12.74 
CAP Ratio overall 0.59 0.73 3.37 -231.50 1.00 N : 4916 
between 
  
0.90 -15.63 0.99 n :  386 
within 
  
3.24 -215.28 17.19 T : 12.74 
LIQ Ratio overall 7.61 1.12 87.12 0.00 4985.50 N : 4916 
between 
  
44.76 0.01 562.35 n :  386 
within 
  
82.62 -459.04 4726.02 T : 12.74 
SIZE Logarithm overall 11.05 10.97 1.95 5.70 16.62 N : 4916 
between 
  
1.84 6.54 16.39 n :  386 
within 
  
0.83 6.28 15.21 T : 12.74 
HINDX Ratio overall 0.64 0.59 0.27 0.16 1.00 N : 4916 
between 
  
0.25 0.22 1.00 n :  386 
within 
  
0.13 0.06 1.23 T : 12.74 
ROA Ratio overall 0.04 0.03 0.14 -0.82 2.85 N : 4916 
between 
  
0.12 -0.54 1.57 n :  386 
within 
  
0.09 -0.69 1.32 T : 12.74 
RESERR Ratio overall -0.03 0.01 1.79 -100.37 9.07 N : 3314 
between 
  
0.82 -11.30 1.01 n :  280 
within     1.71 -93.09 8.51 T : 11.84 
 
Panel B: Indicator Variables  
Variable Metric Represents Value Frequency Percent Firms 
REINSID Identifier Reinsurance not used 0 287 5.84 77 
  




4,916 100 386 
CTAX Identifier Earnings not in convex region 0 4,088 83.16 379 
  
Earnings in convex region 1 828 16.84 232 




Panel C: Summary Statistics of Winsorized Variables  
Variable Unit/Scale Level Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
WREINS Ratio overall 0.29 0.27 0.20 0.00 0.55 N : 4629 
between 
  
0.18 0.00 0.55 n :  367 
within 
  
0.11 -0.18 0.75 T : 12.61 
WREINS2 Ratio overall 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.31 N : 4629 
between 
  
0.10 0.00 0.31 n :  367 
within 
  
0.07 -0.15 0.40 T : 12.61 
WLEV Ratio overall 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.03 0.53 N : 4916 
between 
  
0.12 0.03 0.53 n :  386 
within 
  
0.11 -0.17 0.61 T : 12.74 
WCAP Ratio overall 0.69 0.73 0.20 0.21 1.00 N : 4916 
between 
  
0.16 0.21 0.99 n :  386 
within 
  
0.15 0.03 1.17 T : 12.74 
WLIQ Ratio overall 2.49 1.12 3.43 0.00 13.30 N : 4916 
between 
  
2.94 0.01 13.30 n :  386 
within 
  
2.45 -6.59 14.58 T : 12.74 
WRESERR Ratio overall 0.00 0.01 0.20 -0.98 0.87 N : 3314 
between 
  
0.14 -0.98 0.87 n :  280 
within     0.17 -1.02 1.13 T : 11.84 
(Source: Research Data). Summary statistics for the panel of 386 firms present in the 
UK’s non-life insurance market are presented in this table. At least two consecutive years 
of observations are available for each firm in this sample over the study period of 1985 – 
2010. Panel B reports the summary statistics of indicator variables used in the study, 
while Panel C reports summary statistics of variables after winsorization.   
Notes: RP represents as a percentage the cost of equity calculated using RL model. 
RP_CM represents as a percentage the cost of equity calculated using CAPM. REINS 
represents the reinsurance ratio defined as the ratio of premiums ceded to gross 
premiums written in a year. REINS2 is the square of reinsurance ratio. LEV denotes 
financial leverage, which is calculated as the difference between total assets and 
policyholders’ surplus divided by total assets. CAP denotes an insurer’s capacity to grow, 
calculated as the difference between capital resources and capital resource requirements 
scaled by capital resources. LIQ is the liquidity level calculated as the ratio of cash to 
claims incurred in a given year. SIZE is the natural log of total reported assets by a firm. 
HINDX measures product diversification using the Herfindahl Index. ROA denotes return 
on assets calculated as the earnings before tax divided by total assets. RESERR is the 
reserving error calculated using KFS method. REINSID is an indicator variable which 
takes value 1 if an insurer uses reinsurance and 0 otherwise. CTAX is an indicator 
variable taking value 1 if earnings before tax are in convex region and 0 otherwise. 
WREINS is the reinsurance ratio winsorized at 20th percentile on the right tail. WREINS2 is 
the square of the reinsurance ratio after winsorization. WLEV denotes financial leverage 
winsorized at 10th percentile on both tails. WCAP is the growth capacity winsorized at 5th 
percentile on the left tail. WLIQ is the liquidity winsorized at 5th percentile on the left tail. 
WRESERR is the reserving errors winsorized at 1st percentile on both tails. 
values either across time or firms. The between statistic is the mean of the firm-
level average of a particular statistic, which is calculated over the number of firms 
(n in Table 7.1) present in the sample corresponding to a given variable. On the 
108 
 
other hand, the within statistic, like the overall statistic is calculated over all the 
available observations (N in Table 7.1). The calculation of the within statistic 
involves adding the overall mean to each of the observations while simultaneously 
subtracting the corresponding firm level mean. Thus, the ‘between’ standard 
deviation provides information about the expected deviation from the overall mean 
across a randomly selected sample of firms in any given year, whereas the ‘within’ 
standard deviation estimates the expected deviation from the firm-specific mean 
for an individual firm across different time periods. 
The first variable listed in Table 7.1 is the equity risk premium, RP, estimated 
using the R-L model. For each firm, this variable denotes the excess return over 
the risk-free rate demanded by investors to invest in the firm. The equity risk 
premium for the firms in the estimation sample ranges from a minimum of 4.63% 
to a maximum of 6.91% and a mean value of 5.65%. This variable is 
homogenously distributed over the entire sample as the median value of 5.67% 
and is very close to the overall mean indicating a low level of skewness. A modest 
value of the overall standard deviation (0.53%) relative to the mean suggests that 
the variable shows a low variability around the mean. Since the between-firm 
standard deviation is 0.52%, the cross-firm variation of RP is also low, reflecting 
similar business risks within the UK’s non-life insurance industry. The cross-firm 
variation is, however, much higher than the standard deviation of 0.20% around 
the firm-specific mean. The difference in cross-firm and within-firm variations 
suggests that most of the firms strive to attain a target capital structure such that 
there is little variation in the equity risk premium over the life-time of the firm.  
The second variable listed in Table 7.1 is the reinsurance ratio, REINS, which 
ranges from a minimum of 0 to maximum of 1. A smaller value of this ratio 
indicates a lesser volume of premiums ceded relative to gross premiums written at 
the total business level. A very high value of the ratio is equivalent to a very high 
cession rate, indicative of an insurer either in run-off or in financial distress. Given 
the sampling technique employed, most of the firms in the estimation sample are 
expected to be going concerns, resulting in moderate values of reinsurance ratio, 
Nonetheless, there are a few insurers left in the estimation sample that have large 
values of reinsurance ratio in comparison to the mean and median values of 0.32 
and 0.26 respectively. The uneven distribution of this variable is also reflected in a 
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lower overall mean relative to the average (0.5) of minimum and maximum values. 
Such a distribution pattern arises because both the underlying variables used in 
calculating this ratio, namely the premiums ceded and gross premiums written, are 
themselves distributed log-normally. Similar to the equity risk premium, the 
reinsurance ratio shows a higher variation across the cross-section of firms in a 
given year compared to the within-firm variation during the study period. The 367 
firms observed for approximately 13 years on average give rise to 4,629 
observations available for this variable. The reinsurance ratio being strictly 
positive, the square of this variable follows a distribution similar to the original 
variable with a mean of 0.17 and a median of 0.07.  
As is noted above, a high value of reinsurance ratio is symptomatic of an insurer in 
financial distress, therefore to overcome the confounding effects of extreme 
cession rates, winsorized values of the reinsurance ratio are used in the 
regression analysis. Variable REINS has been winsorized at 20th percentile on the 
right tail to obtain variable WREINS reported in Panel C of Table 7.1. 
Winsorization results in a maximum reinsurance ratio of 0.55, which brings the 
mean and the median values closer to each other at 0.28 and 0.26 respectively. 
Although winsorization reduces the potentially confounding effects of extreme 
values, the change observed in the variation of reinsurance ratio is modest (from 
standard deviation of 0.26 for un-winsorized variable to 0.20 for winsorized 
variable), making the winsorized variable suitable for conducting the regression 
analysis and drawing inferences.  
Leverage, denoted by LEV, is the next variable reported in Table 7.1. In the 
estimation sample, leverage ranges from 0 to 14.5. This suggests the presence of 
both the new entrants, and very highly leveraged insurance firms in the estimation 
sample. The overall standard deviation at 0.44 is almost double the mean of 0.24 
indicating substantial variation in leverage within the estimation sample. The 
within-firm standard deviation of leverage at 0.34 is approximately equal to the 
between-firm variation with a standard deviation at 0.33. A higher value of the 
overall standard deviation relative to the within-standard deviation, however, 
indicates that UK non-life insurers have strived to achieve a stable capital structure 
and risk profile over time. A higher mean (0.24) than the median (0.13) shows that 
the distribution of this variable is positively skewed. Transformed values of 
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leverage obtained by winsorizing at the 10th percentile at both tails, denoted by 
WLEV in Panel C of Table 7.1, are used in the regression analysis, to again avoid 
the confounding effect of extreme values (outliers) of this variable. Post-
winsorization, leverage has a mean of 0.19, which is closer to the median with 
substantial changes in the minimum and maximum values. 
Since the enactment of the Insurance Companies Act (1974), regulations in the 
UK’s non-life insurance sector mandate insurers to maintain a minimum level of 
capital resources commensurate with the risks underwritten by an insurer. 
Therefore, the difference between capital resources available to the insurer and 
the minimum level of capital required to remain a going concern can be used to 
gauge both the capacity to grow, and the riskiness of the insurance business. 
Variable CAP listed in Table 7.1 captures this feature of the risk of an insurer. As 
explained in section 6.5.4, this variable is calculated as the difference of capital 
resources and capital resource requirements, scaled by capital resources. Large 
overall and within-firm variations for this variable are observed in the estimation 
sample with overall and within-standard deviations of 3.37 and 3.24 respectively. 
Both these variations are large with respect to the mean and median values of 
0.59 and 0.73 respectively. Minimum values of CAP at overall, between and 
within-firm levels (231.50, 15.63 and 215.28) have an extremely large magnitude 
in comparison to the overall mean. An insurer with a negative difference between 
capital resources and minimum capital resource requirements will be disallowed 
by the regulator from underwriting any new business. Therefore, to remedy the 
estimation sample from the implausible values of growth capacity, CAP is 
winsorized at the 5th percentile on the left tail to force all the values of CAP to be 
representative of going concerns. This operation places a lower bound of 0.21 on 
CAP, and raises the mean to 0.69 from 0.59.  
The variable SIZE in Table 7.1 is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets 
reported by an insurer in a year. Such a transformation serves two purposes. First, 
since the total assets of a firm in an industry are log-normally distributed, the 
logarithmic transformation results in a ‘near’ normally distributed variable. Second, 
the scaling of total assets is achieved by this transform, which makes the results 
from econometric analysis easy to interpret. The size of the firms in the estimation 
sample, measured using the log of monetary value of total assets, ranges from 
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5.70 (approximately £0.3 million) to 16.62 (£16.5 billion). Interestingly, the between 
and within-standard deviations in size are of similar magnitude at 6.54 and 6.27, 
indicating that the variation in firm size across firms in a given year is likely to be of 
the same scale as the variation in the size of a firm over the study period. The well 
behaved distribution of this variable is reflected in similar mean and median values 
at 11.04 and 10.61 respectively. The overall standard deviation of this variable at 
1.95 is close in magnitude to the between-standard deviation of 1.81, confirming 
that the overall variation in size is driven by a variation in firm size across the 
panel. 
Liquidity is another important variable used in this study, denoted by LIQ, in Table 
7.1. This variable reflects the adequacy of an insurer’s liquid assets to pay the 
claims incurred in any given year. This measure of liquidity indicates a large 
variation in the liquidity levels, both over time for a firm, and across the cross-
section in a year. The mean and median values, at 6.65 and 1.10 respectively, are 
relatively small in comparison to the standard deviation of 82.08. Moreover, there 
is substantial skew in the distribution as there is a long right-hand tail, indicating 
the presence of outliers in the data as confirmed by the huge difference between 
the minimum and maximum values of 0 and 4985.5 respectively. The extreme 
value in this case if so large that it is approximately 50 standard deviations away 
from the mean on right tail. Therefore, to eliminate the confounding effect of 
outliers, LIQ is winsorized at the 5th percentile (13.3) level on the right tail. The 
summary statistics of liquidity after winsorization (denoted by WLIQ) are presented 
in Panel C of Table 7.1. Post winsorization, liquidity becomes much more evenly 
distributed with a smaller mean of 2.42 and comparable standard deviations of 
3.35, 2.59 and 2.38 at overall, between and within levels respectively. 
Product diversification is denoted in Table 7.1 as HINDX which corresponds to the 
annual value of the Herfindahl index calculated for each firm. About 38% (146 out 
of 386) of the firms in the estimation sample conducted their business as mono-
line companies (Herfindahl index of 1), for at least one year during the study 
period. Similar, but relatively large magnitudes of mean (0.64) and median (0.59) 
indicate that less diversified insurers are more prevalent in the estimation sample. 
In other words, insurers operating in the UK non-life insurance market tend to 
specialise in a few niche lines of business rather than diversifying their business 
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across all the product-markets at their disposal. Further, a higher between-
standard deviation (0.25) than within-standard deviation (0.13) suggests that 
product diversification at the firm level shows little variation over the study period. 
However, there are few well diversified insurers in the estimation sample with the 
minimum value of HINDX being 0.15.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, reserving errors have been used in this 
study as an instrument for use of reinsurance. Unlike other variables, observations 
for this variable are available only until the year 2009 (as explained in section 6.7 
of Chapter 6). There is substantial variation in the values of reserving errors with 
minimum and maximum values being -100.37 and 9.07 respectively. A reserving 
error of 9.07 means that the difference between the reserves for the estimated 
losses and actual losses was 9.07 times the admissible capital resources reported 
by the insurer. These are extreme values when compared to the mean and 
median values respectively of 0.06 and 0.03. Given these observations, it is 
unsurprising that the standard deviation is large at 1.35 as compared to the 
reported measures of central tendency. Therefore to alleviate the confounding 
effects of extreme values of this variable in the first stage of IV regressions, the 
values of reserving error are winsorized at the 1st percentile on both the tails. After 
winsorization, the reserving errors range from a minimum of -0.98 to a maximum 
of 0.87.  
Return on assets, denoted as ROA in Table 7.1, is a variable which has also been 
used as an instrument in the IV estimations, ranges from a minimum of -0.82 to a 
maximum of 2.85. A large variation in the values of ROA is evidenced by a high 
standard deviation of 0.14 relative to the mean of 0.04. This is one of the evenly 
distributed variables in this study as the median value of 0.03 is close to the mean 
value of 0.04. Moderate values of the mean and median also confirm that large 
returns are not very common in the UK’s non-life insurance market with risk-
pooling (i.e., economies of scale and scope) being the key driver of profits.  
Panel B of Table 7.1 reports two indicator variables that have been used in this 
study. The first variable indicates the use of reinsurance by an insurer, and shows 
that nearly 95% of the observations correspond to the use of reinsurance by the 
insurers. The mean value of equity risk premium at 6.12% for non-users of 
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reinsurance is higher than the corresponding value of 5.62% for the users of 
reinsurance. Similarly the average value of the Herfindahl index at 0.93 is higher 
for non-users than for users (0.62) of reinsurance. 
As noted in section 6.7 of Chapter 6, annual earnings before tax falling in the 
convex region of the tax schedule have been used as one of the predictors of the 
purchase of reinsurance. The variable CTAX in Panel B of Table 7.1 shows that 
nearly 17% of the observations in the estimation sample correspond to earnings 
within the convex region of the tax schedule. The mean value of the reinsurance 
ratio for these observations is 0.36, which is higher than the mean of 0.31 for the 
remaining observations. 
Having discussed the univariate statistics in some detail, to further discuss the 
simultaneous interactions between the variables entering the regression analysis, 
it is important to consider the correlations between these variables. Therefore, the 
following section presents pairwise correlations between the key variables used in 
this study.  
7.3 Bivariate Results 
Table 7.2 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between the two alternative 
sets of estimates of the cost of equity (dependent variable) and the explanatory 
variables used in the study. Two correlation analyses, namely the parametric 
Pearson Correlation and the non-parametric Spearman Rank Correlation, are 
reported in this table. Both types of correlations reveal that there is a statistically 
significant (p≤0.01, two-tailed) negative correlation between the cost of equity and 
the decision to reinsure. A statistically significant positive association is also found 
between the extent of reinsurance and the cost of equity. These results however 
do not take into account the non-linear relation between the cost of equity and the 
volume of reinsurance purchased, therefore are likely to be biased by large values 
of reinsurance ratio. Increases in leverage and liquidity correspond to increases in 
the cost of equity, as shown by statistically significant positive correlations 
between the equity risk premium and these variables. Since an increase in 
premiums written leads to an increase in both the leverage and cash assets of the 
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Table 7.2: Correlation Matrix for Risk Premium 
Variable 
Pearson Correlation Spearman Correlation 
RP RP_CM RP RP_CM 
RP_CM  0.58***  1  0.52***  1 
REINSID -0.20*** -0.27*** -0.18*** -0.28*** 
REINS  0.09*** -0.01  0.14*** -0.03*** 
REINS2  0.08*** -0.00  0.14*** -0.03*** 
LEV  0.05***  0.06***  0.07***  0.04*** 
CAP -0.02*  0.00 -0.07*** -0.02 
LIQ  0.02  0.02**  0.14***  0.17*** 
SIZE -0.07*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.14*** 
HINDX  0.17***  0.18***  0.16***  0.26*** 
ROA  0.01  0.13***  0.00  0.18*** 
RESERR -0.00 -0.00 -0.08*** -0.04*** 
CTAX  0.01  0.05***  0.02*  0.07*** 
WREINS  0.10*** -0.00  0.15*** -0.03*** 
WREINS2  0.12*** -0.00  0.15*** -0.03*** 
WLEV  0.07***  0.08***  0.08***  0.04*** 
WCAP -0.09*** -0.01 -0.07*** -0.02 
WLIQ  0.10***  0.16***  0.14***  0.17*** 
WRESERR -0.03* -0.01 -0.08*** -0.04*** 
(Source: Research Data). Pairwise correlations among various regressors used in this 
study have been presented in this table. Both Spearman’s Rank Correlation coefficients 
and the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients have been reported. Superscripts *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (two-tail). 
Notes: RP represents as a percentage the cost of equity calculated using the RL model. 
RP_CM represents as a percentage the cost of equity calculated using CAPM. REINS 
represents the reinsurance ratio defined as the ratio of premiums ceded to gross 
premiums written in a year. REINS2 is the square of reinsurance ratio. LEV denotes 
financial leverage, which is calculated as the difference between total assets and 
policyholders’ surplus divided by total assets. CAP denotes an insurer’s capacity to grow, 
calculated as the difference between capital resources and capital resource requirements 
scaled by capital resources. LIQ is the liquidity level calculated as the ratio of cash to 
claims incurred in a given year. SIZE is the natural log of total reported assets by a firm. 
HINDX measures product diversification using the Herfindahl Index. ROA denotes the 
return on assets calculated as the earnings before tax divided by total assets. RESERR is 
the reserving error calculated using the KFS method. REINSID is an indicator variable 
which takes the value 1 if an insurer uses reinsurance and 0 otherwise. CTAX is an 
indicator variable taking the value 1 if earnings before tax are in a convex region and 0 
otherwise. WREINS is the reinsurance ratio winsorized at the 20th percentile on the right 
tail. WREINS2 is the square of the reinsurance ratio after winsorization. WLEV denotes 
financial leverage winsorized at the 10th percentile on both tails. WCAP is the growth 
capacity winsorized at the 5th percentile on the left tail. WLIQ is the liquidity winsorized at 
the 5th percentile on the left tail. WRESERR is the reserving errors winsorized at 1st 




company, it is likely that there would be a positive correlation between the cost of 
equity and measures of leverage and liquidity. As expected, the correlation 
between equity risk premium and growth capacity as well as size is negative and 
statistically significant (p≤0.01, two-tailed). This is so because insurers with a 
higher capacity to underwrite new business are likely to be less financially 
distressed than low capacity insurance firms leading to a relatively lower cost of 
equity. Similarly, larger insurers are generally more diversified than smaller entities 
and so more capable of recapitalising through capital markets in the aftermath of 
unexpectedly severe loss events. Since the Herfindahl index is an inverse 
measure of product-diversification, in accordance with expectations, the equity risk 
premium is positively related to HINDX. Table 7.2 also shows that the equity risk 
premium is not highly correlated with the IVs used for predicting the reinsurance 
ratio, verifying their appropriateness in the context of this study. 
Table 7.3 presents the pairwise correlation coefficients between explanatory as 
well as the IVs used in the study. The upper triangle of this matrix presents the 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients, whereas the lower triangle reports the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients. The reinsurance ratio denoted by REINS in 
Table 7.3 is highly correlated with its winsorized value as well as with its squared 
value. This is expected as the reinsurance ratio cannot be negative (the insurer 
can either decide to purchase or not to purchase reinsurance). However, this 
raises the potential for multicollinearity, which in this case is unavoidable given the 
postulated convex relation between the cost of the equity and reinsurance ratio. 
Further, leverage and reinsurance are expected to be correlated since they are 
both elements of the capital structure of an insurer. This is reflected in a 
moderately high, positive and statistically significant correlation coefficient 
between the leverage and reinsurance ratio35. Growth capacity too is positively 
correlated with the reinsurance ratio as purchasing reinsurance can increase the 
underwriting capacity of an insurer. For an insurer, liquidity is a function of 
premiums underwritten, which leads to an increase in leverage. A highly leveraged 
insurer is likely to purchase more reinsurance, hence LIQ, similar to LEV, is also 
positively correlated with the reinsurance ratio. Due to the higher capacity of larger 
                                            
35 This again poses a concern of multicollinearity in the estimation. Therefore, robustness 







Table 7.3: Correlation between Explanatory Variables 
Pairwise correlations among various regressors used in this study have been presented in this table. The upper-triangle reports the 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation coefficients, whereas the lower triangle reports the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients. Panel A reports the 
correlation coefficients among variables before winsorization and Panel B reports the same after winsorization. Superscripts *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level (two-tail) respectively.  
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients before Winsorization 
  REINSID REINS REINS2 LEV CAP LIQ SIZE HINDX ROA RESERR CTAX 
REINSID  1      0.10***  0.06*** -0.09***  0.19*** -0.27*** -0.15***  0.00 -0.05*** 
REINS    1  1***  0.39***  0.08***  0.27*** -0.09*** -0.21*** -0.15*** -0.09***  0.06*** 
REINS2    0.95***  1  0.39***  0.08***  0.27*** -0.09*** -0.21*** -0.15*** -0.09***  0.06*** 
LEV -0.00  0.36***  0.39***  1 -0.12***  0.13*** -0.00 -0.14***  0.08***  0.01  0.00 
CAP -0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.00  1  0.22*** -0.03*** -0.01  0.21*** -0.02  0.11*** 
LIQ -0.04***  0.07***  0.08***  0.01  0.00  1 -0.40***  0.16***  0.16*** -0.00  0.21*** 
SIZE  0.19*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.03**  0.02* -0.04***  1 -0.39*** -0.10***  0.10*** -0.36*** 
HINDX -0.26*** -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.00  0.00  0.03** -0.39***  1  0.14*** -0.00  0.11*** 
ROA -0.19*** -0.08*** -0.05***  0.06***  0.04*** -0.00 -0.09***  0.12***  1  0.16***  0.15*** 
RESERR -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  0.68***  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.06***  1 -0.02 













Panel B: Correlation Coefficients after Winsorization 
  REINSID WREINS WREINS2 WLEV WCAP WLIQ SIZE HINDX ROA WRESERR CTAX 
REINSID  1      0.10***  0.06*** -0.09***  0.19*** -0.27*** -0.15***  0.00 -0.05*** 
WREINS    1  1***  0.39***  0.08***  0.26*** -0.09*** -0.21*** -0.15*** -0.09***  0.05*** 
WREINS2    0.97***  1  0.39***  0.08***  0.26*** -0.09*** -0.21*** -0.15*** -0.09***  0.05*** 
WLEV  0.09***  0.39***  0.42***  1 -0.12***  0.13*** -0.00 -0.14***  0.08***  0.01  0.00 
WCAP  0.07***  0.06***  0.04*** -0.11***  1  0.22*** -0.03*** -0.01  0.21*** -0.02  0.11*** 
WLIQ -0.15***  0.19***  0.21***  0.14***  0.19***  1 -0.40***  0.16***  0.16*** -0.00  0.21*** 
SIZE  0.19*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.02*  0.03** -0.30***  1 -0.39*** -0.10***  0.10*** -0.36*** 
HINDX -0.26*** -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.08*** -0.03**  0.15*** -0.39***  1  0.14*** -0.00  0.11*** 
ROA -0.19*** -0.09*** -0.08***  0.10***  0.12***  0.14*** -0.09***  0.12***  1  0.16***  0.15*** 
WRESERR -0.00 -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.01  0.03**  0.02  0.07***  0.00  0.10***  1 -0.02 
CTAX -0.05***  0.06***  0.06***  0.02  0.09***  0.18*** -0.34***  0.10***  0.08*** -0.00  1 
(Source: Research Data). 
Notes: COE represents as a percentage the cost of equity calculated using RL model. COE represents as a percentage the cost of equity 
calculated using CAPM. REINS represents the reinsurance ratio defined as the ratio of premiums ceded to gross premiums written in a year. 
REINS2 is the square of reinsurance ratio. LEV denotes financial leverage, which is calculated as the difference between total assets and 
policyholders’ surplus divided by total assets. CAP denotes an insurer’s capacity to grow, calculated as the difference between capital 
resources and capital resource requirements scaled by capital resources. LIQ is the liquidity level calculated as the ratio of cash to claims 
incurred in a given year. SIZE is the natural log of total reported assets by a firm. HINDX measures product diversification using the Herfindahl 
Index. ROA denotes return on assets calculated as the earnings before tax divided by total assets. RESERR is the reserving error calculated 
using the KFS method. REINSID is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if an insurer uses reinsurance and 0 otherwise. CTAX is an 
indicator variable taking value 1 if earnings before tax are in a convex region and 0 otherwise. WREINS is the reinsurance ratio winsorized at 
20th percentile on the right tail. WREINS2 is the square of the reinsurance ratio after winsorization. WLEV denotes financial leverage winsorized 
at 10th percentile on both tails. WCAP is the growth capacity winsorized at 5th percentile on the left tail. WLIQ is the liquidity winsorized at 5th 
percentile on the left tail. WRESERR is the reserving errors winsorized at 1st percentile on both tails. 
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insurers to absorb losses, they tend to purchase fewer amounts of reinsurance 
than smaller entities, which is reflected in the negative correlation between firm 
size and reinsurance ratio. Similarly, the negative correlation between the 
reinsurance ratio and HINDX shows that less diversified insurers are likely to 
demand lesser reinsurance, probably because they have greater expertise in 
underwriting niche classes of risks. All three instruments used for predicting 
reinsurance ratio, namely, ROA, RESERR and CTAX, are significantly correlated 
with the reinsurance ratio as shown by the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. 
On the other hand, only RESERR and CTAX have statistically significant 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient with the reinsurance ratio.  
Leverage is negatively correlated with the winsorized values of growth capacity of 
an insurer, which is in accordance with expectations, as an increase in leverage 
will result in the reduction in capacity to underwrite new business. Leverage is 
negatively correlated to firm size as well; yet the magnitude of correlation is small. 
Less diversified insurers tend be more highly leveraged, as shown by the negative 
correlation between HINDX and leverage. Interestingly, a significant positive 
correlation between the winsorized values of reserving errors and leverage, 
namely WRESERR and WLEV, suggests that highly leveraged insurers tend to 
over-reserve in comparison to their lowly leveraged rivals. Winsorized values of 
liquidity and growth capacity have statistically significant positive correlations, 
which underlines the significant role of cash-holdings among the assets held by an 
insurer. Interestingly, a positive correlation coefficient between the winsorized 
values of growth capacity (WCAP) and reserving errors (WRESERR) suggests 
that insurers with a higher capacity to grow tend to over-reserve. A negative 
correlation coefficient between WLIQ and SIZE, and a positive coefficient of 
correlation between WLIQ and HINDX shows that smaller and less diversified 
insurers tend to hold more cash on their balance sheets in comparison to their 
more diversified, larger competitors. A large, negative and statistically significant 
correlation coefficient between SIZE and HINDX shows that, unsurprisingly, larger 
firms tend to be more diversified than their smaller rivals. Larger insurers are also 
more likely to under-reserve and to have incomes outside the convex region of the 
tax schedule. On the other hand, less diversified insurers tend to have lower 
reserving errors as shown by the positive and statistically significant correlation 
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between the HINDX and WRESERR. Less diversified insurers are also more likely 
to have annual earnings in the convex section of the tax schedule as shown by a 
positive correlation between HINDX and CTAX. The three variables identified as 
instruments for predicting reinsurance ratio are not highly correlated with each 
other which adds weight to their validity as IVs. For example, WRESERR shares a 
statistically significant (p≤0.01 two-tailed) Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 
magnitude 0.06 and 0.08 with ROA and CTAX respectively. 
7.4 Multivariate Results 
The baseline regressions to test the two main research hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 4 follow the method suggested in Newey and West (1987). This method 
has been chosen to account for the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity present 
in the data as shown by the diagnostic tests. Apart from this, the estimates also 
control for arbitrary clustering within firms and over time across firms. The results 
obtained, along with the relevant diagnostic tests are being discussed in the 
following subsections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2.  
7.4.1 Decision to Reinsure 
The hypothesis regarding the decision to reinsure or not is tested by conducting a 
regression analysis based on the equation (6.7) put forward in section 6.6.1 of 
Chapter 6. Table 7.4 reports the relevant coefficient estimates and diagnostics. 
The coefficient estimate on the variable REINSID, which indicates the decision to 
reinsure, is negative and statistically significant (p≤0.01, one-tailed). This result 
provides evidence in favour of the first hypothesis that insurers utilising 
reinsurance for risk management generally have smaller risk premiums (cost of 
equity) in comparison to insurers who do not purchase reinsurance. As mentioned 
in section 4.3 of Chapter 4, reinsurance (risk management) can add value to a firm 
by enabling it to optimise its capital structure, and thus minimise its equity cost of 
capital. This finding is consistent with bivariate results which show that REINSID is 









Two-tailed Test One-tailed Test 95% Conf. 
Interval 
Z p-value χ2 p-value 
REINSID -0.37 0.09 -3.95 0.00 15.63 0.00 -0.50 -0.32 
WLEV 0.26 0.12 2.14 0.03 4.58 0.02 0.16 0.37 
WCAP -0.23 0.11 -2.05 0.04 4.22 0.02 -0.31 -0.13 
WLIQ 0.01 0.01 2.10 0.04 4.43 0.02 0.01 0.02 
SIZE 0.01 0.01 0.77 0.44 0.59 0.78 0.00 0.03 
HINDX 0.27 0.10 2.58 0.01 6.65 0.00 0.21 0.35 
Constant 5.78 0.21 27.83 0.00 - - 5.62 5.98 
Time Effects No 
Observations 4916 
Firms 386 
Diagnostics                 
(1) Wooldridge test for first order autocorrelation in panel data 
  F(1, 348) 155.97 
 
p-value 0.00 
   (2) Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity 
  χ2 (386) 7.70E+32 
 
p-value 0.00 
   (3) F-Test that coefficients are jointly zero 
  F(6,  385) 10.23   p-value 0.00       
(Source: Research Data). This table presents the results of the regression of RP on 
REINSID after controlling for other intervening variables. The regression follows the 
Newey and West (1987) method which controls for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the firm level and on time dimension. 
Diagnostic tests carried out to test the presence of serial autocorrelation, and 
heteroskedasticity in data; and collective validity of coefficients are also reported. 
As expected, the winsorized value of leverage, WLEV, is positively and 
significantly associated with the cost of equity. Specifically, WLEV has an 
estimated coefficient of 0.26 with one-tailed p-value less than 0.05. This finding 
conforms to one of the postulates of the theory of capital structure put forward by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) that the cost of equity is an increasing function 
of leverage. A high leverage leads to increased frictional costs, such as costs 
associated with financial distress, resulting in a higher equity risk premium. Not 
only this, but in the case of an insurance company, leverage is significant also 
from the perspective of product market performance, as policyholder customers 
are unwilling to pay high premiums for the policies issued by highly leveraged 
insurers (Doherty and Tinic, 1981; Wakker et al., 1997). Similarly, an insurer 
holding more capital than mandated by statutory regulations not only has a higher 
capacity to underwrite new policies, but is less likely to face a high probability of 
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ruin in the wake of low-frequency high-severity loss event. This argument suggests 
a negative relation between WCAP and the cost of equity. Indeed, as shown in 
Table 7.3, the regression coefficient corresponding to WCAP is negative and 
statistically significant (p-value ≤0.05, one-tail).  
For a non-financial firm, increased revenue leads to an increase in cash without a 
corresponding increase in its leverage. This, however, is not true for insurance 
companies. An increase in cash due to underwriting more risks is accompanied by 
a corresponding increase in leverage, which in turn can lead to a higher cost of 
equity.  This mechanism explains the positive and statistically significant (p-value 
≤0.01, one-tail) coefficient corresponding to WLIQ in Table 7.4. At 0.012, this 
estimated coefficient is small, indicating that the liquidity level does not have a 
large impact on the cost of equity. Due to the greater reach of larger firms to 
capital markets, the cost of equity is generally expected to be negatively related to 
the firm size (e.g., see Fama and French, 1995). This observation however is not 
corroborated by results shown in Table 7.4, which reports that firm size does not 
have any statistically significant impact on the cost of equity. This result will be 
scrutinised further through the robustness tests reported in section 7.5 below. 
Product diversification does have a statistically significant impact on the cost of 
equity.  As expected, the cost of equity increases with an increase in HINDX. 
Keeping in mind that HINDX is an inverse proxy for product diversification; a 
positive coefficient indicates that the cost of equity increases as the degree of 
product diversification decreases. According to Table 7.4, HINDX has a coefficient 
estimate of 0.27 significant at 1% level (p-value ≤0.01, one-tail).  
7.4.2 Extent of Reinsurance 
The reinsurance volume decision model specified in equation (6.9) in section 6.6.1 
of Chapter 6 is used to test the effect of the reinsurance ratio on the cost of equity. 
Regression estimates obtained are presented in Table 7.5. In preliminary tests, the 
Wooldridge Test (Wooldridge, 2002), and the Modified Wald Test (Greene, 2003) 
respectively confirm the presence of serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
in the sample used. Therefore, to control for confounding effects of arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, Newey and West’s (1987) estimation 
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procedure with clustering across firm and year dimensions is implemented to 
derive consistent standard errors.  




Two-tailed Test One-tailed Test 95% Conf. 
Interval Z p-value χ2 p-value 
WREINS -0.41 0.44 -0.92 0.36 0.85 0.18 -1.28 0.46 
WREINS2 1.20 0.63 1.89 0.06 3.58 0.03 -0.04 2.44 
WLEV 0.08 0.14 0.55 0.58 0.30 0.29 -0.20 0.36 
WCAP -0.30 0.11 -2.76 0.01 7.64 0.00 -0.52 -0.09 
WLIQ 0.02 0.01 2.68 0.01 7.20 0.00 0.00 0.03 
SIZE 0.01 0.01 0.59 0.56 0.35 0.72 -0.02 0.04 
HINDX 0.26 0.10 2.59 0.01 6.70 0.00 0.06 0.46 
Constant 5.49 0.22 24.83 0 - - 5.06 5.92 
Inflection Point 0.17 
Time Effects No 
Observations 4629 
Firms 367 
Diagnostics                 
(1) Wooldridge test for first order autocorrelation in panel data 
  F(1,332) 146.898 
 
p-value 0.00 
   (2) Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity 
  χ2 (367) 1.9E+31 
 
p-value  0.00 
   (3) F-Test that coefficients are jointly zero 
  F( 7,  366) 4.86   p-value 0.00       
(Source: Research Data). This table presents the results of regression of RP on REINS 
and REINS2 after controlling for other intervening variables. The regression follows Newey 
and West’s (1987) method along with controlling for clustering at the firm level and on time 
dimension. Diagnostic tests carried out to test the presence of serial autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity in the data and the collective validity of coefficients are also reported. 
In section 4.4.2 of Chapter 4, it was postulated that the equity risk premium is a 
quadratic function of the extent of reinsurance, which can be depicted graphically 
as a U-shaped (convex) curve. Given the condition that the cost of equity and 
reinsurance ratio cannot be negative; for the cost of equity to be a convex function 
of the reinsurance ratio, the estimated coefficients corresponding to WREINS and 
WREINS2 must be negative and positive respectively. Table 7.5 confirms that this 
is indeed the case. Moreover, such a combination of coefficient estimates 
facilitates the calculation of the inflection point of the U-shaped curve.  
The coefficient estimate corresponding to WREINS, however, is not significant at 
conventional levels (p≤0.10). WREINS2, on the other hand, has a positive 
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coefficient which is statistically significant at the 5% level (one-tailed). Ambiguity 
arising from conflicting significance levels of coefficients corresponding to the 
reinsurance ratio suggests that either the effect of reinsurance on the cost of 
equity is weak, or the results could be affected by multicollinearity. To remedy this 
situation robustness tests are required, which will be discussed in the next 
sections of this chapter.  
Among the control variables, leverage does not significantly impact on the cost of 
equity. The sign of the coefficient estimate remains unchanged from Table 7.4, 
which suggests that leverage is likely to be at least to some degree positively 
related to the cost of equity. WCAP on the other hand has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient estimate (p-value ≤0.01, one-tail). This finding 
reaffirms the results reported in Table 7.4 which suggest that the insurers with a 
relatively large capacity to underwrite new business have a smaller cost of equity.  
The winsorized value of liquidity has a positive coefficient which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Similar to the regression results from the decision to 
reinsure model, the coefficient corresponding to WLIQ is small, confirming that 
liquidity only has a very small impact on the cost of equity. In line with the findings 
reported in Table 7.4, HINDX has a positive and statistically significant (p-value 
≤0.01, one-tail) coefficient as reported in Table 7.5. The magnitude of this 
estimated parameter is almost equal to the coefficient reported in Table 7.4. Size 
again is not a statistically significant determinant of the cost of equity, which is in 
line with the findings reported above in section 7.4.1.  
Having discussed the baseline results, it is imperative that their robustness be 
tested using different procedures. The following sections report the results of 
various robustness tests conducted to verify the estimates. 
7.5 Robustness Tests 
To establish the consistency and reliability of empirical results reported in section 
7.4 above, various robustness tests are conducted. More precisely, the estimation 
is carried out using five different techniques which allow for different data 
characteristics. The first technique employed combines an OLS estimation with the 
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non-parametric method of standard error estimation described in Driscoll and 
Kraay (1998) which controls for arbitrary spatial and temporal dependence in 
panel data. The second technique uses generalised least squares (GLS) 
methodology with standard errors corrected for first order serial autocorrelation. 
Greene (2003) argues that if data supports the assumption that firm fixed effects 
are uncorrelated with the regressors, then it is appropriate to treat firm specific 
intercepts as being randomly distributed across firms with certain finite variance. 
Under these conditions, GLS produces unbiased, consistent and efficient 
estimates of model parameters. Gelman and Hill (2007) explain that the fixed 
effects estimator can be considered to be a special case of GLS estimator which 
assumes the variance of firm fixed effects to be infinite. However, if firm specific 
effects are correlated with other explanatory variables, then the GLS estimator is 
consistent but biased, whereas the fixed effects estimator is unbiased (Greene, 
2003). The explanatory variables in this study are correlated with firm fixed effects; 
therefore GLS estimates could be biased. On the other hand, Clark and Linzer 
(2012) point out that the fixed effects estimator requires centring the data on the 
firm specific mean, and therefore it is sample specific. It follows that the estimates 
produced by the fixed effects estimator are then not applicable out of the sample. 
Using Monte Carlo simulations, Clark and Linzer (2012) show that for a dataset 
with a small number of observations per firm (≤20), and moderate correlation 
(correlation coefficient ranging from 0.3 to 0.5) between firm fixed effects and other 
explanatory variables, GLS, is more consistent than the fixed effects estimator. 
Nevertheless, for comparative purposes, both hypotheses are tested here using 
estimates based on both the GLS and fixed effects estimation techniques. Two 
versions of each estimator are used, first controlling only for autocorrelation; and 
the second, controlling both for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
For brevity, all the techniques mentioned above are abbreviated. OLS_DK is used 
to denote the estimates obtained using OLS with standard errors computed using 
the method of Driscoll and Kraay (1998). GLS_AC denotes the GLS estimator 
estimated assuming the presence of first-order autocorrelation in the estimation 
sample. GLS_HAC denotes the GLS estimator controlling for first order 
autocorrelation within firms and presence of heteroskedasticity across firms. 
FE_AC denotes the fixed effects estimator with standard errors corrected for first-
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order autocorrelation in the error term. FE_HAC denotes fixed effects estimator 
with standard errors corrected for first-order autocorrelation in the error term and 
presence of heteroskedasticity across firms. All the estimators take account of 
time specific effects by including year dummies in the model. GLS_AC, GLS_HAC 
and FE_HAC discard 19 observations corresponding to firms that had only one 
observation during the period of study. 
7.5.1 Robustness Test for Decision to Reinsure Hypothesis 
Parameter estimates obtained on the testing decision to reinsure hypothesis using 
the techniques mentioned above are reported in Table 7.6. Table 7.6 shows that 
the coefficient estimate corresponding to the REINSID is negative across all the 
methods and statistically significant at the 1% level (two tail) for OLS_DK, 
GLS_AC and GLS_HAC estimators. The magnitude of the estimate though is not 
consistent across estimators. However, this is not a cause for concern in testing 
the reinsurance decision model as the primary objective is to test the direction of 
the relation rather than the magnitude of the effect. These results demonstrate that 
users of reinsurance have a lower cost of equity in comparison to non-users of 
reinsurance. The estimated coefficient for WLEV is inconsistent across estimators 
as two estimators confirm a statistically significant positive relation with the cost of 
equity, whereas one technique shows a negative relation. Since the GLS estimator 
is consistent even though biased, it is more likely to provide an estimate closer to 
the ‘true estimate’ (Clark and Linzer, 2012). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that the leverage has a positive relation with the cost of equity as confirmed by 
prior studies such as Botosan and Plumlee (2005)36. 
The coefficient estimate for WCAP is consistently negative across all the 
estimators and is statistically significant at the 1% level (two tail) according to the 
four estimators. This finding confirms that the cost of equity is indeed lower for 
firms that have a larger capacity to underwrite new business. Similarly, the relation 
between
                                            
36 Botosan and Plumlee (2005) use long-term liabilities at the end of the fiscal year scaled 
by the market value of equity as the measure of leverage. Their cost of equity estimates 
are derived from market-based accounting methods discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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Table 7.6: Robustness Tests – Decision to Reinsure 
Variable OLS_DK GLS_AC GLS_HAC FE_AC FE_HAC 
REINSID -0.376*** -0.111*** -0.024*** -0.027 -0.027 
   (0.048)  (0.020)  (0.008)  (0.021)  (0.031) 
WLEV  0.271***  0.023  0.029** -0.060 -0.060* 
   (0.059)  (0.028)  (0.012)  (0.045)  (0.036) 
WCAP -0.223*** -0.057*** -0.005 -0.085*** -0.085*** 
   (0.067)  (0.019)  (0.008)  (0.027)  (0.026) 
WLIQ  0.013***  0.004***  0.001**  0.006**  0.006*** 
   (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
SIZE  0.016*** -0.009* -0.021***  0.005  0.005 
   (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
HINDX  0.290***  0.160***  0.129***  0.070*   0.070* 
   (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.012)  (0.035)  (0.040) 
Constant  5.734***  5.771***  5.804***  5.643***   - 
   (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.027)  (0.081)   - 
Time Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  4916  4897  4897  4916  4897 
Firms  386  367  367  386  367 
Obs. per Firm 
     Minimum  1  2  2  1  2 
Average  12.70  13.34  13.34  12.70  13.34 
Maximum  26  26  26  26  26 
(Source: Research Data). OLS_DK denotes the estimates obtained using OLS with 
standard errors computed using the method of Driscoll and Kraay (1998). GLS_AC 
denotes the GLS estimator estimated assuming a first order autocorrelation in the error 
term. GLS_HAC denotes the GLS estimator estimated assuming a first order 
autocorrelation in the error term and the presence of heteroskedasticity across firms. 
FE_AC denotes the fixed effects estimator with standard errors corrected for first order 
autocorrelation in the error term. FE_HAC denotes a fixed effects estimator with standard 
errors corrected for first order autocorrelation in the error term and the presence of 
heteroskedasticity across firms. Superscripts *, ** and *** denote the statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (two-tail). Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses under the respective parameter estimates. 
WLIQ and equity risk premium is consistent and statistically significant (p-value 
≤0.05, two tail) across all the estimators. The magnitude of the coefficient though 
is small suggesting that the liquidity levels do not have a large impact on the cost 
of equity. As with leverage, the sign (direction) of the coefficient estimate 
corresponding to firm size too is not consistent across all the estimators. Among 
the three estimators for which this coefficient is statistically significant (p-value 
≤0.10, two tail), two GLS estimators suggest an inverse relation and OLS_DK a 
positive relation between the cost of equity and size. The coefficient estimates 
obtained using GLS are more efficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
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autocorrelation, (Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, it is appropriate here to accept the 
results of the GLS estimators, which are in accordance with the findings of prior 
research based on the data drawn from the US corporate sector (e.g. see Botosan 
et al. 2011; Fama and French, 1995).  
The coefficient estimates for HINDX are in line with expectations and are 
statistically significant across all the estimators at the 10% level or better (two tail). 
These results make it clear that firms with a higher product diversification tend to 
have a lower cost of equity compared with their less diversified counterparts. 
Similarly, the results from all the estimators confirm that firm-specific effects play a 
significant role in determining cost of equity as the constant term of comparable 
magnitude is observed across all four estimators. 
7.5.2 Robustness Test for Reinsurance Volume Decision Hypothesis 
Table 7.7 presents parameter estimates for the reinsurance volume decision 
hypothesis obtained by using the five regression techniques described above. 
Coefficient estimates for the linear term of reinsurance ratio is negative for all and 
statistically significant (p-value ≤0.05, two tail) for four estimators. Moreover, the 
quadratic term of the reinsurance ratio is positive and statistically significant over 
all the estimators at the 5% level (two-tailed) or better. As explained in section 
7.4.2, this is desirable given that the cost of equity and the reinsurance ratio are 
always positive. Such a combination of coefficient estimates for WREINS and 
WREINS2 facilitates the calculation of the point of inflection of the U-shaped curve 
predicted by this hypothesis, which is reported in Table 7.7 for each set of 
coefficients. These results indicate that the cost of equity, as predicted, is indeed a 
quadratic function of the reinsurance ratio. The inflection points calculated using 
these estimates correspond to reinsurance ratio values ranging from a minimum of 
0.172 to a maximum of 0.329. Given that the median value of the reinsurance ratio 
in the estimation sample is 0.26 (see Table 7.1), the inflection point of 0.245 
corresponding to GLS_HAC seems the most appropriate, as most of the UK non-




Table 7.7: Robustness Tests – Extent of Reinsurance 
Variable OLS_DK GLS_AC GLS_HAC FE_AC FE_HAC 
WREINS -0.422 -0.360*** -0.101*** -0.235*** -0.235** 
   (0.249)  (0.089)  (0.039)  (0.056)  (0.113) 
WREINS2  1.221***  0.555***  0.206***  0.357***  0.357** 
   (0.345)  (0.139)  (0.064)  (0.102)  (0.181) 
WLEV  0.090  0.029  0.028** -0.055 -0.055 
   (0.063)  (0.028)  (0.013)  (0.051)  (0.040) 
WCAP -0.298*** -0.054*** -0.006 -0.080*** -0.080*** 
   (0.060)  (0.020)  (0.009)  (0.028)  (0.026) 
WLIQ  0.017***  0.003**  0.001**  0.005**  0.005** 
   (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
SIZE  0.015*** -0.013** -0.021***  0.006  0.006 
   (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
HINDX  0.286***  0.121***  0.119***  0.062  0.062 
   (0.035)  (0.025)  (0.013)  (0.042)  (0.043) 
Constant  5.417***  5.751***  5.777***  5.607***   - 
   (0.095)  (0.067)  (0.023)  (0.086)   - 
Inflection Point  0.173  0.324  0.245  0.329  0.329 
Time Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  4629  4610  4610  4629  4610 
Firms  367  348  348  367  348 
Obs. per Firm 
     Minimum 1 2 2 1 2 
Average  12.60  13.25  13.25 12.60  13.25 
Maximum  26  26  26  26  26 
(Source: Research Data). OLS_DK denotes the estimates obtained using OLS with 
standard errors computed using the method of Driscoll and Kraay (1998). GLS_AC 
denotes the GLS estimator estimated assuming a first order autocorrelation in the error 
term. GLS_HAC denotes the GLS estimator estimated assuming a first order 
autocorrelation in the error term and the presence of heteroskedasticity across firms. 
FE_AC denotes the fixed effects estimator with standard errors corrected for first order 
autocorrelation in the error term. FE_HAC denotes the fixed effects estimator with 
standard errors corrected for first order autocorrelation in the error term and the presence 
of heteroskedasticity across firms. Superscripts *, ** and *** denote a statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (two-tail). Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses under the respective parameter estimates. 
Estimated coefficients corresponding to leverage are inconsistent across the 
estimators and statistically significant only for GLS_HAC at the 5% level (two-
tailed). Due to the reasons discussed in section 7.5.1, the estimates produced by 
GLS after controlling for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (GLS_HAC) are 
considered appropriate. Therefore, it follows from this result that the cost of equity 
is an increasing function of leverage. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient 
for WCAP is negative for all the estimators and significant for four, therefore it can 
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be concluded that the cost of equity increases as the growth capacity of an insurer 
reduces. Similarly, statistically significant coefficient estimates with a consistent 
sign are obtained for liquidity. This observation suggests that liquidity levels have a 
small but significant effect on the equity risk premium demanded by the investors. 
Further, coefficient estimates corresponding to firm size are again inconsistent as 
reported earlier in section 7.5.1. Therefore, based on the reasons mentioned 
above, the coefficient estimate obtained using GLS_HAC is considered to be the 
most reasonable estimate. This result shows that smaller insurers have a larger 
cost of equity in comparison with their larger competitors. The coefficient estimate 
for HINDX is positive for all the regressions and is statistically significant for three 
estimators, which is similar to the results reported in section 7.5.1 above. 
Therefore, it is concluded that non-life insurers with more diversified product 
offerings tend to have a lower cost of equity than non-life insurers with a more 
concentrated product-mix.  
7.6 Sensitivity Tests 
This section of the thesis examines the consistency of the decision to reinsure and 
the extent of the reinsurance models to sensitivity tests based on different criteria. 
First, the sensitivity of the respective models to an alternative measure of cost of 
equity, calculated using the CAPM, is established. This is followed by a test for the 
sensitivity of the aforementioned models to multicollinearity. As explained in 
section 7.5, after controlling for heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation, GLS 
based estimates are found to be the most appropriate in the context of this study. 
Therefore, the GLS_HAC regression is used to test the sensitivity of both models.   
7.6.1 Sensitivity to Alternative Cost of Equity Measure 
Table 7.8 reports the results obtained from the regression of CAPM based equity 
risk premium estimates (RP_CM in Table 7.1) on REINSID and other control 
variables. All the findings are consistent with those reported in Table 7.6 under the 
column labelled GLS_HAC. Although the magnitude of the coefficient estimate 
changes, the corresponding signs remain as reported in Table 7.6. All the 
coefficient estimates are in line with expectations, and they are statistically 
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significant (p-value ≤0.10, one-tailed). This result proves that, all else being equal, 
users of reinsurance have a lower cost of equity as compared with insurers not 
using reinsurance. Similarly, larger insurers enjoy a lower cost of equity in 
comparison with their smaller rivals. On the other hand, insurers with higher 
leverage, lower diversification, and higher liquidity correspondingly have to 
contend with a higher equity risk premium and cost of equity. 




Two-tailed Test One-tailed Test 95% Conf. 
Interval Z p-value χ2 p-value 
REINSID -0.03 0.00 -5.86 0.00 34.29 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 
WLEV 0.01 0.01 1.70 0.09 2.88 0.04 0.00 0.02 
WCAP -0.01 0.00 -1.33 0.19 1.76 0.09 -0.01 0.00 
WLIQ 0.00 0.00 1.78 0.08 3.17 0.04 0.00 0.00 
SIZE -0.02 0.00 -13.07 0.00 170.77 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
HINDX 0.05 0.01 8.30 0.00 68.85 0.00 0.04 0.06 
Constant 5.63 0.01 390.89 0.00 - - 5.60 5.66 
Time Effects Yes 
Observations 4897 
Firms 367 
Obs. Per Firm Min 2   Mean 13.34   Max 26 
Diagnostics                 
(1) First Order Autocorrelation Coefficient 
  AR(1) 0.87 
      (2) Wald Test that coefficients are jointly zero 
  χ2(31) 669.49   p-value 0.00       
(Source: Research Data). This table presents the results of the regression of RP_CM on 
REINSID after controlling for other intervening variables. The regression is conducted 
using the GLS method taking into account firm level heteroskedasticity and serial 
autocorrelation. Year dummies are included in the regression to control for time-specific 
effects. Diagnostic tests carried out to test the presence of the first order autocorrelation 
and collective validity of coefficients are also reported. 
Next, the sensitivity of the extent of the reinsurance hypothesis to RP_CM is 
tested. This test shows that the reinsurance volume decision is sensitive to the 
measure of the cost of equity used. A possible reason for this may be that the 
CAPM, being a parametric method of estimating the cost of equity, fails to capture 
the higher moments of the cost of equity distribution, which are priced by the 
market (He and Leland, 1993). This could lead the cost of equity – reinsurance 
ratio relation to potentially become more susceptible to the relatively high values of 
the reinsurance ratio. To test the sensitivity of RP_CM to large values of the 
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Table 7.9: Sensitivity Test – Extent of Reinsurance 
Variable 
Percentile of Reinsurance Ratio 
    25      50     75     100 
WREINS -3.173*** -0.239*** -0.016  0.013 
   (0.314)  (0.073)  (0.025)  (0.013) 
WREINS2  24.050***  0.775***  0.016 -0.035*** 
   (2.850)  (0.252)  (0.046)  (0.013) 
WLEV  0.044**  0.025*  0.016**  0.018*** 
   (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
WCAP -0.002 -0.024*** -0.005  0.000 
   (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
WLIQ  0.003***  0.003***  0.001***  0.000 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
SIZE -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
HINDX -0.011  0.026**  0.045***  0.025*** 
   (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Constant  5.711***  5.600***  5.609***  5.602*** 
   (0.031)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Inflection Point  0.066  0.154  0.500  0.186 
AR(1) Coefficient  0.792  0.800  0.871  0.880 
Time Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1120  2278  3448  4610 
Firms  144  239  310  348 
Observations per Firm 
    Minimum 2 2 2 2 
Average  7.78  9.53  11.12  13.25 
Maximum  23  26  26  26 
(Source: Research Data). This table presents the results of the regression of RP_CM on 
REINS and REINS2 after controlling for other intervening variables. The regression is 
conducted at the 25th, 50th, 75th and 100th percentiles of the reinsurance ratio using the 
GLS method taking into account firm level heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation. 
Year dummies are included in the regression to control for time-specific effects. 
Diagnostic test carried out to test the presence of first order autocorrelation and inflection 
point indicated by coefficients are also reported. Superscripts *, ** and *** denote the 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (two-tail). Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses under the respective parameter estimates. 
reinsurance ratio, the estimation was done at different levels of the reinsurance 
ratio. More specifically, the estimation sample size was progressively increased 
corresponding to the 25th, 50th, 75th and 100th percentiles of reinsurance ratio. 
These estimates are presented in Table 7.9. 
Table 7.9 shows that the RP_CM and reinsurance ratio is not stable across the 
entire estimation sample. At sample sizes corresponding to the 25th and 50th 
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percentiles of the reinsurance ratio, the estimates concur with the results reported 
in the column labelled GLS_HAC of Table 7.7. However, the results corresponding 
to the 75th and 100th percentiles of the reinsurance ratio are different from the 
GLS_HAC results reported in Table 7.7. In fact, the estimates corresponding to the 
full sample, though not statistically significant, indicate an inverted U-shaped 
(concave) relation between RP_CM and the reinsurance ratio. These results make 
it clear that the relation between the cost of equity and the reinsurance ratio is 
indeed susceptible to the larger values of the reinsurance ratio if the cost of the 
equity estimate based on CAPM is used in the regression analysis. 
7.6.2 Sensitivity to Multicollinearity 
As mentioned previously in section 7.4.2, multicollinearity is a potential cause for 
concern in this research. Hence, to establish the validity of coefficient estimates in 
the presence of multicollinearity, five more regressions are run for each of the 
hypotheses. One of the five control variables is absent in each of the five 
regressions. If a reversal in direction (change of sign) or a change in the statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimates is observed in these regressions, then it 
can be seen as evidence for the susceptibility of the results to multicollinearity. 
Panel A of Table 7.10 reports the results for the reinsurance participation model 
(H1), whereas the results related to the reinsurance volume decision model (H2) 
are reported in Panel B. The results obtained confirm that coefficient estimates are 
not severely distorted by multicollinearity. Table 7.10 also confirms that the 
direction and statistical significance of all the relations is robust to multicollinearity. 
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Table 7.10: Sensitivity of the Estimates to Multicollinearity 
Panel A: Decision to Reinsure 
Variable H1_M1 H1_M2 H1_M3 H1_M4 H1_M5 
REINSID -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.037*** -0.034*** 
   (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
WLEV    0.029**  0.022**  0.025**  0.033*** 
  
 
 (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
WCAP -0.006   -0.001 -0.01 -0.003 
   (0.008) 
 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
WLIQ  0.001*** 0.001**    0.002***  0.001*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
SIZE -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020***   -0.025*** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
 (0.002) 
HINDX  0.129***  0.128***  0.132*** 0.157***   
   (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
 Constant  5.807***  5.804***  5.796***  5.587***  5.940*** 
   (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.015)  (0.021) 
 
Panel B: Extent of Reinsurance 
Variable H2_M1 H2_M2 H2_M3 H2_M4 H2_M5 
WREINS -0.095** -0.107*** -0.100*** -0.115*** -0.118*** 
   (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.040) 
WREINS2  0.210***  0.209***  0.207***  0.240***  0.227*** 
   (0.064)  (0.060)  (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.066) 
WLEV    0.030**  0.031**  0.028**  0.032** 
  
 
 (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
WCAP -0.006   -0.005 -0.013 -0.005 
   (0.009) 
 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
WLIQ  0.001** 0.001**    0.002***  0.001** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
SIZE -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022***   -0.029*** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
 (0.002) 
HINDX  0.120***  0.116***  0.120*** 0.138***   
   (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
 Constant  5.783***  5.782***  5.787***  5.558*** 5.938*** 
   (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.015)  (0.019) 
Inflection Point  0.226  0.256  0.242  0.240  0.260 
(Source: Research Data). This table presents the results of regressions testing sensitivity 
of estimates to multicollinearity. Panel A reports the regression results for the decision to 
reinsure model, whereas Panel B is for the reinsurance volume decision. All regressions 
use the GLS method taking into account firm level heteroskedasticity, serial 
autocorrelation and time-specific effects. One variable out of five control variables is 
absent from each of five regression estimates. Superscripts *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (two-tail). Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses under the respective parameter estimates. 
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7.7 Endogeneity and IV estimation 
As mentioned in section 6.6.2 of this thesis, the cost of equity and reinsurance, 
being elements of the capital structure of an insurer raises concerns about 
potential endogeneity. Based on suggestions made in the econometric literature, 
such as Wooldridge (2002) and Greene (2003), the IV estimation was identified in 
section 6.7 to mitigate the issue of variable endogeneity. The results of 2SLS 
regressions based on the IV approach are presented in this section. Both the 
stages use the GLS estimation for controlling both heteroskedasticity and serial 
autocorrelation in the panel dataset. Table 7.11 presents the results of the first-
stage regressions, which are used to predict the values of the reinsurance ratio. All 
the instruments used to predict reinsurance are found to be significant at the 5% 
level (one-tailed as well as two-tailed). The Chi-square test of endogeneity rejects 
the null of no endogeneity at the 5% level of significance. Thus, IV estimation is 
indeed required. Moreover, the centred R-squared value of 0.33 indicates a good 
fit between the predictors and the reinsurance ratio. The F-test too provides strong 
support for the joint validity of the coefficient estimates. The values of the 
reinsurance ratio predicted following the first stage regression, named PREINS, 
range from a minimum of 0.006 to a maximum of 0.75. The respective mean and 
median values of PREINS at 0.27 and 0.25 are close to the mean and median 
values of the reinsurance ratio reported in Table 7.1. The variation in PREINS with 
a standard deviation of 0.14 is approximately half of that observed for REINS. 
However, similar to REINS, within-firm variation in PREINS is lower than the 
between-firm variation.  
In the second-stage of the IV estimation, the equity risk premium is regressed on 
the predicted values of the reinsurance ratio along with other control variables. To 
establish the sensitivity of the risk premium – reinsurance ratio relation, the 
regression is conducted at different sample sizes based on the 25th, 50th and 75th 
and 100th percentiles of PREINS. The results obtained employ the GLS method 
and control for heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation.  These are reported in 
Table 7.12. These results confirm that the cost of equity–reinsurance ratio relation
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Table 7.11: IV Estimation – First-Stage Results 
(Source: Research Data). This table presents the first stage results of two stage IV 
estimations to control for endogeneity. The regression uses the Newey and West (1987) 
method taking into account firm level heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation. 
Diagnostic tests carried out to test the presence of endogeneity, joint validity of 
coefficients and goodness of fit are also reported. 
is of quadratic form albeit susceptible to extreme values of reinsurance ratio. As 
expected, the coefficient estimate for PREINS and its squared term are 
respectively negative and positive at all percentiles of PREINS. Moreover, the 
coefficient estimates follow the patterns reported in sections 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 
above. For example, leverage is positively and significantly related to the equity 
risk premium across all the samples. Similarly, liquidity is positively related to risk 
premium in all the regressions. The coefficient estimates for firm size 
corresponding to the 50th and higher percentiles are consistent in magnitude, 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The points of inflection 
corresponding to the estimated coefficients related to the 25th, 50th and 75th 
percentiles too are in the vicinity of those reported in sections 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6. 
First-order serial correlation coefficients are also of comparable magnitudes 




Two-tailed Test One-tailed Test 95% Conf. 
Interval Z p-value χ2 p-value 
WRESERR -0.037 0.02 -2.00 0.05 3.99 0.02 -0.07 0.00 
ROA -0.292 0.05 -5.66 0.00 32.00 0.00 -0.39 -0.19 
CTAX 0.023 0.01 2.03 0.04 4.12 0.02 0.00 0.05 
WLEV 0.684 0.03 22.13 0.00 489.88 0.00 0.62 0.74 
WCAP 0.156 0.02 6.47 0.00 41.92 0.00 0.11 0.20 
WLIQ 0.009 0.00 5.35 0.00 28.60 0.00 0.01 0.01 
SIZE -0.023 0.00 -8.75 0.00 76.59 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 
HINDX -0.238 0.02 -14.14 0.00 200.08 0.00 -0.27 -0.20 
Constant 0.391 0.04 9.6 0.00 - - 0.31 0.47 
Time Effects Yes 
Observations 3054 
Firms 250 
Diagnostics                 
(1) Chi-square test for presence of endogeneity under null of no endogeneity 
  χ2(1) 4.25 
 
p-value 0.04 
   (2) Wald Test that coefficients are jointly zero 
  F(32, 3021) 36.95 
 
p-value 0.00 
   (3) R-squared statistic for goodness of fit 
  Centred 0.33   Uncentred 0.70     
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Table 7.12: IV Estimation – Second-Stage Results 
Variable 
Percentile of Reinsurance Ratio 
    25     50     75    100 
PREINS -0.556 -0.482** -0.380*** -0.070 
   (0.355)  (0.191)  (0.127)  (0.073) 
PREINS2  0.945  0.912  0.694**  0.032 
   (1.737)  (0.586)  (0.280)  (0.087) 
WLEV  0.337***  0.201***  0.110*  0.096** 
   (0.104)  (0.069)  (0.056)  (0.041) 
WCAP -0.044 -0.019 -0.017 -0.008 
   (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.011) 
WLIQ  0.011***  0.004**  0.005***  0.001 
   (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
SIZE  0.004 -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.029*** 
   (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
HINDX  0.297***  0.096*** -0.016  0.006 
   (0.053)  (0.035)  (0.028)  (0.021) 
Constant  5.237***  5.720***  5.777***  5.801*** 
   (0.118)  (0.076)  (0.062)  (0.051) 
Inflection Point  0.294  0.264  0.274  1.094 
AR(1) Coefficient  0.81  0.86  0.88  0.90 
Time Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  730  1490  2265  3039 
Firms  112  170  221  250 
Observations per Firm 
    Minimum 2 2 2 2 
Average  6.52  8.76  10.25  12.16 
Maximum  25  25  25  25 
(Source: Research Data). This table presents the second stage results of the two stage IV 
estimation to control for endogeneity. The regression is conducted using sample sizes 
based on maximum values of the predicted values of the reinsurance ratio restricted to the 
25th, 50th, 75th and 100th percentiles PREINS. The regressions use the GLS method taking 
into account firm level heteroskedasticity, serial autocorrelation and time specific effects. 
The diagnostic test carried out to test the presence of a serial autocorrelation is also 
reported. Superscripts *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively (two-tail). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under 
the respective parameter estimates. 
7.8 Conclusions 
This chapter tests the cost of equity – reinsurance relation using two hypotheses 
and five control variables formulated in Chapter 4 using a panel dataset from 386 
firms operating in the UK’s non-life insurance market from 1985-2010. The 
empirical results obtained from the statistical procedures described in sections 6.6 
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and 6.7 of Chapter 6 are reported and discussed in this chapter. Both the 
hypotheses forwarded in Chapter 4 are supported by the empirical results 
presented in this chapter. The equity risk premium is found to be lower for users of 
reinsurance compared with non-users. It is also found that the cost of equity 
increases with an increase in leverage, and liquidity-risk. On the other hand, the 
risk premium is lower for firms that are larger, have a greater capacity to 
underwrite new business, and are more diversified in product-markets. These 
findings provide support for the idea that reinsurance (risk management) is a 
value-added activity in terms of risk reduction (lower equity risk premium).  
The regression analysis conducted to test the reinsurance volume decision model 
reveals that the equity risk premium and reinsurance ratio have a quadratic 
relation which graphically is U-shaped (convex). Apart from this, the results 
corresponding to control variables show respective relations to be in predicted 
directions, proving that the control variables included in the study influence the 
cost of equity. These findings add support to the trade-off, pecking order and 
agency cost based arguments behind the theory of optimal capital structure. 
Moreover, these results prove that reinsurance is a key component of the capital 
structure of an insurance company, and that risk management and capital 
structure decisions are intertwined. The main conclusions of this study and 




 CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER 8.
8.1 Introduction 
A summary of the thesis and its key findings are presented in this final chapter of 
the thesis. Section 8.1 begins by providing an overview of the research objectives 
and follows it by restating the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of this 
study. Section 8.2 summarises the key empirical results obtained using the 
statistical analysis. Section 8.3 considers the main conclusions and implications of 
the study. The limitations of the study and prospective areas for future research 
are discussed in section 8.4.   
8.2 Project Overview 
The value-added realised by corporate hedging has been an issue of debate in the 
academic finance literature. Explanations based on an assumption of efficient 
financial markets conclude that corporate hedging is a non-value-added activity, 
as shareholders can diversify away the firm-specific risks on their own accord by 
holding balanced portfolios of investment. On the other hand, inefficient financial 
markets engender frictional costs (such as financial distress and bankruptcy costs) 
which can be mitigated by risk management. This makes financial hedging a 
value-added activity. There are two channels through which financial hedging 
could increase the traded value of a firm. First, risk management can stabilise 
and/or increase future cash flows by minimising frictional costs, resulting in a 
higher traded value. Second, it can reduce the perceived riskiness of a firm, 
resulting in a lower cost of capital. The first channel has been investigated in many 
studies (e.g., see Mayers and Smith, 1990; Nance et al., 1993; Plantin, 2006; Zou, 
2010), whereas the second channel has hitherto remained insufficiently explored 
in the academic literature. Research on the relation between the cost of equity and 
corporate risk management is even scarcer in the case of financial intermediaries 
such as insurers. One key constraint in pursuing such research is a lack of 
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sufficient data to conduct meaningful analyses. However, this limitation is 
overcome in the case of the UK’s insurance industry because of the legal 
obligation imposed on insurers to report the purchase of reinsurance in their 
annual statutory reports. Motivated by the dearth of empirical evidence on the 
effect of corporate financial hedging on the cost of equity, especially in the case of 
financial intermediaries, this study thus attempts to investigate the aforementioned 
relation in the UK non-life insurance market. Specifically, two main research 
questions are addressed: 
 Does reinsurance influence an insurer’s cost of equity capital? 
 If it does, then to what extent does reinsurance impact on an insurer’s cost 
of equity capital?  
The UK’s non-life insurance market is a well-developed large international 
insurance market with a long history and homogenous regulations. Non-life 
insurance industry regulations in the UK are targeted at maintaining the 
confidence of the investors and protecting the rights of the customers. However, 
this does not result in regulatory requirements intervening with the industry’s 
capability to innovate and introduce new products onto the market. Such a unitary 
regulatory/fiscal regime reduces the possibility of biases being induced by 
variations in State-based regulatory practices relating to premium rate regulation 
and taxation. Moreover, the greater prevalence of reinsurance in the non-life 
compared with the life sector of the insurance market, and independence of 
managerial decisions to purchase reinsurance from statutory requirements further 
facilitate prospectively ‘cleaner’ tests of the proposed research questions in the 
context of the UK non-life insurance market. Furthermore, the availability of a 
reasonably long time-series of data (1985-2010) makes statistical analysis robust 
to time-specific macroeconomic events. Chapter 2 of this thesis provides details of 
the key institutional features of the UK’s property-liability insurance market.  
A critique of positive-descriptive theories in the financial economics literature that 
are relevant in addressing the two aforementioned research questions is 
presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis. This review led to the identification of the 
theory of optimal capital structure as the most appropriate and viable framework 
within which to guide the empirical analysis to be carried out (see Chapter 3, 
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section 3.3.). Two key hypotheses regarding the linkage between the cost of 
equity and reinsurance were then put forward in Chapter 4 (section 4.4) based on 
a framework drawn from the theory of optimal capital structure. Subsequently, 
after a careful review of various cost of equity metrics in Chapter 5, the R-L model 
(Leland, 1999; Rubinstein, 1976) and the CAPM (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964) 
were selected as the appropriate cost of equity models to be employed in the 
context of this study. The selection of these models is also influenced by the data 
constraints as described in Chapter 6 (section 6.4). 
Justification for the use of the statistical analysis, which is scientifically rigorous 
and produces generalizable results, is provided in Chapter 6 (section 6.2). The 
data used for empirical analysis were obtained from Standards & Poor’s 
“SynThesys Non-Life Insurance” database, which provides the returns submitted 
to the UK regulatory authorities by UK-licensed insurance companies. The 
sampling procedure detailed in Chapter 6 (section 6.3) resulted in a panel dataset 
comprising 386 UK-based non-life insurers over the twenty-six years 1985-2010. 
The method of regression analysis described in Newey and West (1987) is 
employed in this study to test empirically the two main hypotheses put forward in 
this research project. This method controls for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
serial autocorrelation, which might be present in the data. Moreover, to account for 
time-specific events, year-dummies are also included in the regression analysis. 
The empirical results obtained are reported in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
Furthermore, a battery of sensitivity and robustness tests was employed to 
ascertain the robustness of statistical results to endogeneity and multicollinearity. 
Overall, the two research hypotheses are supported by the empirical evidence 
presented in this study. The main conclusions and implications arising from the 
data analysis reported in Chapter 7 are now presented in the following section 8.3. 
8.3 Main Conclusions and Implications 
The linkage between risk management and the capital structure of a firm has been 
examined in several academic studies (e.g., see Froot et al., 1993; Froot and 
Stein, 1998; Leland, 1998; Stulz, 1996). These studies argue that risk 
management enables companies to optimise their capital structure by stabilising 
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future cash flows and/or minimising frictional costs. The current study examines 
the role played by reinsurance in determining the cost of equity finance in the UK 
non-life insurance sector. Following is a discussion of the main conclusions drawn 
from the empirical analysis conducted in this project.  
The first main conclusion drawn from the analysis carried out is that the use of 
reinsurance seems to be well explained by optimal capital structure theory-based 
arguments. The empirical results obtained in this study support the proposed 
hypothesis that users of reinsurance in the UK non-life insurance markets have a 
comparatively lower cost of equity than their counterparts without any reinsurance 
cover. This could reflect that investors in the UK’s non-life (property-liability) 
insurance market incorporate the risk reduction achieved by diversification through 
reinsurance in their return expectations. Reinsurance can also reduce agency 
incentive conflicts between shareholders and managers, thus aligning managers’ 
interests with that of the shareholders. These factors can result in shareholders 
demanding lower returns for their investment because they perceive a well-
reinsured insurer to be a lower risk investment capable of producing the required 
rate of return with a higher degree of probability. 
As predicted by the ‘reinsurance volume decision’ hypothesis (H2), the study finds 
that there is a non-linear convex (U-shaped) relation between the extent of 
reinsurance use and the UK-based non-life insurers’ cost of equity. This result 
accords with the theoretical predictions made in Froot (2007) and Froot and Stein 
(1998) which suggest that risk management remains a value-added activity unless 
the associated costs exceed the cost of the risk of loss being mitigated. This result 
is also in line with the empirical findings of Purnanandam (2008) which hint at the 
existence of optimal capital structure, and that of Zou (2010) which show that the 
relation between the extent of property insurance use and the firm value is 
graphically concave (i.e., an inverted U-shape). The results reported in Table 7.7 
suggest that the inflection point occurs approximately at the 50th percentile of the 
sample of firms. This statistic shows that for about half of the non-life insurance 
firms, which cede less than or equal to a quarter of their gross premiums written, 
reinsurance results in a reduced cost of equity; whereas for the other half, 
reinsurance drives-up the cost of equity. This observation implies that the prudent 
use of reinsurance can lower the cost of equity for insurers by providing surety of 
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return. On the other hand, excess reinsurance can result in the cost of reinsurance 
exceeding its benefits (in terms of lowering of frictional costs), which in turn 
increases the cost of equity for insurers. This finding also indicates that 
reinsurance is an important instrument at an insurer’s disposal to achieve an 
optimal capital structure in inefficient financial markets. 
Empirical results obtained for the control variables used in this study are mixed in 
regards to consistency with prior empirical research and finance theory. As 
predicted, leverage and liquidity are found to be positively related to the cost of 
equity across a majority of the estimators employed in this study. It is well 
documented in the academic finance literature that leverage increases the 
riskiness of a firm and leads to an increase in the cost of equity. Further, an 
observed positive relation between liquidity and the cost of equity adds weight to 
the argument made by Borde et al. (1994) that insurers holding a greater 
proportion of liquid assets (such as cash) tend to make riskier investment choices. 
In line with expectations, insurers having more capital resources relative to their 
stated liabilities tend to have a lower cost of equity, as higher capital levels 
improve investors’ confidence that the insurance firm is likely to be a going 
concern. Similarly, a greater level of product market diversification leads to a lower 
cost of equity for UK-based non-life insurers, as the coefficient estimate 
corresponding to the variable used as an inverse proxy for product diversification 
is positive. Mixed results are obtained in regards to relation between firm size and 
cost of equity. However, a negative relation is found between firm size and the 
cost of equity in two out of three estimators for which this relation is statistically 
significant. This finding suggests that large non-life insurance firms are perceived 
by investors to be less risky than smaller firms because larger firms tend to be 
more diversified, both in terms of geography as well as in the range of products 
that they sell. Moreover, larger non-life insurance firms tend to have more 
resources at their disposal than smaller entities. All these factors result in relatively 
lower costs of equity capital for larger insurers.  
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8.4 Contribution of the Research 
New insights into the reinsurance-cost of equity relation in the UK non-life 
insurance sector are provided by this research project. The study contributes to 
the existing insurance and finance literature by generating regulatory/practical 
implications in at least following four important regards: 
This study is believed to be the first to provide empirical evidence on the impact of 
reinsurance purchase on the cost of the equity of an insurer. The findings of this 
research provide useful insights for assessing a firm’s future profitability, riskiness 
and market value. The empirical evidence provided by this study suggests that 
investors take account of reinsurance purchased in assessing risks associated 
with an insurer’s business, and thus in pricing its securities. Managers can also 
use this information to optimise the capital structure of their respective employers 
resulting in the minimisation of the prospective cost of equity, and other frictional 
costs arising due to market imperfections. Moreover, an optimal reinsurance (risk 
management) policy can reduce the level of retained share capital resulting in the 
maximisation of reported returns on equity. This insight could help policyholders 
and shareholders to make better informed choice decisions and potentially assist 
regulators to design and develop capital maintenance rules. 
Most previous studies have focussed on financial derivatives while attempting to 
explain the impact of risk management on firm value (e.g., see Allayannis and 
Weston, 2001; Gay et al., 2011; Géczy et al., 1997; Haushalter et al., 2007). 
Moreover, derivatives’ data are not only ‘noisy’ and difficult to interpret, but may 
not be able to completely eliminate the risk exposure (Haushalter, 2000). In 
contrast the current study focuses on reinsurance which not only is a pure 
indemnity contract, but provides a prospectively rich and publicly available (in the 
case of the UK) dataset to use in this research project. Therefore, this study 
provides cleaner evidence for the cost of equity – risk management relation within 
the UK non-life insurance market because of the ‘pure-hedge’ nature of 
reinsurance and the sufficiently large dataset employed to test the hypotheses. In 
this regard, the study provides a ‘solid’ basis for further academic research on the 
role of corporate hedging and its impact on the market value of firms. This could 
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be of interest to investors, financial analysts, and credit rating agencies amongst 
others. 
Since investment financing and risk management decisions are inextricably bound, 
it is imperative to control for endogeneity induced by such a relationship. This 
study tests the cost of the equity – reinsurance relation using a battery of tests to 
ensure the validity of the results. Moreover, the IV is employed to check the 
robustness of the results. Another factor that adds to the reliability of the results 
obtained in this study is the fact that the UK insurance market operates under a 
unitary regulatory/fiscal regime. Not only this, the absence of premium rate 
regulation and regulator imposed purchase of reinsurance alleviates the possible 
effects of bias induced by such regulatory practices. This is because reinsurance 
purchase decisions and premium ratemaking (including reinsurance premiums) in 
the UK non-life insurance market are free managerial choices. Accordingly, the 
results of this research are unlikely to be unduly confounded by regulatory effects. 
This attribute furthers the potential contribution of this research project as a 
potential benchmark for future academic inquiry. 
 
It is also believed that this study is the first to combine the full information beta 
method of Kaplan and Peterson (1998) with the non-parametric method of equity 
beta estimation described in Wen et al. (2008) to arrive at a firm-level equity risk 
premia. This is a novel technique for the cost of equity estimation that 
encompasses all organisational forms and accounts for all the ‘moments’ of the 
return distribution. This allows the cost of equity estimates to incorporate all the 
risk factors priced by investors while maximising the sample size. Therefore, this 
method is considered to be superior to other common asset pricing models such 
as the CAPM. As a result, it is considered that the present study makes a 
prospectively useful methodological contribution to the literature. 
8.5 Limitations of the Study 
Inferences drawn from this study are subject to certain inherent limitations, and 
should be interpreted as such. Although every possible care has been taken to 
minimise their impact, their influence on the results of this study must be 
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acknowledged. The first limitation arises because data unavailability eliminated the 
use of the valuation-based cost of equity metrics in this research. As most of the 
firms in the estimation sample are not publicly traded, the valuation based cost of 
the equity measures relying on a long time series of analysts’ forecasts had to be 
ruled out. These metrics have been reported to correspond better with firm specific 
risk factors in comparison with asset pricing-based models such as the CAPM 
(e.g., see Botosan and Plumlee, 2002).  
Second, the regulatory changes that have taken place during the study period 
have altered the format of the statutory returns filed by the insurers. The data 
provider (Standard & Poor’s) has mapped the information in returns with the old 
format into the new format with due diligence, but few newly introduced data items 
are not available for years prior to the implementation of these changes. This 
limitation has been overcome by combining the new data items to synthesize the 
same information as presented solvency reports with the old format. Therefore, 
this limitation is unlikely to adversely influence the main inferences drawn from this 
study. 
Third, the UK’s non-life insurance sector has seen some merger and acquisition 
activity over the period of this study. To account for changes in the risk profiles of 
firms brought about by these activities, firms that underwent any major 
merger/acquisition are treated as different entities pre-and-post merger. This 
treatment is assumed to sufficiently address the issue of change in risk profiles of 
insurers undergoing a merger/acquisition.   
Finally, as is the case with any study concentrating on the UK non-life insurance 
sector, the results of this study may not be completely generalisable to other 
jurisdictions/countries with different regulatory and market structures. Any effort to 
generalise these results to different contexts should therefore be tempered by 
considering the impact on the reinsurance – cost of equity relation of the 
institutional features of the respective environment. 
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8.6 Areas for Future Research 
The results presented in the current study hint at some prospective areas for 
future research. First, the current study can be enhanced by incorporating other 
potentially relevant variables subject to data availability. For example, future 
research could explore the differences in the effect of different types of 
reinsurance treaties on the cost of equity, and firm value. Moreover, a comparison 
between the impact of hedging on the cost of equity through different techniques 
such as financial derivatives and insurance can help identify the optimal mix of 
financial risk management techniques to achieve risk management policy 
objectives. Further, variations in the impact of financial hedging across the 
different lines of insurance can also advance our understanding of the relation 
between risk management, cost of equity and firm value.  
Second, alternative metrics, such as mark-to-market accounting-based cost of 
equity estimation models, could be employed in any future research to test the 
relation between the cost of equity and reinsurance. Due to the absence of a 
universally accepted cost of equity estimation model, it is imperative that any study 
investigating the relation between reinsurance and the cost of equity uses more 
than one estimate of the cost of equity to establish the robustness of estimates. 
Third, future research could explore the risk management-cost of equity relation in 
other industrial sectors such as banking. Although the results from the current 
study are not directly applicable to non-insurance industrial sectors, they can 
nonetheless provide a broad framework within which the cost of equity-risk 
management relation can be analysed.  
Fourth, the findings of the current study can be complemented by examining the 
link between risk management decisions and the dispersion of corporate share 
holdings. For example, future research could examine whether 
ownership/diversification influences risk/hedging decisions in particular ways. It is 
important because firms with a more diversified and larger investor base are 




8.7 Final Remarks 
Many stakeholders including investors, managers and regulators attach 
considerable importance to corporate risk management and its effect on firm 
value. Substantial academic research has been conducted in this area, but 
consensus regarding the impact of financial hedging on firm value remains elusive. 
However, much of this research has attempted to analyse the impact of financial 
risk management (hedging) on firm value either by concentrating on the overall 
market value of the firm or by focusing on its impact on a firm’s cash flows. This 
study enriches the extant literature by investigating the effect of corporate hedging 
on the cost of the equity of non-life (property-liability) insurers, an important 
determinant of a firm’s traded value. By focusing on insurance companies this 
study also addresses the dearth of research in the field of risk management of 
financial intermediaries. Despite its limitations, the study makes a potentially 
important contribution to the finance and risk management literature by 
demonstrating that the cost of equity-reinsurance relation in the case of insurance 
companies is non-linear. The theory of optimal capital structure also finds support 
from the empirical evidence presented in this study, suggesting that financial 
markets are indeed inefficient. These insights can lead to better informed decision-
making by managers, investors, policyholders, insurers and other stakeholders 
such as credit rating agencies. Finally, this study provides a basis for further 
research that investigates the impact of risk management on firm value through 
different channels (e.g., financial derivatives) and extends the applicability of this 
research across different sectors of the economy (e.g., the banking sector). 
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 APPENDIX A 
 Using the Bootstrap Method for Estimating Industry Betas 
Calculation of industry-level annual betas using the bootstrap method in this study 
entails a six step process. Following are the steps involved in this process: 
1. First, the degree of risk aversion parameter ‘b’ is calculated for each month 
as described in equation 5.13 of Chapter 5. This equation utilises monthly 
returns on non-life insurance sector index (FTSE 350 Non-Life Insurance 
Index) and the market index (FTSE All-Share Index) to calculate this 
parameter.  
2. Next, the median of monthly values of risk aversion parameter ‘b’ calculated 
in step 1 is estimated to represent the risk aversion parameter in 
subsequent calculations. 
3. The bootstrap method as employed in this study involves randomly 
selecting returns, with replacement, from the full sample of actual monthly 
returns at market and industry level respectively to generate a series each 
of market and industry returns of the same sample size as the original data. 
4. The median value of risk aversion estimated in step 2 is then used in 
conjunction with returns’ series constructed in step 3 to generate an 
industry level beta estimate as per equation 5.14 of Chapter 5.  
5. Steps 3 and 4 are then repeated a desired number of times (1560 in this 
study) to generate a sufficiently long series of beta estimates.  
6. Next, the average of the first sixty beta estimates obtained in step 5 is 
assumed to represent the true beta for the year 1985, and the mean of the 
next sixty estimates for the year 1986 and so on to get 26 estimates of beta 
corresponding to each year from 1985 to 2010. 
The annual beta estimates obtained above are then used to estimate product-
market level betas, leading on to firm level beta estimates, as explained in section 





 APPENDIX B 
 Calculation of Reserving Errors Using the KFS Method 
The calculation of reserving errors using the KFS method (see section 6.7) can 
best be explained by using an example. As noted in section 6.7 of Chapter 6, the 
following equation is used by the KFS method in calculating reserving errors: 
nti,ti,ti, Losses IncurredLosses IncurredError Reserve   
Subscripts ‘i’ and ‘t’ in the above equation denote firm and year respectively. For 
simplicity, the following explanation omits subscript ‘i’, and focusses on loss 
development for a single firm over time. Incurred losses in ‘x’ most recent accident 
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In this study the losses incurred in the two most recent years in the past (i.e., x=2) 
have been used to calculate incurred losses. Incurred losses corresponding to 

















ntj,nt Paid Claims NetClaims IBNRClaims ReportedLosses Incurred
1
 
This study sets n=1, i.e. losses corresponding to year ‘t’ to ‘t-2’ are calculated in 
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